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Summary: 
This thesis examines the legal status of the United Nations 
Council for Namibia and the validity of its actions before 
and after the independence of the Territory with special 
emphasis on its Decree No 1. Chapter I describes the 
natural environment of Namibia, its human resources and 
economic conditions. These are basic to the interpretation 
and evaluation of the policies concerning administration 
and development of the Territory. 
The problem of Namibia in the UN is analysed in 
Chapter II. All organs of the Organisation, the GA, the SC, 
and the ICJ found that South Africa's presence in Namibia 
was illegal and that South Africa had no right to 
administer the Territory. As a result the UN terminated 
South Africa's Mandate over Namibia and established the 
UNCfN (as a subsidiary organ of the GA irt terms of art 22 
of the Charter). This body then administered the Territory 
until its independence in March 1990. 
Because UNCfN was a unique institution in the history 
of the Organisation, and because of the Council's uncertain 
legal status, Chapter IV examines the legal character of 
the Council and concludes that UNCfN had legitimate powers 
over the Territory (even with regard to foreign affairs). 
In its capacity as administering authority, UNCfN, on 27 
September 1974, issued Decree No 1 for the protection of 
the natural resources of Namibia. The legal force of this 
Decree in international law before and after independence 
is the focus of discussion in Chapter V. 
With regard of the validity of this Decree before 
independence, an examination of the practice of states 
showes that almost all Member States of the UN denied the 
Decree binding force in international law. To hold 
otherwise would imply that the Council could create 
international legal obligations for UN Members, thereby 
giving the Council greater powers than those of a sovereign 
government. Because the Decree is an act of the Namibian 
Government (following its incorporation into the Namibian 
Constitition), the validity of Decree No 1 after 
independence is discussed in terms of the principles 
governing observance of foreign acts of state. The finding 
is that other states are free to recognise paras 1 and 3 
(as self-executing acts) or execute paras 4 and 5 (as non-
self-executing acts). The observance of para 2 of _the 
Decree as an illegal act of state in international law 
depends on the approach of the state concerned to the act 
of state doctrine. Continental states adhere to territorial 
principle, and so they usually deny the validity of illegal 
foreign acts, whereas Anglo-American jurisdictions refuse 
to examine foreign acts in terms of their compliance with 
international law. Because of the confusion surrounding the 
judicial use and proper scope of the doctrine, however, one 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On 31 January 1989, the GA declared 21 March 1990 as 
independence day for Namibia1, a premiere not only for the 
new State but for the United Nations as well. 
By Res 652 of 17 April 1990 the SC recommended that 
the GA approve Namibia's application to become a member of 
the Organisation, and on 23 April 1990 Namibia was admitted 
as the 160th member of the UN, the world's youngest 
independent State. 
These acts resolved one of the most complex problems 
of modern international law, especially the law of 
internatfonal organisations. Since the establishment of the 
Organisation in 1945, the UN and its organs have been 
involved in the situation in southern Africa. Political, 
economic and humanitarian problems and conflicts were on 
the agenda of almost every plenary meeting of the UN. More 
than 150 GA and more than 30 SC resolutions and 
declarations referred directly to the problem of Namibia. 2 
This problem has been the subject of six appearances before 
2 
The name Namibia, established by the GA Res 2372 
(XXII) of 12 June 1968, is taken from the Namib 
Desert (which is in the Territory). The name South 
West Africa, which was used in the older 
literature, will also occur, depending on the 
context. The use of one name or the other should 
not be construed as a judgment on the status on 
the Territory before independence. 
See for a survey M Nzuwah 'United Nations 
decisions on Southern Africa' (1979) 4 Journal of 
SA Affairs 187-210. 
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the ICJ; 3 and without doubt it has prompted more 
resolutions and produced more juridical decisions than any 
other matter to come before the UN. 
The situation in Namibia before independence seemed to 
be no more than conflict between the UN and South Africa, 
one of the last problems of decolonialisation. But this 
conflict was only part of a much larger issue: the conflict 
between the western industrial countries and the developing 
countries of the Third World. This issue was intensified by 
the economic and strategic importance of Namibia. 4 The 
Territory has a great variety of mineral deposits, 
including diamonds, lead/zinc, copper, bauxite, salt and, 
of a particular importance, uranium (5 per cent of the 
world production). Besides this there are rich marine 
resources in the 1400 km coastal waters, which are one of 
the greatest fishing grounds in the world. 5 The 
exploitation of Namibian natural resources was conducted 
almost exclusively by South Africa or by European and North 





See II (3) below, which deals with the ICJ 
Opinions of 1950, 1952 and 1971 and judgments of 
1962 and 1966. 
UNCfN, Report of the UN International Conference 
in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People 
for Independence Paris 25 - 29 April 1983 UN-Doc 
A/Conf 120/8 1 seq. 
See Report UNCfN GAOR 42nd Sess Suppl No 24 vol I 
§§ 511 seq. 
UNCfN, Report on the Activities of Foreign 
Economic interests in Namibia of 25 April 1984 UN-
Doc A/AC/131/115. 
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On 27 October 1966 the UN adopted Res 2145 (XXI), in 
which it revoked South Africa's Mandate over South West 
Africa and simultaneously designated South West Africa as a 
territory having international status. (The UN decided, 
that the Territory should maintain this status until it 
achieved independence). By these acts the UN laid the 
foundation-stone of a UN-administration for Namibia, which 
until independence was exercised by the United Nations 
Council for Namibia. 7 
Undeterred by the potential constitutional and legal 
problems raised by the creation of the UNCfN, 8 the Council 
for Namibia demanded the right to act for the Territory, 
even in international relations. It entered into 
international agreements on behalf of the Territory, 
applied for membership of international organisations and 
participated in many international conferences. 
On 27 September 1974 the UNCfN adopted Decree No 1 for 
the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia. This 
Decree was probably the Council's most important and most 
controversial act during its term of office. Few questions 
have given rise to as much confusion as the legal nature 
7 
8 
The UNCfN was constituted by GA Res 2248 (S-V) of 
19 June 1967, first as the United Nations Council 
for South West Africa; after GA Res 2372 (XXII) of 
12 June 1968 (which established Namibia as the 
official name for the Territory) it changed its 
name. 
See GA Res 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967. The vote on 
this Resolution was 85 to 2, with 30 abstentions. 
The large number of abstentions, and the fact that 
all major powers except China abstained, shows the 
controversial nature of this decision. 
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and character of Decree No 1, and even the Commissioner for 
Namibia himself characterised the Decree as a 'new and 
strange legal concept'. 9 
It is the aim of this thesis to: clarify the legal 
character of the United Nations Council for Namibia; 
determine the international legal validity of the Council's 
decrees; decide whether such decrees are binding on the new 
state of Namibia. The major object of research in this 
connection will be Decree No 1, spec~fically its legal 
nature and character and its binding force on Member States 
of the UN before independence as well as its legal force in 
the internal laws of Namibia's trading partners after 
independence. 
(1) Namibia - geographic, ethnic, and economic 
conditions 10 
(a) Geographical features 
The Territory of Namibia lies on the Atlantic seaboard of 
the south-western portion of Africa. The Territory 
9 
10 
Report of the Commissioner for Namibia on the 
implementation of Decree No 1 UN-Doc A/AC/131/81 
of 18 July 1980. 
In my opinion the three factors of natural 
environment, human resources and their inter-
relationship and economic conditions are basic to 
the interpretation of conditions and future policy 
in Namibia and cardinal to an evaluation of any 
policy of administration and development in the 
Territory. 
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stretches from the southern border of Angola to the north-
western border of the Republic of South Africa, and from 
the Atlantic Ocean in the West to the western border of 
Botswana in the East. 
Namibia has an area of 824 269 sq km (318 261 sq 
miles), including the area of Walvis Bay (measuring 1 124 
sq km or 437 sq miles), which is a part of the Republic of 
South Africa administered by its Government in Pretoria. 11 
The Territory constitutes nearly 3 per cent of the total 
area of Africa, while its population amounts to only 0,2 
per cent of the total population of the Continent. With the 
exception of Botswana, it has the lowest population density 
south of the Sahara, 12 and one of the lowest population 
density figures in the world. 13 
Topographically, the Territory can be divided into 
three separate regions: the Namib, the Central Plateau and 
the Kalahari. The western area between the escarpment and 
the coast is known as the Namib. It is an extremely arid 
and desolate region stretching along the entire coastline 
Of the Territory. The lateral width of the area varies from 




J Putz, P Caplan & H von Egidy Namibia Handbook 
and Political Who's Who 13. 
1962 UN Statistical Yearbook 24-5. 
UN statistical Yearbook op cit 21-39. The popula-
tion density is less than one person per square 
kilometre. For purposes of comparison, the fo\-
lowing population densities per square kilometre 
have been extracted from the same source: Liberia, 
12; Ethiopia, 17; United States of America, 20; 
the Netherlands, 346. 
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the total land area of Namibia. It consists mainly of vast 
plains of constantly moving sand and low mountains. 
Practically the whole population of this region, being less 
than 6 per cent of Namibia's population, is concentrated in 
four coastal urban areas (Swakopmund, Walvis Bay, Luderitz 
and Oranjemund). The Central Plateau is an area lying to 
the east of the Namib. It also stretches all the way from 
North to South. It varies in altitude from between 1 000 to 
2 000 m, and in itself offers a diversified landscape of 
rugged mountains, sand-filled valleys and softly ~ndulating 
plains. It covers slightly more than 50 per cent of.the 
land area of the Territory. Finally, the Kalahari covers 
the eastern, north-eastern and northern areas of Namibia. 
It is mainly an area of monotonous plains covered by sand 
dunes, which, in contrast to those of the Namib, are 
covered with vegetation. The main problem confronting 
present and tuture exploitation of the Kalahari region is 
not an inadequate rainfall, but the lack of surface water 
(ground water is sometimes so deep as to be economically 
unexploitable). 
(b) Population 
The exact population and its structure is disputed. 
Particular estimates depend on the political point of view 
of the person computing the figures. Following recent 
Namibian estimates, the total population of the Territory 
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can be calculated at 1 184 ooo. 14 Following a South 
African projection, however, based on a census of 1970, the 
total population should have been about 1 ooo 000 in 1985, 
composed of 84 per cent Blacks, 5 per cent Coloureds and 11 
per · cent Whites. 15 
The most recent figures emanating from Namibia 
indicate that the total population is 1 200 ooo, composed 
of 87 per cent Blacks, 6 per cent Coloureds and 7 per cent 
Whites. 16 In this context one must appreciate that the 
population of Namibia is, and has been for centuries, a 
heterogenous one. 17 The main population groups - differing 
widely in appearance, ethnic stock, nations of origin, 
culture, language and general level of development18 - are 
(in order of their size): the Ovambo (587 000); the Kavango 
(110 000); the Herera, also known as Cattle Damara or 
Damara of the Plain (89 000); the Dama, also known as 
Bergdama or Damara of the Hills (88 000); the European or 
White population group, mainly of South African and German 
origin (78 000); the Nama, also known as Khoi or Hottentots 






Standard Bank Group Namibia in Figures 2. 
R J Rotberg Namibia - Political and Economic 
Prospects 42, citing the South African Department 
of statistics. 
Putz, von Egidy & Caplan (nll) 13. 
See J H van der Merwe National Atlas of South West 
Africa (Namibia) 42 seq and J H Wellington south 
West Africa and its Human Issues part I 1-128 and 
S Bruwer SWA: The Disputed Land. 
See for further details, Ethiopia & Liberia ·v 
South Africa 1966 ICJ Reports 311-48. 
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the Bushmen (34 000); the Rehoboth Baster (29 000); the 
Tswana (7 000); Others (12 000) . 19 
(c) Economic conditions 
Statements about Namibia's economic power are often 
contradictory. On the one hand, they speak of the richest 
mineral resources in Africa20 and on the other hand -
according to the South African Government - state that 
available mineral resources exist in non-workable 
quantities. 21 More detailed accounts about output, which 
would clarify the question, are generally withheld by 
South African and foreign companies. 
It is clear, however, that the economy of the 
Territory is based on mining, agriculture and fishing. 
These industries together account for 89 per cent of the 
export rate and 40,7 per cent of the gross national 
product.n 
The greatest obstacle to the development of Namibia's 
economy is its natural environment. Most of the country is 





Standard Bank Group (nl4) 2. 
SC Saxena Namibia - Challenge to the United Na-
tions 3 and UNCfN Report of the UN International 
Conference of the Struggle of the Namibian People 
for Independence Paris 25-29 April 1983 Doc. 
A/Conf 120/8 of 4 April 1983 1. 
Rotberg (nl5) 30-32. 
Standard Bank Group (nl4) 3. 
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average annual rainfall of more than 400 mm which can be 
regarded as the absolute lower limit for agriculture in 
warm temperate summer rainfall regions. 23 
(2) Historical Development~ 
In the closing years of the nineteenth century Namibia came 
into being as a geographically defined territory under 
agreements and boundary settlem~nts between the three 
European powers, Germany, Portugal and Britain. 
Although Portuguese navigators, such as Diego Cao 
(1484), Bartholomeu Dias (1486) and Gasper Vegas (1534), 
went ashore on their voyages along the coast of the present 
Namibia, interest in this part of the African Continent was 
stimulated only after the establishment of a white 
settlement at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652. The 'Grundel' 
was dispatched by the Cape Governor as early as 1670 to 
explore the coast of this area. The 'Bode' followed in 
23 
24 
ICJ Reports (n18) 295. 
The historical data and facts are drawn from 
following publications: 
I Goldblatt History of South West Africa from the 
Begining of the Nineteenth Century; 
Interessengemeinschaft Deutschsprachiger Siidwester 
Vom Schutzgebiet bis Namibia 1800-1984 257 seq; M 
E Townsend The Rise and Fall of Germany's Colonial 
Empire 1884-1918; WO Aydelotte Bismarck and the 
British Colonial Policy: The Problem of South West 
Africa; P Laband Das Staatsrecht des Deutschen 
Reiches vol II; J Dugard The South West 
Africa/Namibia Dispute; G M Cockram South West 
African Mandate and UN Commission of Enquiry into 
South West African Affairs Report for 1962-1963. 
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1677. Although both ships anchored at Angra Pequena and 
sandwich Bay, 'the interior could not be explored because of 
the impenetrable nature of the Namib Desert. 
In 1868, Rhenish missionaries, the first European 
inhabitants of the central area, in desperation asked the 
British authorities in the Cape Province for protection. 
They also asked that Hereroland be annexed by the British. 
Their proposal was, curiously, backed strongly by Bismarck, 
who was at that time uninterested in German colonial 
development in the area; he declared in 1868 that 'the 
advantages expected from colonies rested for the most part 
on illusions'. 25 The British, however, declined to accept 
the invitation to annex the area. 
Then, in 1883, a German - Heinrich Vogelsang - landed 
at Angra Pequena, to the South of Walvis Bay, as an agent 
for a Bremen merchant, Adolf Luderitz. He succeeded in 
acquiring an area of approximately 560 000 ha around Angra 
Pequena to be used for trading stations and- settlements 
from the Nama chief Josef Fredericks. In 1883, since native 
fighting had broken out in 1880, the German Government 
asked whether Britain was prepared to protect Luderitz 
adding that eventually protection would be given by the 
German Government itself. Further it wanted to know whether 
Her Majesty's Government would or wished to exercise 
25 Ls Amery German Colonial Claim 50. 
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authority in the area. Again the British Government refused 
to be responsible for any territory outside Walvis Bay. 26 
In April 1884, the German Consul at the Cape was 
instructed by Bismarck to advise the Cape Government that 
the area acquired by Luderitz had been formally placed 
under German protection. The German flag was hoisted at 
Angra Pequena, and the Bay was renamed Luderitzbucht. This 
marked the creation of German South West Africa. 
In August 1884, a German protectorate was formally 
declared over the area surrounding Liideritzbucht. This was 
followed in September of the same year by the declaration 
of a further protectorate over the coastal area from the 
Orange River up to Cape Frio, excluding Walvis Bay. In 
October Namaland was declared a protectorate. In the next 
year, German agreements with the Rooinasie (Red People) and 
with the Basters of Rehoboth followed. In October of the 
same year the Herera also accepted German protection. 
While Germany was extending its sphere of influence 
into the interior, Britain, in March 1885, proclaimed a 
protectorate over Bechuanaland. In the North the Portuguese 
were already in possession of Angola. The boundaries of·the 
new Territory of German South West Africa were laid down in 
agreements with Portugal and Britain. One of the most 
important of these agreements was the 1885 General Act of 
26 In 1878, the United Kingdom decided to annex 
Walfish Bay (Walvis Bay, as it is now known), the 
only good harbour of South West and its surroun-
ding area. Commander RC Deyer, on board of the 
ship 'Industry', then annexed the area surrounding 
Walvis Bay in the name of the Queen. The area was 
incorporated in the Cape Colony by Act 35 of 1884. 
- 21 -
/ 
the Conference of Berlin. This Conference, among other 
things, ratified the protectorate proclaimed by Bismarck in 
1884 over the coast of south West Africa. A joint 
declaration by Germany and Portugal signed in 1886 
delimited the northern boundary of South West Africa. 27 An 
Anglo-German Agreement of 1890 delimited the eastern and 
southern boundaries and recognised South West Africa as a 
German sphere of influence. 28 South West Africa remained 
under German rule until the outbreak of the First World 
War. 
on 9 July 1915, German troops in the Territory 
surrendered to the South African Forces, who had joined the · 
Allies in the war against Germany. 
With the termination of the First World War, and in 
terms of art 119 of the Peace Treaty of Versailles 1919, 
Germany relinquished its colonial territories including 
German South West Africa. All former German overseas 
possessions were placed under the international control of 
the League of Nations' mandate system .. According to art 22 
of the Covenant of the League, 29 South West Africa was 
classified as a 'C' Mandate, ie one which: 
'owning to the sparseness of population, or small 
size, or remoteness from the centres of civilisation, 




The text of the Proclamation is reproduced in I 
Brownlie African Boundaries 1277-8. 
Brownlie op cit 1027-8. 
For full text see FM van Asbeck UN Textbook part 
·I 8. 
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Mandatory, and other circumstances, can best be 
administered under the iaws of the Mandatory as an 
integral portion of its territory.' 
This Mandate was conferred on South Africa by the Council 
of the League of Nations by a Resolution of 17 December 
1920. 
During the 1930s and early 1940s proposals were made 
within South Africa for incorporation of the Territory into 
the Union as a fifth province. 30 No steps were taken to 
give effect to these proposals until the end of World War 
II. In 1945 at the San Francisco Conference, when the 
Charter of the United Nations was being drafted1 no clear 
provision was made for the future of mandated territories, 
as it was confidently expected that Mandatory States would 
place their territories under the new trusteeship 
system. 31 South Africa, on 9 April 1946, 32 however, served 
notice on the international community that she intended to 
incorporate South West Africa into the Union and that she 
would not place the mandated Territory under the 
trusteeship system. 33 So began a political and legal 
conflict between South Africa and the UN which continued 





See GAOR 1st Sess Fourth Committee part I 231-2. 
See Chapter XII of the UN Charter. 
League of Nations Official Journal Special Suppl 
No 194 of the 20th and 21st Ordinary Sess of the 
Assembly 32 seq. 
M Scott The Orphans' Heritage: The Story about the 
South West African Mandate 11-12. 
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II. THE PROBLEM OF NAMIBIA BEFORE THE ORGANS OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS 
(1) The General Assembly's role 
During the Second World War, the white inhabitants of South 
West Africa had expressed a desire for incorporation into 
South Africa. In May 1943 the South West African 
Legislative Assembly had unanimously adopted the following 
Resolution: 
'That this House respectfully request His Honour the 
Administrator to forthwith urge upon the Government of 
the Union of South Africa that the time has arrived 
for the termination of its Mandate over the Territory 
of South West Africa, and that it is the earnest 
desire of the inhabitants of this Territory that upon 
such termination of the Mandate, the Territory of 
South West Africa be formally annexed to and 
incorporated in the Union of South Africa upon such 
terms as to financial relations and political 
representation as may be initially agreed upon between 
the Government of the Union of South Africa and 
representatives nominated by this House.' 
In 1946 the South West African Legislative Assembly again 
unanimously adopted a similar Resolution. This was 
subsequent to the comment of the South African delegate to 
the final session of the League Assembly in April 1946 
that: 
'the Union Government have deemed it incumbent upon 
them to consult the peoples of South West Africa, 
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European and non-European alike, regarding the form 
which their own future government should take.' 1 
The Union Government informed the UN of the request of the 
Legislative Assembly of South West Africa, adding (as a 
concession to opinions in the UN), that the non-European 
inhabitants of the Territory should also be enabled to 
express their opinion on the proposal. The results of 
consultation with the black inhabitants showed that 208 850 
were in favour of incorporation, 33 520 were against it, 
and the opinion of 56 790 could not be ascertained. 2 The 
Union"of South Africa then placed these results before the 
GA. 
The GA, after a long debate, rejected the proposal for 
incorporation. On 14 December 1946 it passed Res 65 {I) by 
37 votes to none, with 10 absentions. This Resolution noted 
that the African inhabitants of South West Africa had not 
yet secured political autonomy or reached a stage of 
political development enabling them to express a considered 
opinion, which the Assembly could recognise, on a question 
as important as incorporation. 3 
In 1946, 1947 and 1948 South Africa continued to 
submit annual reports to the UN on its administration of 
South West Africa. But Mr Harry .Andrews, the South African 
2 
3 
Assembly Debates vol 56 15 March 1946 col 3682. 
See GM Cockram South West African Mandate 224. 
For full text of this Resolution, see J Dugard The 
SWA/Namibia Dispute 111. 
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representative, informed the Fourth Committee of the GA4 
that these reports contained the same type of information 
as was required for non-self-governing territories under 
art 73(e) of the UN Charter. It was the assumption of his 
government, Mr Andrews continued, that the reports would 
not be considered by the Trusteeship Council and would not 
be dealt with as if a trusteeship agreement for the 
Territory had in fact been concluded. 5 
In 1948 the National Party was elected in SA. On 11 
July 1949 the new Government informed the UN Secretary 
General of its decision, in the interest of efficient 
administration, to discontinue the submission of further 
reports on South West Africa. 6 In the same year the 
Government introduced the controversial South West Africa 
Affairs Amendment Act, 7 which provided for closer 
association with South Africa. 8 In December 1949, the GA 
passed a Resolution regretting the decision of the South 






UN Doc A/422 of 27 October 1947. See also GAOR 3rd 
Sess Fourth Committee 287 seq. 
Ibid. 
See GAOR 4th Sess Fourth Committee, Annex to Summary 
Records of Meetings of 1949 7-8. 
Act 23 of 1949. 
The Act gave South West Africa six representatives in 
the Union House of Assembly, all of whom had to be 
elected, and four in the Senate, two of whom had to be 
elected and the other two nominated by the Governor-
General. 
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introduce the 1949 Act and urged South Africa again to 
enter into a trusteeship agreement. 9 
In a second Resolution of 194910 the GA decided to 
seek clarity on the legal status of South West Africa by 
asking for an advisory opinion from the ICJ. In its Opinion 
delivered in 1950, 11 the Court held that there were no 
legal obligations on the Union to place South West Africa 
under the UN Trusteeship system. On the other hand, the 
Court found that the Union continued to have the 
international obligations in art 22 of the Convenant of the 
League of Nations, as well as the obligation to transmit 
petitions from the inhabitants. The GA accepted the Court's 
Advisory Opinion as a basis for th~ supervision of the 
administration of the mandated Territory of South West 
Africa and established an 'Ad Hoc Committee' to discuss 
with South Africa measures necessary to implement the 
Opinion. 12 Although the Ad Hoc Committee was reconstituted 
in 1952 13 and 1953, 14 it was unable to reach any agreement 
with the South African Government. Consequently, in 1953, a 







GA Res 337 (IV) of 15 December 1949. 
GA Res 338 (IV) of 6 December 1949. The Resolution was 
adopted by 40 votes in favour, seven against, and four 
abstentions. 
International Status of South West Africa 1950 ICJ 
Reports 128 seq. 
GA Res 449 A (V) of 13 December 1950. 
GA Res 570 (VI) of 19 January 1952. 
GA Res 651 of 20 December 1953. 
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Res 749. A (VIII) 'until such time as an agreement is 
reached between the United Nations and the Union of South 
Africa'. 15 The Committee on South West Africa was as 
unsuccessful as its predecessor in attempting to implement 
the 1950 Advisory Opinion because South Africa refused to 
co-operate. 16 Hence, in 1961, the committee was dissolved 
by the GA. 17 
In the same year the UN established a Special 
Committee on South West Africa, 18 consisting of 
representatives of seven Member States, nominated by the 
President of the GA, to prepare the Territory for 
independence. This was now viewed as a desirable goal in 
lieu of a trusteeship agreement. The Special Committee's 
task was to achieve the following objectives: 
'(a) A visit to the Territory of South West Africa 
before 1 May 1962; 
(b) The evacuation from the Territory of all military 
forces of the Republic of South Africa; 
(c) The release of all political prisoners without 
distinction as to party or race; 
(d) The repeal of all laws or regulations confining 
the indigenous inhabitants in reserves and 
denying them all freedom of movement, expression 
and association, and of all other laws and 





GA Res 749 A (VIII) of 28 November 1953 No 12. 
South Africa's main criticism of the Committee on 
South West A·frica was that it included no member with · 
experience of African administration. 
GA Res 1704 (XVI) of 12 October 1961. 
GA Res 1702 (XVI) of 19 December 1961. 
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intolerable system of apartheid; 
(e) Preparations for general elections to a 
Legislative Assembly based on universal adult 
suffrage, to be held as soon as possible under 
the supervision and control of the UN; 
(f) Advice and assistance to the Government resulting 
from the general elections, with a view to 
preparing the Territory for full independence; 
(g) Co-ordination of the economic and social 
assistance with which the specialised agencies 
will provide the people in order to promote their 
moral and material welfare; 
(h) The return to the Territory of the indigenous 
inhabitants without risk of imprisonment, 
dententioh or punishment of any kind because of 
their political activities in or outside the 
Territory. ' 19 
One year later, ~n 1962, the GA dissolved the Special 
Committee on South West Africa and transferred the question 
of South West Africa to the Special Committee on the 
Situation with regard to the Implementation of the 
Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples (Special Committee of 24) . 20 
At the same time, South Africa created a Commission of 
Enquiry into South West African Affairs under F H Odendaal. 
Its terms of reference included the drawing up of a five-
year plan for the: 
19 
20 
'accelerated development of the various non-white 
groups of South West Africa, inside as well as outside 
their own territories.' 
GA Res 1702 (XVI) No 2. 
GA Res 1806 (XVII) of 14 December 1962. 
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The Report of the Odendaal Commission21 recommended the 
establishment of separate tribal territorial regimes for 
twelve African population groups, consistent with the 
official government policy of separate development 
(apartheid) . 22 In a White Paper tabled on 29 April 1964, 
the Government of South Africa accepted the report in 
principle and stated that it would proceed to implement 
various of its recommendations for the economic and social 
advancement of the Territory. 
The UN's response to the Odendaal Report was immediate 
and hostile. In 1964 the Report was condemned by the 
Special Committee of 24 23 and in 1965 the GA added its 
protest. 24 The South African Government did not 
immediately act on the Report, but waited for the outcome 
of the ICJ's proceedings. The 1966 decision of the ICJ 
shattered the UN programme for change in South West Africa, 
a programme which, since 1960, had been constructed on the 
assumption that the Court would hand down a judgment 






As a result, the GA took its most drastic action thus 
Report of the commission of Enquiry into South West 
African Affairs 1962-63 RP 12/1964. 
For more detailed discussion of this Report, see E 
Kahn 'South-West Africa and the United Nations' 1960 
Annual Survey of South African Law 54-9 and P Mason 
'Separate development and South West Africa' {1964) 5 
Race 83 seq. 
1964 June UN Monthly Chronicle 33 seq. 
GA Res 2074 (XX) of 17 December 1965. 
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far in its conflict with South Africa: on 27 October 1966, 
it adopted Res 2145 (XXI) terminating the Mandate for South 
West Africa. 25 This Resolution set the Territory of South 
West Africa on _its way to independence. Resolution 2145 
(XXI) reads: 
25 
'The General Assembly, 
2. Reaffirms further that South West Africa is a 
territory having international status and that it 
shall maintain this status until it achieves 
independence; 
3. Declares that Soµth Africa has failed to.fulfil 
its obligations in respect of the administration 
of the Mandated Territory and to ensure the moral 
and material well-being and security of the 
indigenous inhabitants of South West· Africa and 
has, in fact, disavowed the Mandate; 
4. Decides that the Mandate conferred upon His 
Britannic Majesty to be exercised on his behalf 
by the Government of the Union of South Africa is 
therefor terminated, that South Africa has no 
other right to administer the Territory and that 
henceforth South West Africa comes under the 
direct responsibility of the United Nations; 
5. Resolves that in these circumstances the United 
Nations must discharge those responsibilities 
with respect to South West Africa; 
6. Establishes an Ad Hoc Committee for South West 
Africa - composed of fourteen Member States to be 
designated by the President of the General 
Assembly - to recommend practical means by which 
South West Africa should be administered, so as 
to enable the people of the Territory to exercise 
The Resolution was adopted by 114 votes to 2 (Portugal 
and South Africa), with 3 abstentions (France, Malawi, 
and United Kingdom) . _ 
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the right of self-determination and to achieve 
independence, and to report to the General 
Assembly, at a special Session as soon as 
possible.and in any event not later than 1967; 
7. Calls upon the Government of South Africa 
forthwith to refrain and desist from any action, 
constitutional, administrative, political or 
otherwise, which w'ill in any manner whatever 
alte~ or tend to alter the present international 
status of South West Africa; 
8. Calls the attention of the Security Council to 
the present Resolution.' 
Following this Resolution an Ad Hoc Committee for South 
West Africa was established consisting of fourteen Member 
States. 26 The Committee which was charged with the task of 
recommending practical means by which South West Africa 
should be administered so as to enable the people of the 
Territory to achieve independence. When the Committee could 
not reach unanimity it put forward its proposals to the GA 
for consideration by that body. 27 
These proposals were then considered by the GA at its 
fifth Special Session, which commenced on 24 April 1967. On 
19 May the Assembly adopted, by 85 votes to 2 (Portugal and 
south Africa), with 30 abstentions, Res 2248 (S-V) 
establishing an eleven-member UN Council for South West 
26 
27 
The representatives of the following States were 
elected to the Committee: Canada, Chile, 
Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Finland, Italy, Japan, 
Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, the Soviet Union, 
the United AFab Republic, and the United States. 
See 1967 March UN Monthly Chronicle 6-10 and April 11-
16. 
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Africa to administer the Territory until independence. 28 
When in December the GA again took up the question of South 
West Africa, it had before it a report from the Council for 
South West Africa in which it was conceded that the Council 
had been unable to discharge any of its functions in the 
light of South Africa's illegal presence in the Territory. 
On 16 December the Assembly condemned South Africa's 
refusal to comply with Res 2145 (XXI) and 2248 (S-V) and 
declared that the continued presence of South Africa in the 
Territory was a flagrant violation of its territorial 
integrity and international status. 29 Further the GA 
called upon the SC: 
'to take all appropriate steps to secure the 
implementation of the present Resolution and to take 
effective measures in accordance with the provisions 
of the Charter of the United Nations to ensure the 
immediate removal of the South African presence from 
Namibia and to secure for Namibia its independence in 
accordance with the General Assembly Resolution 2145 
(XXI) . ' 3o 
(2) The Security council's role 




On 13 June the GA elected the following eleven States 
as Members of the Council: Chile, Colombia, Guyana, 
India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Turkey, the 
United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia and Zambia. 
GA Res 2325 (XXII) of 16 December 1967. 
GA Res 2372 (XXII) of 12 June 1968. 
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African dispute at the time of the 'Terrorist Trial 1 • 31 on 
that occasion the SC gave implicit support to Res 2145 
(XXI), because the trial, 
'being held under arbitrary laws whose application has 
been illegally extended on the Territory of South West 
Africa' 32 
must be regarded as illegal since termination of the 
31 
32 
The term 'Terrorist Trial' is the name popularly used 
to describe State v Tuhadeleni, the trial of 37 South 
West Africans for offences under the Terrorism Act No 
83 of 1967. The trial, conviction and sentencing of 
the accused evoked protest and condemnation from the 
United Nations on the ground that, as a result of GA 
Res 2145 (XXI), south Africa had lost jurisdiction 
over the Territory and hence the competence to try the 
accused at all. On 16 December, 1967, by Res 2324 
(XXII), the GA condemned the 'illegal arrest, 
deportation, -and trial' of the accused, and on the eve 
of the judgment in the case on 25 January, 1968, the 
SC in a unanimous Resolution called upon the 
Government of South Africa 'to discontinue forthwith 
this illegal trial and to release and repatriate the 
South West Africans concerned'(SC Res 245 of 1968). 
After many of the accused had been sentenced to long 
periods of imprisonment this call was converted into 
a demand by SC Res 246 (1968). The South Afric-an 
Government, however, arguing that GA Res 2145 (XXI) 
was invalid and that it was fully competent in law to 
prosecute the accused for offences committed in South 
West Africa, declined to accept these calls and 
demands. The most important result of the trial was to 
elevate the twenty-year-old dispute over South West 
Africa to the SC, where implicit approval was given to 
GA Res' 2145 (because the trial could only be regarded 
as 'illegal' if the Mandate had been terminated). 
The full proceedings of the trial are not published in 
the SALR, but the preliminary objection before the 
Transvaal Provincial Division is reported in State v 
Tuhadeleni 1967 ( 4) SA 511 (T) . The Appeal Court 
confirmed the decision of the court a quo in State v 
Tuhadeleni 1969 (1) SA 153 (AD). For detailed 
accounts, see J Dugard 'South West Africa an.d the 
Terrorist Trial' (1970) 64 AJIL 19-41. 
SC Res 245 of 25 January 1968. 
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Mandate. 33 On 20 March 1969 the SC gave its express 
imprimatur to the revocation of the Mandate: 
33 
'The Security Council, 
1. Recognises that the United Nations General 
Assembly terminated the Mandate of South Africa 
over Namibia and assumed direct responsibility 
for the Territory until its independence; 
2. Considers that the continued presence of South 
Africa in Namibia is illegal and contrary to the 
principles of the Charter and the previous 
decisions of the United Nations and is 
detrimental of the interests of the population of 
the Territory and those of the international 
community; 
3. Calls upon the Government of South Africa to 
immediately withdraw its administration from the 
Territory; 
4. Declares that the actions of the Government of 
South Africa designed to destroy the national 
unity and territorial integrity of Namibia 
through the establishment of Bantustans are 
contrary to the provisions of the United Nations 
Charter; 
5. Declares that the Government of South Africa has 
no right to enact the "South West Africa Affairs 
Bill", as such an enactment would be a violation 
of the relevant resolutions of the General 
Assembly; 
6. Condemns the refusal of South Africa to comply 
with General Assembly Resolutions 2145 (XXI), 
2248 (S-V), 2324 (XXII), 2372 (XXII), and 2403 
(XXIII) and Security Council Resolutions 245 and 
Both the United Kingdom and France, which had 
abstained on Res 2145 (XXI), reserved their positions 
on the termination of the Mandate in the explanations 
of their votes for Res 245 and 246; see 1968 February 
UN Monthly Chronicle 14 and 1968 April 35 seq. 
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246 of 1968; 
7. Invites all States to exert their influence in 
order to obtain compliance by the Government of 
South Africa with the provisions of the present 
Resolution; 
8. Decides that in the event of failure on the part 
of the Government of South Africa to comply with 
the provisions of the present Resolution, the 
Security Council will meet immediately to 
determine upon necessary steps and measures in 
accordance with the relevant provisions of the 
Charter of the United Nations.'¼ 
In its reply of 30 April, the South African Government 
rejected the Resolution on the ground that: 
'there is no legal basis for the activities of the so-
called Council for South West Africa or for Security 
Council intervention. 135 
Following this rebuff, the SC, in Res 269 (1969), 36 
condemned South Africa for its refusal to comply with Res 
264 (1969}; decided that South Africa's continued presence 
in Namibia 'constitutes an aggressive encroachment on the 
authority of the United Nations'; and called upon South 
Africa 'to withdraw its administration. from the Territory 





South Africa's refusal to withdraw from Namibia by 4 
SC Res 264 of 20 March 1969. The Resolution was 
adopted by 13 votes to none, with two abstentions 
(United Kingdom and France). 
1969 June UN Monthly Chronicle 31. 
This Resolution passed by 11 votes to none, with four 
abstentions •(Finland, France, United Kingdom and the 
United States}. 
See SC Res 269 of 12 August 1969. 
.l 
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October 1969 compelled the SC to accept the political 
reality of the situation. On 30 January 1970 it adopted Res 
276, 38 in which it called upon States to take certain 
measures against Sou_th Africa to compel it to withdraw from 
Namibia and in which it established an Ad Hoc Sub Committee 
consisting of all Members of the SC to study ways and means 
by which the decision of the SC could be effectively 
implement~d. SC Res 276 reads: 
'The Security Council, 
1. Strongly condemns the refusal of the Government 
of South Africa to comply with General Assembly 
and Security Council resolutions pertaining to 
Namibia; 
2. Declares that the continued presence of the South 
African authorities in Namibia is illegal and 
that consequently all acts taken by the 
Government of South Africa on behalf of or 
concerning Namibia after the termination of the 
Mandate are illegal and invalid; 
3. Declares further that the defiant attitude of the 
Government of South Africa towards the Council's 
decisions undermines the authority of the United 
Nations; 
4. Considers that the continued occupation of 
Namibia by the Government of South Africa in 
defiance of the relevant United Nations 
resolutions and of the United Nations Charter has 
grave consequences for the rights and interests 
of the people of Namibia; 
, 5. Establishes an Ad Hoc Sub Committee - composed of 
all members of the Security Council - to study 
ways and means by which the decision of the 
38 The Resolution was adopted by 13 votes to none, with 
two abstentions (France and United Kingdom). 
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Security Council could be effectively 
implemented; 
6. Calls upon all States, particulary those which 
have economic and other interests in Namibia, to 
refrain from any dealings with the Government of 
South Africa which are inconsistent with 
operative paragraph 2 of this Resolution. 139 
In its report the Sub Committee of the SC recommended a 
variety of political, economic, legal and military actions 
which might be pursued by the UN in order to compel south 
Africa to vacate Namibia. 40 Inter alia, it suggested that 
an advisory opinion be obtained from the ICJ. 
When the SC next considered the question of Namibia it 
adopted two Resolutions. In the first, Res 283 of 29 July 
1970, it requested all States to refrain from any relations 
- diplomatic, consular or otherwise - with South,Africa 
implying recognition of the authority of the South African 
Government over Namibia. 41 In the second, Res 284, 42 the 
SC sent the dispute back to the ICJ. It decided, in 
accordance with art 94(1) of the Charter and art 65 of the 






'What .are the legal consequences for States of the 
sc Res 276 of 30 January 1970. 
See, for a summary of these recommendations, 1970 
August UN Monthly Chronicle 28-9. 
The voting on this Resolution was 13 to none, with 2 
abstentions (France and United Kingdom). 
This Resolution passed by 12 votes in favour to none 
against, with three abstentions (Poland, the Soviet 
Union and United Kingdom). 
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continued presence of South Africa in Namibia, 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 
( 1970)? , 43 
The Opinion of the ICJ was accepted by the SC on 29 October 
1971 by Res 301.« 
(3) Jurisdiction of the International court of Justice45 
(a) Introduction 
The concern of the Court with the Namibian problem falls 
into three distinct periods. The first is the period of the 
three Advisory Opinions of 1950, 1955 and 1956; these 
Opinions arose directly from the failure of the 
international community to bring about the transfer of the 
Mandate to the UN Trusteeship System. During this period 
the ICJ enjoyed the overall confidence of the GA. The 
· second period, the decade of the sixties, is dominated by 




SC Res 284 of 29 July 1970. 
ICJ Reports 1971 27 seq. 
The ICJ at The Hague was established after the Second 
World War as the principal judicial organ of the UN. 
Its functions are to determine disputes between states 
and to give advisory opinions to various organs of the 
UN, in particular, to its political organs. The ICJ 
replaced an earlier tribunal, the Permanent Court of 
International Justice, as the main judicial body 
operating in the field of international law. For a 
detailed account on the International Court of Justice 
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266-85. 
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culminating in a sharply divided Court and a serious rift 
between the Court and the GA which went far beyond the 
problem of Namibia and threatened the status of the Court 
as an institution. 46 The third period, introduced by the 
Advisory Opinion of 1971 (on the legal consequences for 
States of the continued presence of South Africa in 
Namibia), is the period in which the relationship between 
the political organs of the UN and the Court was repaired. 
(b) The Advisory Opinions of 1950, 1955, and 1956 
Although these three Opinions span a six-year period, they 
form a coherent whole and should be read together. The 1950 
Advisory Opinion is without question the most important, 
not only in relation to the 1955 and 1956 Opinions, but 
also in relation to the entire evolution of the Namibian 
problem within the UN. 
In December 1949 the GA decided to seek clarity on the 
legal status of South West Africa by asking for an advisory 
opinion from the ICJ on the following issues: 
46 
'What is the international status of the Territory of 
South West Africa and what are the international 
obligations of the Union of South Africa arising 
therefrom, in particular: 
(a) Does the Union of South Africa contin~e to have 
international obligations under the Mandate for 
South West Africa and, if so, what are those 
A Junius The United Nations Council for Namibia 23. 
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obligations? 
(b) Are the provisions of Chapter XII of the Charter 
applicable and, if so, in what manner, to the 
Territory of South West Africa? 
(c) Has the Union of South Africa the competence to 
modify the international status of the Territory 
of South Africa, or, in the event of a negative 
reply, where does competence rest to determine 
and modify the international status of the 
Territory? ' 47 
The ICJ handed down its Advisory Opinion on 11 July 
1950. 48 The first and most important question to be 
considered by the Court was whether the Mandate, as a legal 
institution, had survived the demise of the League of 
Nation·s. Clearly, if it had ended together with the League, 
South Africa would no longer be under any international 
obligation in regard of the Territory. 
By emphasising the character of the Mandate as an 
objective international regime, the Court was able to show 
that the fulfilment of the obligations flowing from the 
Mandate did not depend on the continued existence either of 
the League of Nations or of its organs of supervision. In 
support of its arguments, the Court referred to art 80(1) 
of the Charter, which expressly maintained the rights of 
states and p~oples and the terms of existing international 
instruments until the territories in question had been 
47 
48 
GA Res 338 (IV) of 6 December 1949. The vote was 40 to 
7, with 4 abstentions. 
International Status of South West Africa 1950 ICJ 
Reports 128 seq. 
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placed ·under the Trusteeship System. 49 In so far as South 
Africa's obligations to submit to international supervision 
was concerned the Court constructed a de facto succession 
between the League of Nations and the UN. In essence, the 
Court argued that this obligation continued in force by 
operation of law if the League's final Resolution on 
Mandates and art 80 of the UN Charter were read 
together. 50 The obligations incumbent upon South Africa 
were those deriving directly from art 22 of the Covenant as 
well as the obligation to transmit petitions, which had 
been developed as a practice by the League of Nations and 
which the Court now found as an acquired right of the 
inhabitants of the Territory. 51 
In answer to the GA's second question the Court 
decided that the provisions of Chapter XII of the Charter 
(Trusteeship system) were applicable to South West Africa 
as a mandated Territory. The Court interpreted the second 
part of the question, the manner of application, to mean: 
'whether the Charter imposes an obligation upon the 
Union of South Africa to place the Territory under the 
Trusteeship system by means of a Trusteeship 
agreement' . 52 
A textual reading of arts 75 and 77 showed, in the opinion 
of the Court, that the Charter imposed no obligations on 
49 ICJ Reports op cit 133-5. 
so ICJ Reports op cit 136-7. 
51 ICJ Reports op cit 133. 
52 ICJ Reports op cit 139. 
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South Africa to place South West Africa under the 
Trusteeship System. In reaching this conclusion the Court 
relied on the plain meaning of the language in arts 75 and 
77 and rejected the argument that art 80(2) placed a duty 
on Mandatories to negotiate and conclude Trusteeship 
agreements. The Court found that: 
'had the parties to the Charter intended to create an 
obligation of this kind for a Mandatory State, such 
intention would necessarily have been expressed in 
positive terms. 153 
Finally, with regard to the question of the competence 
of South Africa to modify the provisions of the Mandate 
unilaterally, the Court expressed the view that the 
competence to determine or modify the international status 
of the Territory was South Africa's acting with the consent 
of the UN. 54 
The Opinions of 1955 and 1956 are of less importance. 
In the 1955 judgment the ICJ found that UN decisions 
pertaining to South West Africa may be taken by a two-
thirds majority, 55 and the 1956 Opinion dealt with the 
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Votinq orocedure on question relating to reports and 
petitions concerning the Territory of South West 
Africa 1955 ICJ Reports 67 seq. 
Admissibility of hearings of petitions by the 
Committee of South West -Africa 1956 ICJ Reports 23 
seq. 
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(c) The south West Africa cases 1962 and 1966 
On 4 November 1960, the Governments of Ethiopia and 
Liberia, the only two African States which had been Members 
of the League of Nations, commenced proceedings against 
South Africa at the ICJ. 57 After the possibility of a 
political solution to the problem receded (following the 
failure of the GA's Good Offices committee in 1958) 58 a 
new strategy was developed: to obta~n a binding judgment of 
the Court against South Africa, which, unlike an advisory 
opinion, would be enforceable in accordance with the 
provisions of art 94(2) of the Charter. 
The Ethiopian-Liberian submission was based on the 
1950 Advisory Opinion on the status of South West Africa. 
In the first place they asked the Court to declare that 
South West Africa was still a territory under the Mandate 
within the meaning of art 22 of the Covenant and that the 
Mandate was still valid and constituted a 'treaty in force' 
within the meaning of art 37 of the Statute. Secondly, they 
submitted that South Africa had violated a number of 
provisions in the Mandate and, thirdly, that south Africa 
57 
58 
Ethiopia & Liberia v South Africa 1962 ICJ Reports 319 
seq. 
The Committee, composed of representatives from 
Brazil, the United Kingdom and the United States, 
engaged in intensive negotiations with South Africa 
during 1958. One of the proposals discussed with South 
Africa concerned the partition of South West Africa. 
The southern part would be annexed by the Union and 
the northern part placed under a trusteeship 
agreement. The GA rejected the suggestion by 61 votes 
to 8, with 7 abstentions. See GA Res 1243 (XVI) of 30 
October 1958. 
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was bound to stop all such violations and respect in good 
faith the international status of South West Africa. 59 
In answer South Africa submitted certain preliminary 
objections contesting the Court's right to exercise 
jurisdiction. 60 In brief these were the following: 
(i) The Mandate for South West Africa (or, at least 
art 7 thereof) never was, at least since the 
dissolution of the League of Nations, 'a treaty 




Neither Ethiopia nor Liberia was any longer 
'another Member of the League of Nations' as 
required by art 7 of the Mandate. 
Ethiopia and Liberia lacked any material interest· 
in the alleged conflict and therefore no dispute 
was present within the meaning of art 7. 
(iv) It could not be said that the alleged dispute 
could be settled by negotiation as required by 
art 7. 
On 21 December 1962, the Cour·t, divided by 8 votes to 7, 
concluded that the Mandate was a treaty or convention still 
in force, that the dispute between the parties was one 
envisaged in art 7 of the Mandate, and that it could not be 
settled by negotiation. The Court declared itself competent 
to hear the dispute on the merits. 61 
On 18 July 1966, after three years of pleadings and 




ICJ Reports (n57) 322 seq. 
ICJ Reports (n57) 326-7. 
For the full text of this judgment see G Horten 'Das 
Urteil des IGH in Sachen SWA' ( 1966) 4 Journal der 
Internationalen Juristenkommission 189 seq. 
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the most controversial judgment in its history. 62 The 
Court found that: 
'the Applicants cannot be considered to have 
established any legal right or interest appertaining 
to them in the subject-matter of the present claims, 
and that, accordingly, the Court must decline to give 
effect to them.'~ 
The judgment was rendered by the President's casting vote 
(in effect a second vote) in terms of art 55(2) of the 
Statute of the ICJ. 64 
This judgment was followed by a number of diss·enting 
opinions. 65 The role of chief dissenter was assumed by 
Judge Jessup. He considered the judgment to be 'completely 
unfounded in law' dissenting 'not only from the legal 





Junius (n46) 27-8. 
Ethiopia & Liberia v South Africa 1966 ICJ Reports 51. 
It seems that this decision was the consequence of 
changes in the composition of the Court which had 
resulted in the minority of 196.2 becoming the majority 
in 1966. The majority consisted of President Sir Percy 
Spender (two votes), Judges Winiarski, Spiropoulos, 
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, Morelli, Gros, and Judge ad 
hoc Van Wyk. Of these only Judge Gros of France, who 
had replaced his compatriot Judge Basdevant in 1964, 
had not formed a part of the minority of 1962. The 
seven dissenting Judges on this occasion were Judges 
Koo, ,Koretsky, Tanaka, Jessup, Nervo, Forster, and ad 
hoc Judge Sir Louis Mbanefo. 
Dissenting Opinions of Judges Koretsky, Tanaka and 
Jessup ICJ Reports 1966 (n63) 237 seq, 248 seq and 323 
seq respectively. See also B Cheng 'The 1966 South 
West Africa judgment of the World Court' ( 1970) 20 
Current Leqa,l Problems 181 seq and W Friedmann 'The 
jurisprudential implications of the South West Africa 
Case' (1967) 6 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 
1 seq. 
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judgment but also from its entire disposition of the case'. 
In his view the Court was: 
'not legally justified in stopping at the threshold of 
the case, avoiding a decision on the fundamental 
question whether the policy and practice of apartheid 
in the mandated Territory of South West Africa is 
compatible with the discharge of the sacred trust 
confided to'the Republic of South Africa as 
Mandatory. 166 
Judge Jessup was concerned to limit the effect of the 
decisiori. He pointed out that in all its previous 
decisions, the court had found that the Mandate remained in 
force and constituted the only legal basis for South 
Africa's presence in South West Africa. 
'The Court now in effect sweeps away this record of 16 
years and, on a theory not advanced by the respondent 
in its final submission .•. , decides that the claim 
must be rejected on the ground that the applicants 
have no legal right or interest. 167 
Judge Jessup's views with regard to the question of legal 
interest were echoed in several of the ~issenting opinions. 
Hence Judge Tanaka, for example, held that while it was 
possible to admit the existence of both a national and a 
general interest of States in the mandates system, once the 
general interest was institutionalised in a legal 
instrument, this amounted to a legal interest justifying 




ICJ Reports (n63) 325. 
ICJ Reports (n63) 328. 
ICJ Reports (n63) 251. 
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The 1966 judgment brought to an abrupt end the attempt 
to resolve the Namibian problem through judicial means and 
shifted the question back to the political organs of the 
UN. The involvement of the ICJ did not end there, however. 
Despite the- criticism to which it was subjected in the 
aftermath of the 1966 decision, the Court was called upon 
once more, in 1971, to give an advisory opinion. 
(d) The Advisory Opinion of 197169 
In terms of importance, in the evolution of the Namibian 
problem, this Opinion must undoubtedly be seen as the 
counterpart to the 1950 Opinion. Just as the Court in 1950 
provided the judicial basis for the GA's assumption of 
supervisory responsibilities in relation to the Mandate, 
the 1971 Opinion provided judicial underpinning for the 
Council for Namibia as the authority entitled to administer 
the Territory. The Court did this by confirming the 
validity of the GA's termination of the Mandate and by 
recognising the binding nature of the SC's decisions 
relating to that termination. 
By Res 284 of 29 July 1970, the SC decided to request· 
an advisory opinion of the ICJ. 
69 Between 1966 and 1971 the composition of the ICJ 
underwent important changes as a result of the two 
triennial elections of the Court held in 1966 and 
1969. Of the 1966 majority only two remained, namely, 
Judges Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice and Gros, while African 
representation on the Court had increased from one in 
1966 to three in 1971. 
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'What are the legal consequences for States of the 
continued presence of South Africa in Namibia, 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 
(1970)?' 
On 21 June 1971 the ICJ handed down its Opinion. 70 The 
Court confirmed that the continued presence of South Africa 
in Namibia was illegal and that south Africa was under an 
obligation to withdraw its administration immediately and 
to put an end to its occupation of the Territory. 71 In 
addition, the Court found that Member States of the UN were 
obliged to recognise both the illegality of South Africa's 
presence in Namibia and the invalidity of its acts on 
behalf of or concerning Namibia. 72 
The court's conclusions are far more than a 
restatement of the decisions already taken by the GA and 
the SC. They established the validity and constitutionality 
of the termination of the Mandate and thereby legitimised 
the UN's assumption of powers over the administration of 
Namibia.TI Thus, the main importance of the 1971 Opinion 
resides not in its conclusions but in those passages which 
deal with the competence and power of the GA and SC in 
relation to Namibia. 
The argument of the majority of the Judges was that: 
the Mandate of South Africa over Namibia was 'in fact and 
70 1971 ICJ Reports 15 seq. 
71 This decision was adopted by 13 votes to 2 . 
72 This decision was adopted by 11 votes to 4. 
n Junius (n46) 29. 
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in law an international agreement having the character of a 
treaty or convention',~ and as such it could be 
termina,ted in the ordinary way, regard being had to art 
60(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.~ 
In the light of these rules, only the material breach of a 
treaty justifies termination, such breach being defined as: 
'(a) a repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the 
present convention; or 
(b) the violation of a provision essential to the 
accomplishment of the object or purpose of the 
treaty.' 
The GA determined in Res 2145 (XXI) that both forms of 
material breach had occurred. By stressing that South 
Africa 'has, in fact, disavowed the Mandate', the GA 
exercised the right to terminate a relationship in case of 
a deliberate and persistent violation of obligations that 
had destroyed the very object and purpose of that 
relationship. 76 The UN was exercising its right as 
successor to the League of Nations, at least with respect 






The Court's Opinion was f?rcefully attacked by Judges 
1971 ICJ Reports 46. See also 1962 ICJ Reports (n57) 
330-1. 
For a criticism of this conclusion see, 
'Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties: 
convention and the International Court 
(1974) 68 AJIL 51 seq. 
1971 ICJ Reports 47. 
ICJ Reports op cit 49. 




Fitzmaurice and Gros. 78 They argued, first, that although 
the Mandates had survived the dissolution of the League, 
the UN, which was not the League's successor in law, had 
never been invested with the League's supervisory function. 
The Mandatory's reporting obligation had become dormant and 
was not transformed into an obligation owing to the the 
United Nations, because the Mandatory had never consented 
to such a novation. Even if the UN acquired a supervisory 
function, this did not include any power of unilateral 
revocation. Secondly, they said that, even if the Council 
of the League had possessed a power of unilateral 
revocation, the GA would not be competent to exercise it 
because of the constitutional limitations placed on it by 
the Charter. And, thirdly, that the Assembly lacked general 
competence of an executive nature. Thus the Assembly had no 
power to terminate any kind of administration over a 
territory and Res 2145 (XXI) could have effect only as a 
recommendation. 
Finally, they argued that, so far.as the SC was 
concerned, its powers were no greater than those of the 
Assembly. The executive powers of the SC were limited to 
the field of peace and security and binding decisions were 
possible only under Chapters VII and VIII. In the present 
case, the SC's intervention had not taken place within the 
framework of these Chapters, and art 25 did not confer on 
the SC the power inferred by the Court. Otherwise one would 
78 Dissenting Opinions of Judges Fitzmaurice and Gros ICJ 
Reports op cit 220 seq and 323 seq respectively. 
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modify the principles of the Charter as regards the power 
vested by States in the organs they instituted. These 
powers had been fixed by the Charter and could not be 
modified through broad-based interpretations. 
'Otherwise an association of States created with a 
view to international co-operation would be 
indistinguishable from a federation. It would be 
precisely the super-State which the United Nations is 
not.'~ 
The criticism of the 1971 Opinion, however, should 
consider the particular situation in Namibia. Resolutions 
of the GA have no binding force on members of the UN. In a 
written statement. to the Court, the Secretary-General 
argued that the powers of the GA in the case of Namibia lay 
in the special responsibilities of the UN towards the 
people of Namibia as confirmed by the Advisory Opinion of 
' 
1950 and repeatedly reaffirmed by SC and GA resolutions. 
Accordingly: 
79 
'Decisions taken by the General Assembly concerning 
the implementation of the collective responsibilities 
of the United Nations towards Namibia must therefore 
be distinguished from other General Assembly 
resolutions, and from recommendations calling for 
action within the sovereign authority of States. For 
in the absence of any intervening sovereign 
jurisdiction between the General Assembly and Namibia 
no governmental authority exists other than the 
General Assembly and the Security Council ..• It 
follows that General Assembly resolutions adopted in 
ICJ Reports op cit 340-1. 
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fulfilment of the special responsibilities of the 
United Nations towards Namibia have constituted, for 
the authority administering the Territory, the 
controlling decisions of the international community 
on whose behalf the Territory has been 
administered. 180 
The Secretary~General's statement was based, therefore, not 
on a textual reading of the power of the GA but on a 
teleological interpretation of the implied powers of the GA 
within a very specific context, namely the international 
status of Namibia and the spec'ial responsibilities·of the 
GA in that regard. 
The Court appears to have found the Secretary-
General's argument convincing. After taking issue with 
. South Africa's assertion that Res 2145 ((XXI) had 'decided 
a transfer of territory' 81 it stated that: 
'it would not be correct to assume that, because the 
General Assembly is in principle vested with 
recommendatory powers, it is debarred from adopting, 
in specific cases within the framework of its 
competence,· resolutions which make determinations or 
have operative design.'~ 
In the court's view the GA's pronouncement in Res 2145 
(XXI) was based on a conclusion ~eached by the Court in 
1950 to the effect that, if the Mandate had lapsed, the 





1971 ICJ Reports Pleadings vol I 85. 
The court found 'that is in fact not so'. See 1971 ICJ 
Reports 50. 
1971 ICJ Reports 50. 
For the 1950 Advisory Opinion, see supra II (3) (b). 
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conclusion had been confirmed by the 1962 judgment.M 
Thus, relying on these decisions, the GA declared in Res 
2145 (XXI) that the Mandate having been terminated by the 
Mandatory's own conduct, 'South Africa has no other right 
to administer the Territory'. The Court characterised this 
to be 'not a finding on facts but the formulation of a 
legal situation', 85 already foreseen by the court. 86 But, 
the Court stated 'lacking the necessary power to ensure the 
withdrawal of South Africa from the Territory' the GA then 
went on to enlist' the cooperation of the sc. 87 
Despite the criticism of Res 2145 (XXI) one must 
remember that the judgment of the Court was rejected by 
only two Judges; 13 agreed with the majority decision. 
On 20 October 1971, the SC, by thirteen votes to none 
with two abstentions, adopted Res 301 in which it accepted 
the court's Advisory Opinion. The United Kingdom and 
France, doubtless encouraged by the dissenting opinions of 






For this judgment, see supra II ( 3) ( c) . 
1971 ICJ Reports 50 
Cf Junius (n46) 34. 
1971 ICJ Reports 51. 
Although he rejected the Court's Advisory Opinion, the 
French delegate argued that South Africa was under an 
obligation to negotiate in good faith with the UN for 
the establishment of an international regime: 1971 
November UN Monthly Chronicle 14. The British delegate 
explained that his Government would abstain on the 
grounds that it was unable to· accept the Court's 
opinion of the validity of Res 2145 (XXI): 197~ 
November UN Monthly Chronicle 26. 
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(e) Conclusion 
The 1950, 1955, and 1956 Advisory Opinions were both 
legally and politically significant. From a strictly legal 
point of view they filled a legal vacuum which had 
threatened the continued existence of the South West Africa 
Mandate. In so doing, the Court furnished the political 
organs of the UN with the foundation for their authority 
and competence in respect of Namibia. These Opinions can be 
seen as the product of a creative attitude to the judicial 
function, one consistent with the ICJ's status as the 
principal judicial organ of the UN. 
In the eyes of most observers the 1966 judgment lacked 
credibility. From a purely legal point of view the attempt 
by the majority to distinguish between what the Court had 
said in 1962 and what it was saying in 1966 was 
unconvincing. From a political point of view, the court, at 
one stroke, alienated the overwhelming majority of states 
in the GA and condemned itself to an immediate future of 
opprobrium. In the final analysis, the 1966 judgment does 
more to. illuminate the functioning of the Court and the 
perils of international adjudication than to solve the 
Namibian problem. As one writer has observed, it shows that 
judges' theories about law are highly significant in 
determining judicial decisions. 89 Thus, the discrepancy 
between the 1962 and 1966 decisions may be explained on the 
89 WM Reisman 'Revision of the South West Africa Cases' 
(1966) 7 VJIL 87. 
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basis of a conflict in judicial philosophy between two 
schools of interpretation: the teleoloiical or 
sociological, on the one hand, and the conceptual or 
formalistic, on the other. It was· even suggested that this 
dichotomy finds some reflection in the opposition between 
the common and civil-law approaches to the judicial 
function: for example, Judges Spender and Fitzmaurice as 
common-law judges were unable to move confidently in a 
legal order which (because of its incompleteness) required 
the judge to legislate.~ 
The 1971 Opinion as a whole failed to find complete 
acceptance. Some States have questioned or rejected certain 
aspects of the Court's findings. In particular, two 
permanent Members of the SC, France and the United Kingdom, 
formally rejected the conclusions reached by the Court. In 
the final analysis, the 1971 Opinion did not provide the 
international community with the solid platform it required 
to complete the process (that had been initiated by the 
General Assembly in 1966) of evicting SA. 
Summing up, however, it may be said that all organs of 
the UN, the GA, the SC, and the ICJ, found that South 
Africa's presence in Namibia was illegal and that South 
Africa had no right to administer the Territory. 91 
90 
91 
s Slonim south West. Africa and the United Nations 
( 1973) 355-6. 
Only South Africa and Portugal voted against GA'Res 
2145 (XXI); France and United Kingdom abstained. 
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III. PROCESS OF INDEPENDENCE 
Following the unanimous adoption of Res 385 {1976) (which 
demanded free and fair elections in Namibia), the five 
western members of the SC {France, United Kingdom, and the 
United States - as permanent members - together with Canada 
and the Federal Republic of Germany) approached the South 
African Government with a view to developing a settlement 
proposal which could lead to free and fair elections and 
independence for the Territory. The South African 
Government agreed that it would participate in such a 
process on the clear understanding that the people of the 
Territory should be allowed to decide their own future 
without intimidation from whatever source. 
Over the following two years there were serious and 
protracted discussions between the so-called 'Western Five' 
and South Africa, on the one hand, and the South African 
Government and leaders of Namibia, on the other. These 
culminated in the settlement proposals which the Western 
Five presented to the South African Government on 10 April 
1978. 1 
The objective of the settlement proposal was to bring 
about a transition to independence for Namibia, acceptable 
to all concerned parties. The key element of the proposal 
related to the holding of elections in the Territory, while 
allowing for an appropriate UN role. It was foreseen that 
For the full text see Western Proposals for Settlement 
UN-Doc S/12636. 
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the Secretary-Genera~ of the UN would appoint a Special 
Representative whose central~task would be to ensure that 
conditions were established which could allow free and fair 
elections and an impartial electoral process. The Special 
Representative would be assisted by the United Nations 
Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) . 2 
The purpose of the envisaged elections would to be 
elect representatives to a Constituent Assembly which would 
draw up and adopt, by a two-thirds majority, a constitution 
for an independent and sovereign Namibia. 3 In carrying out 
these responsibilities the Special Representative would 
work together with the Administrator-General, as the 
representative of the South African Government in the 
Territory. 
The proposal was formally endorsed by SC Res 435 on 29 
September 1978. This Resolution can be regarded as the most 
significant act of the UN in the Namibian di~pute. 
Resolution 435 (1978) reads: 
2 
3 
'The Security Council, 
1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General 
(S/12827) for the implementation of the proposals 
for a settlement of the Namibian situation 
(S/12636) and its explanatory statement(S/12869); 
2. Reiterates that its objective is the withdrawal 
of South Africa's illegal administration of 
Namibia and the transfer of power to the people 
of Namibia with the assistance of the United 
Nations in accordance with Resolution 385 (1976); 
Western Proposals for Settlement op cit (ii) 5. 
Western Proposals for Settlement op cit (ii) 6. 
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3. Decides to establish under its authority a United 
Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in 
accordance with the above mentioned report of the 
Secretary-General for a period up to 12 months in 
order to assist his Special Representative to 
carry out the Mandate conferred upon him by 
paragraph 1 of Security Council Resolution 431 
(1978), namely, to ensure the early independence 
of Namibia through free and fair elections under 
the supervision and control of the United 
Nations; 
4. Welcomes SWAPO's preparedness to co-operate in 
the implementation of the Secretary-General's 
report, including its expressed readiness to sign 
and observe the case-fire provisions as 
manifested in the letter from the President of 
SWAPO dated 8 September 1978 (S/12841); 
5. Calls upon South Africa forthwith to co-operate 
with the Secretary-General in the implementation 
of this Resolution; 
6. Declares that all unilateral measures taken by 
the illegal administration in Namibia in relation 
to the electoral process, including unilateral 
registration of voters, or transfer of power, in 
contravention of Security Council Resolutions 385 
(1976), 431 (1978) and this Resolution, are null 
and void; 
C 
7. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the 
Security Council no later than 23 October 1978 on 
the implementation of this Resolution.' 
After the adoption of this Resolution the concerned 
parties entered a number of further agreements which, 
together with the settlement proposal, form a comprehensive 
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whole. 4 The most important agreement was a document about 
'Principles Concerning the Constituent Assembly and the 
Constitution for an Independent Namibia'. 5 
That was the beginning of one of the most extensive UN 
operations in the history of the Organisation. More than 
8 000 soldiers from more than 100 countries were 
distributed among 200 offices throughout Namibia. The total 
expenses of the operation were about 400 million US$ (US-
Dollar) . 6 The main task of UNTAG was to secure the 
execution of the principles laid down in Res 435 (i978), in 
particular, free and fair elections for a Constituent 
Assembly. 
The election took place from 7 to 11 November 1989. 97 
per cent of those eligible voted. SWAPO won the election by 
an absolute majority of 57,3 per cent, followed by DTA with 
28,6 per cent. 7 On 21 November .1989, the elected 
representatives of the Namibian people held their first 
parliamentary session. The Assembly with the help of South 
African experts, Arthur Chaskalson, Prof Marinus Wiechers 
and. Prof Gerhard Erasmus, drew up a cons ti tut ion, which was 




First, a 1982 agreement that UNTAG would monitor SWAPO 
bases in Angola and Zambia; secondly informal 
understandings in 1982 on the question of 
impartiality; and thirdly a 1985 agreement that the 
elections would be based on a system of proportional 
representation. 
UN-Doc S/15287. 
UNTAG A new Nation is born 2. 
7 Deutsch-Namibische Gesellschaft e V Namibia hat 
gewahlt 10. 
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February 1990. 8 Independence day for Namibia was set for 
21 March 1990. When the Namibian flag w.as hoisted, it 
announced the birth of a new, independent State and the end 
of one of the most successful UN operations in the history 
of the Organisation. 9 
8 
9 
For a detailed analysis of the Cons ti tut ion see H 
Melber 'The constitution of Namibia' (1990) 6 DGVN 105 
seq and H Weiland 'Namibia am Beginn eines eigenen 
Weges' (1990) 1 Namibia Magazin 8 seq. 
'Many people are calling this a success for the United 
Nations, which it is. But we who worked so closely 
with Namibians in every corner of this country -
through repatriation, registration, the campaign and 
the election - know that the real success is yours. 
We admire your determination in seeing through 
the election process fairly, your generous spirit in 
seeking reconciliation with each other and your wisdom 
in drafting a constitution that is an inspiration to 
the world. 
We leave Namibia grateful for having had the op-
portunity to help an extraordinary people achieve a 
historic goal. We will cherish the memory of this ex-
perience for the rest of our lives.' Special Represen-
tative, Martti Athisaari, on 22 March 1990, in 
Windhoek. Cited by UNTAG (n6) 49. 
- 61 -
IV. THE UNITED NATIONS COUNCIL FOR NAMIBIA 
(1) Emergence, functional organisation, and field of 
competence 
On 27 October 1966, the GA of the UN adopted Res 2145 {XXI) 
by which it terminated the Mandate of South Africa over 
Namibia and placed the Territory under the direct 
responsibility of the UN. In the following year, the GA 
created the United Nations Council for South West Africa,· 
later to be renamed the UNCfN, 1 and entrusted it with the 
following powers and functions: 
'(a) to administer South West Africa until independence 
with the maximum possible participation of the people 
of the Territory; 
(b) to promulgate such laws, decrees and administrative 
regulations as are necessary for the administration of 
the Territory until a legislative assembly is 
established following elections conducted on the basis 
of universal adult suffrage; 
{c) to take as an immediate task all the necessary 
measures, in consultation with the people of the 
Territory, for the establishment of a constituent 
assembly to draw up a constitution; 
(d) to take all necessary measures for the maintenance of 
law and order in the Territory; 
(e) to transfer all powers to the people of the Territory 
following the declaration of independence.' 2 
Finally, the Assembly requested the Council to entrust 
2 
See GA Res 2372 (XXII) of 12 June 1968. 
See GA Res 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967. 
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executive and administrative tasks, as it deemed necessary, 
to a United Nations Commissioner of South West Africa. 
At first, the Council consisted of eleven members, but 
was later3 enlarged to 31. 4 The Council was organised in 
two sections: the Council itself and the UN Commissioner, 
who was, in accordance with operative para 3 of Res 2248 
(S-V), the executive and administrative arm of the Council. 
(a) The council 
For the purpose of performing the Council's functions, an 
organ of 31 members was too large to operate. Thus the 
Council established a Steering Committee and three standing 
Committees. The Steering Committee met in closed sessions 
to discuss major policy issues and to consider and organise 
the procedures of the Council. It was composed of the 
President of the Council, three Vice-Presidents and the 
Chairmen of the three Standing Committees. 
The main tasks of the standing Committees were laid 




See GA Res 3031 (XXVII) of 18 December 1972 and GA Res 
3295 (XXIX) of 13 December 1974. 
The 31 Members of the Council were, in its last term 
of off ice in 1989, drawn from the following Member 
states of the UN: Algeria, Angola, Australia, 
Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burundi, 
Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Cyprus, Egypt, 
Finland, Guyana, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Liberia, 
Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Senegal, 
Turkey, Soviet Union, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zambia. 
Report UNCfN GAOR 34th Sess Suppl No 24 para 33-38. 
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Standing Committee I was responsible for the representation 
of Namibia with regard to foreign affairs. The 'Terms of 
Reference' differentiated in this connection between (i) 
the representation of the Territory in international 
organisations, (ii) consultations with the Member States of 
the UN and the Organisation of African Unity and (iii) 
other regional or political organisations interested in 
supporting the cause of the Namibian people. 
Standing Committee II was responsible for the internal 
administration of Namibia, in particular: 
'(a) to review the progress of the liberation struggle 
in Namibia in its political, military and social 
aspects and submit to the Council periodic 
reports related thereto; 
(b) to consider the compliance of Member States with 
the relevant United Nations resolutions on, 
Namibia, taking into account the Advisory Opinion 
of the ICJ of 1971; 
(c) to consider the activities of foreign economic 
interests operating in Namibia with a view to 
recommending appropriate policies to the Council 
in order to counter the support which those 
foreign economic interests give to the illegal 
South African administration in Namibia; 
(d) to consider all legal issues relating to the 
liberation struggle of the Namibian people for 
self-determination, freedom and national 
independence in a united Namibia and to the 
illegal South African administration in Namibia; 
(e) to consider the nature and scale of South African 
military installations and operations in Namibia 
in order to recommend to the Council ways and 
means of taking action against and denouncing 
South African military adventurism in Namibia.' 
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Standing Committee III had the task - in co-operation 
with the information bureau of the UN - to consider ways 
and means of increasing the dissemination of information 
relating to Namibia, and in this regard to recommend 
appropriate measures and policies to the Council. Besides 
this, it.had to organise and co-ordinate contacts by 
Council delegations with the media, educational and 
cultural institutions, and action and support groups. 6 
The Council for Namibia was associated with SWAPO, 
whose role and function must briefly be explained. The GA 
recognised SWAPO as 'the authentic representative of the 
Namibian people' 7 and accorded it observer status to 
participate in the sessions and work of the GA, including 
all conferences convened under the auspices of the 
Assembly. The GA accorded similar observer status to other 
African national liberation movements8 but SWAPO's status 
and relationship to the GA was administratively far closer 
than that of any other organisation or movement. SWAPO 
enjoyed a particular~y close relationship to the Council, 
in which it was formally an observer; but, in practice, no 




Besides the Standing Committees there was a Drafting 
Committee to prepare the annual reports of the Council 
to the GA and a committee on the United Nations Fund 
for Namibia, for the financial support of the Namibian 
people during the transition period. See GA Res 2679 
(XXV) of 9 December 1970. 
See GA Res 3111 (XXVIII) of 12 December 1973. 
The basic decision with regard to the African national 
liberation movements is to be found in GA Res 3280 
(XXIX) of 10 December 1974. 
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SWAPO. Moreover, a SWAPO representative was always included 
in missions or delegations of the Council. 9 
(b) The commissioner 
The Commissioner for Namibia was the executive and 
administrative arm of the Council. He was responsible for 
implementing the decisions of the Council and he engaged in 
a number of substantive activities such as: adminis~ration 
and supervision of the support programmes of the United 
Nations Fund for Namibia; execution of Decree No 1 for the 
protection of the natural resources of Namibia; research 
into foreign economic activities in the Territory; and 
demographic research about the people of Namibia. 10 He had 
offices in Gaborone (Botswana), Luanda (Angola), and Lusaka 
(Zambia). The Commissioner had also been designated the 
Special Representative of the Secretary~General within the 
framework of the settlement proposal approved by the SC in 
Res 431 (1978), a dual function which had given rise to 
some difficulties because the exercise of these two 
functions was not necessarily compatible. 
The position of the UN Commissioner for Namibia was 
occupied by, inter alios, the former Legal Adviser of the 
9 
10 
See Report UNCfN GAOR 36th Sess Suppl No 24 135 seq., 
A detailed survey of the Commissioner's activities is 
listed in all annual reports of the Council to the GA 
under the Chapter 'Activities of the _Office of the 
United Nations Commissioner for Namibia'. 
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UN, Stavropoulos, and the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General during the transition period to 
independence, Martti Athisaari. 
(2) Legal character of the United Nations council for 
Namibia 
(a) Introduction 
The legal basis for the Council itself and, hence its 
authority to 'promulgate such laws, decrees and 
administrative regulations as are necessary for the 
administration of the Territory', rested on uncertain 
ground. 11 The reason for this was the doubtful juridical 
11 The following authors affirmed the existence and par-
ticular rights of the Council: H G Schermers 'The 
Namibia Decree in national courts' (1977) 26 ICLQ 81 
seq; R Barsotti 'In tema di amministrazione diretta di 
territori non autonomi da parte dell'ONU: il- case 
della Namibia' (,1980) 16 Communicazioni e studi 55; F 
Rigaux 'Le Decret sur les Resources Naturelles de la 
Namibie adopte le 27 Septembre 1974 par le Conseil des 
Nations Unies pour la Namibie' (1976) 9 RDDH 471; I 
Sagay 'The right of the United Nations to bring ac-
tions in municipal courts in order to claim title to 
Namibian products exported abroad' (1972) 66 AJIL 600 
seq; AU Obozuwa The Namibian Question - legal and 
political Facts 147; J Faundez 'Namibia: the relevance 
of international law'(1986) 8 Third World Quarterly 
549 and J Castaneda Legal Effects of United Nations 
Resolutions 128. 
The following authors disapproved of the Council: H 
Booysen & GEY Stephan 'Decree No 1 of the United 
Nations Council for South West Africa' (1975) 1 SAYIL 
63 seq; L Herman 'The legal status of the United Na-
tions Council of Namibia' (1975) 13 CYIL 320; L Luc-
chini 'La Namibie, une construction des Nations Unies' 
(1969) 15 AFDI 366; s Solomon South West Africa and 
the United Nations: An International Mandate in Dis-
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basis of Res 2145 (XXI): the powers of the GA in 
terminating the Mandate of South Africa were questionable 
. 
since it acted without a binding decision of tne sc; 12 and 
the Resolution constitutive of the Council 13 was passed 
prior to any independent action by the SC confirming the 
GA's termination. It is clear, however, that the intention 
of the GA was to make the Council for Namibia an 
administering authority for Namibia (with full 
administrative and legislative powers) until the Territory 
achieved independence. The notion that a UN organ might act 
as an international administering authority is not 




pute 320; E Menzel & K Ipsen Volkerrecht 223; I Seidl-
Hohenveldern Das Recht der Internationalen or-
ganisationen 303; J F Engers 'The United Nations 
travel and identity documents for Namibians' (1971) 65 
AJIL 574; L Tauber 'Legal pitfalls on the road to Na-
mibian independence' (1979) 12 New York University 
Journal of International Law and Politics 386; c 
Cadoux 'L'Organisation des Natidns Unies et le 
Probleme de le'Afrique Australe - l' Evolution de la 
strategie des pressions internationales' (1977) 23 
AFDI 152 and S Carrillo & A Juan 'Un caso de decolo-
nizacion: el territorio del Sudoeste Africano'(1967) 
20 Revista Espanola de Derecho Internacional 425. 
See the above discussion about the treatment of Res 
2145 (XXI) in the 1971 Namibia opinion of. the ICJ. 
Res 2248 (S-V) was adopted by 85 votes to 2, with 30 
abstentions. The large number of abstentions and the 
fact that all major powers except China abstained, 
underlined the controversial nature of this decision. 
For a complete and considered record of the Members' 
attitudes towards Res 2145 (XXI) and 2248 (S-V), as 
well as other resolutions relating to Namibia, see, 
Report of the Secretary-General 'Compliance of Member 
States with the United Nations Resolutions and Deci-
sions relating to Namibia' UN-Doc A/AC 131/37 of 12 
March 1975. 
For examples see infra IV (2) (e). 
- 68 -
Irian, 15 where UN administration was established on the 
basis of an agreement between Indonesia and the 
Netherlands. 16 In the case of Namibia the establishment of 
the Council derived from resolutions of the GA. In this 
sense then, one can say that the Council for Namibia was 
unique in UN practice, because it was an attempt by the UN 
to set up an international administering authority without 
the express agreement of all the parties directly 
concerned. 
Nevertheless, the Council was a duly established 
subsidiary organ of the GA in terms of art 22 UN 
Charter, 17 and, at the very minimum, it had to be regarded 
as a legitimate organ within the legal order of the 
Organisation. Defining the Council as a subsidiary organ of 
the GA, does not clarify its actual powers, in particular 
whether the Council's actions were binding on the Member 
States of the Organisation. 
(b) As an exile government 




For further details on this case see J Leyser 'Dispute 
and agreement on New West Guinea' ( 1962) 10 ArchVR 257 
seq. 
Agreement_of 15 August 1962. The text is reprinted in 
the Report of the UNCfN GAOR 33rd Sess Suppl No 24 23-
24. 
Article 22 reads: 'The General Assembly may establish 
such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the 
performance of its functions.' 
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treat the Council as a lawful government for Namibia. The 
strongest argument in this regard derives from the fact 
that the Council was vested with powers which were 
comparable with those of a real government, viz: 
'to promulgate such laws decrees and administrative 
regulations as are necessary for the administration of 
the Territory. ' 18 
Besides, the financing of the Council's activities was on a 
basis similar to that of an ordinary executive power: 
'the administration of South West Africa under the 
United Nations shall be financed from revenues 
collected in the Territory. ' 19 
The UNCfN was, by the transfer of these powers, in a 
comparable situation to so-called 'exile governments 1 • 20 
These are governments which usually have only law-
enforcement agencies, very rarely legislatures, and which 
have their seats of government outside the territory of 
which they claim to be a government. 21 
One has to distinguish between governments which 





GA Res 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967 II 1 (b). 
GA Res op cit III 1 (a). 
Consequently the Council called itself the authentic 
representative of the Namibian people in the form of 
an exile government. See the former President of the 
Council 1970 May UN Monthly Chronicle 41. See also 
Provisional Record of the International Labour Con-
. ference 64th Sess 28; statement of the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 'In terms of 
status, the Council is ·comparable to a government in 
exile' (1982) 13 NYIL 184 and Seidl-Hohenveldern (nll) 
156. 
W Wengler Volkerrecht vol I 299. 
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external act of violence and those which are created in 
foreign territories. This difference can be found in a 
useful terminological distinction used in German law: 
authentic and non-authentic exile governments. 22 While an 
authentic exile government administered a territory -
lawfully established with regard to constitutional law -
before its expulsion, non-authentic exile governments do 
not fulfil these conditions. They are created in exile for 
an existing or future state and it makes no difference 
whether it had ever exercised public authority in the 
territory. 23 
Thus, the UNCfN can, at most, be regarded as a non-
authentic exile governent. These 'governments' are 
generally not accepted by the international community 
before they actually begin to control at least parts of the 
territory. 24 The Council sought to fulfil the requirement 
of territorial control; in other words, it tried to 
exercise de facto control over the Territory. But this 
attempt was frustrated because South Africa refused to 
allow Members of the Council to enter the Territory. 25 The 





This is my translation of the German terms 'echt' and 
'unecht'. See o Kimminich 'Volkerrechtsfragen zur 
exilpolitischen Betatigung' (1962) 10 ArchVR 148 seq. 
For examples see, K H Mattern Die Exilregierung 29 
seq. 
For example the de facto recognition of the De Gaulle 
Government by the United States and the United Kingdom 
on 11 July 1944. For further details on this case and 
more examples see, Mattern op cit 44 seq. 
See 1968 May UN Monthly Chronicle 50 seq. 
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institution of exile government was not applicable to the 
Council. Nevertheless, the essential point is that the 
Council lacked a criterion required for all exile 
governments: the support of the people of the territory on 
behalf of which it claimed to act. Such a support was 
obviously lacking in the case of the UNCfN; its 31 Members 
represented Member States of the UN. They had been elected 
by the GA in which the ·Namibian People had no vote at all. 
Besides this, the attempt to generate support of the 
Namibian people for the Council with help of SWAPO as the 
'authentic representative of the Namibian people 126 
failed. Although the Council worked closely with SWAP0, 27 
there were two reasons why this attempt was doomed to 
failure. First, the activities of SWAPO in the UN were 
limited to observing and advising. Secondly, SWAPO was 
composed mostly of Ovambos, who constituted 52 per cent of 
the black population of Namibia. Thus, SWAPO represented 
only 40-45 per c~nt of the total population of the 
Territory. Consequently - despite political opposition and 
the fact that not all ovambos supported SWAP028 - many 
European and other countries in the UN refused to recognise 




See GA Res 3111 (XXVIII) of 12 December 1973. 
See Report UNCfN GAOR 36th Sess Suppl No 24 vol I 135 
seq. 
In 1975 SWAPO called for a boycott of elections, but 
only 55 per cent of the Ovambo population responded. 
See R v Lucius 'Die verfassungs- und volkerrechtliche 
Entwicklung Namibias' (1975) 29 Journal der 




Summing up, it may be said that the· UNCfN could not be 
treated as an exile government without the overt expression 
of support by the Namibian people, and this was lacking 
during the Council's term of office. Consequently, the 
model of exile government as the basis of an autonomous 
administration was not applicable to the UNCfN. 
(c) Definition of the legal character in terms of t~e UN 
Charter 
Barsotti proposed another approach to the legal 
qualification of the UNCfN. 30 He regarded the Council as a 
subsidiary organ of the GA in terms of art 22 of the UN 
Charter, with the implication that it had extensive 
governmental powers under arts 1(2), 10, and 14 UN 
Charter. 31 This approach is noteworthy because Barsotti 
assumed that the UN Charter was the compulsory constitution 
for all Member States and any award of governmental powers 
to a UN organ must be explained in terms of the Charter. 
His reference to arts 10 and 14 of the Charter is 




See 1981 UNYB, 1130-2. 
Barsotti (nll) 53 seq: 
Barsotti (nll) 57-8. 
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of the GA to recommendations and debates. 32 Thus, neither 
is appropriate to explain the GA 1 s power to delegate 
governmental powers to a subsidiary organ. 
Further, because UNCfN was established in lieu of the 
former Mandatory, South Africa, it is possible that 
governmental powers could be delegated to the Council under 
Chapter XII- of the UN Charter ('Trusteeship System') . 33 
According to this chapter, after termination of the South 
African Mandate over Namibia the GA had constituted itself 
as the trustee for the Territory in terms of art 81 UN 
Charter. This legal basis meant, in the opinion of some 
authors, 34 that the UN could administer the Territory 
under the provisions of the International Trusteeship 
System (Chapter XII of the UN Charter). 
An essential requirement for the application of 
Chapter XII of the Charter, however, is that the territory 
to be administered should fall within the scope of art 
77(1). This article demands the conclusion of a trusteeship 





Article 10 'The General Assembly may discuss ... ' and 
art 14 'The General Assembly may recommend ... '. 
See the statement of H Jagota on 23 June 1981 during 
a seminar on the 'Legal Issues concerning the Question 
of Namibia' (UN-Doc A/AC 131/3). 
See Jagota op cit; Schermers (nll) 85 and H G 
Schermers International Institutional Law vol II 484. 
United states proposals during the negotiations of the 
San Francisco Conference to regulate the conclusion of 
trusteeship agreements unilaterally by the United 
Nations were refused. See RB Russel A History of the 
United Nations Charter - The Role of the United States 
1940-1945 332. 
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territories as may be placed thereunder by means of 
trusteeship agreements.' 36 Notwithstanding repeated 
requests by the GA, 37 a trusteeship agreement between 
South Africa and the UN was never concluded because of 
South Africa's refusal. Consequently, Chapter XII of the 
Charter does not apply, at least in so far as the 
governmental'powers of the GA to administer a former trust 
territory are concerned. The ICJ confirmed this view in its 
Advisory Opinion of 1950, 38 by denying that the provisions 
of Chapter XII of the Charter were applicable to the 
Territory. 39 
From the above it is evident that neither the model of 
an exile government nor Chapter XII of the UN Charter can 
be used as a basis of authority for the powers exercised by 
the Council. Are.there any other ways of legitimating UN 
administration of the Territory? 
Following GA Res 2145 (XXI) of 1967, which declared 
any South African administration within Namibia illegal, 
there was an administrative vacuum. The UNCfN had a general 
authority of the UN to take up responsibility in default of 





Article 77(1) UN Charter. 
See GA Res 65 (I) of 14 December 1946; GA Res 141 (II) 
· of 1 November 1947; GA Res 227 (III) of 26 November 
1948; GA Res 337 (IV) of 6 December 1949 and GA Res 
449 B (V) of 13 December 1950. 
See supra II (3) (b), which deals with the ICJ Opinion 
of 1950. 
See GA Res 338 (IV) of 6 December 1949. 
- 75 -
'It is inconceivable that the interests of the people 
of a territory placed under the sacred trust of 
civilisation by the League of Nations, over which the 
General Assembly exercised a supervisory role for 21 
years and which has ultimately been brought under a 
direct responsibility of the United Nations, should be 
delivered into a juridical vacuum. 140 
To argue the contrary would mean that the Organisation 
would have been forced to tolerate an illegal situation 
until South Africa agreed to a trusteeship agreement. 
The power to act could even be construed as an 
obligation to act in terms of the right of self-
determination as laid down in arts 1(2) and 55 of the UN 
Charter. The abstract right of self-determination was put 
in concrete terms in many UN resolutions, codifications and 
declarations and is today a generally re~ognised principle 
of international law. 41 (Some authors even hold that the 
right is part of ius cogens) . 42 In this context, however, 
it is sufficient to acknowledge the Namibian people's right 





UN Interoffice Memorandum by Eric suy, Legal Counsel, 
·UN-Doc 23A/No 82 of 20 April 1982. 
See, K Doehring 'Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Volker 
als unumstoBlicher Grundsatz des Volkerrechts' (1974) 
14 Berichte der deutschen Gesellschaft fur Volkerrecht 
15-19. 
I Brownlie Principles of Public International Law 513 
and 515. 
See GA Res 1514 (XV) of 14 Decmber 1960 (Declaration 
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and Peoples) which is the fundamental resolution for 
the right of self-determination of colonial people. 
This general principle was concreted 1n GA Res 1803 
(XVII) of 14 December 1962; GA Res 2625 (XXI) of 24 
October 1970; GA Res 3171 (XXVIII) of 5 February 1974 
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confirmed by all UN organs44 and all Member states of the 
Organisation, 45 including South Africa.~ 
·BY termination of South Africa's Mandate over the 
Territory in 1967, 47 the UN had the obligation to realise 
the right of self-determination for the Namibian people. 
From this point of view, the UN bound itself to establish 
an administration for the Territory, based on the 
principles of the UN Charter, to bring about the immediate 
independence of the Namibian people. The UN discharged this 
. obligation by establishing of the UNCfN. 48 This did not 
correspond to the principles for the administration of non-
self-governing territories laid down in Chapter XII of the 
UN Charter (Trusteeship System), because there was no 
treaty agreement between the Mandatory and State(s) or the 
Organisation.w 
It is obvious that the organs of any international 
organisation are obliged to meet the constitutional goals 
of the organisation by using the institutions provided. The 







and GA Res 3201 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974. 
For instance, GA Res 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967; SC Res 
309 of 4 February 1972 and the 1971 Advisory Opinion 
of the Court 1971 ICJ Reports 31 seq. 
See supra II 3 (e). 
See J Dugard The South West Africa/Namibia Dispute 
523. 
GA Res 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966. 
GA Res 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967. 
See arts 75 and 77 UN Charter. 
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explicitly mentioned in the Charter, is possible only on 
the understanding.that ther,e is no othe~ way of discharging 
obligations within the UN system. Thu9 ~ with respect to the 
UNCfN, its establishment was lawful 'if the system for the 
administration of non-self-governing territories (Chapter 
XII of the UN Charter) was unavailable. This argument 
depends on whether there were other possible ways, apart 
from establishing the Council, of administering Namibia 
during the transition. 
(i) conclusion of trusteeship agreements in terms of 
Chapter XII UN Charter 
In the first instance it must be determined whether the UN 
could transfer the Territory into the trusteeship system of 
the Charter by concluding an agreement with South Africa, 
other States, or SWAPO. 
The conclusion of a trusteeship agreement with South 
Africa was unrealistic. Despite all their efforts and 
repeated requests by the GA and the sc, 50 South Africa was 
not willing to co-operate; 51 it tried, on the contrary, to 
incorporate the Territory as its fifth province. However, 
50 
51 
See GA Res 85 (I) of 14 December 1946; GA Res 141 (II) 
of 1 November 1947; GA Res 227 (III) of 26 November 
1948; GA Res 337 (IV) of 6 December 1949; GA Res 449 
B (V) of 13 December 1950 and at last GA Res 1143 
(XII) of 25 October 1957 and GA Res 1243 (XIII) of 30 
October 1958. 
See GAOR 2nd Sess 4th Committee 134-5 Doc A/334. 
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one might envisage a trusteeship agreement with another 
State or group of States. 52 Even here, a basic requirement 
for the application of the trusteeship system was missing. 
Fiduciary administration in terms of arts 73 seq of the 
Charter is possible only if the territory concerned is not 
capable of self-government. In the case of Namibia, since 
GA Res 2248 (S-V) of 1967, the UN had assumed that the 
people of Namibia were prepared for self-government, 
because the rights vested in the Council by that Resolution 
contemplated the early independence of the Territory. 53 In 
addition it would have been virtually impossible to find 
consensus on the selection of a trustee or trustees, 
because of the different attitudes states had to 





An example can be found in the case of Somaliland 
which obtained independence on 1 July 1960. This 
formerly Italian colony was administered for 10 years 
by Italy (as the official Mandatory) and a trusteeship 
council consisting of representatives from Colombia, 
Egypt and Philippines. See, for further details, GA 
Res 289 (IV) of 21 November 1949; 1950 UNYB 797 seq 
and G A. Costanzo The Administration of Somaliland 
1950-1955. National Studies on International 
Organisation: Italy and the United Nations. 
In this sense also see SR Res 385 (1976) and SR Res 
435 (1978). 
See 1967 UNYB 694; 1960 October Revue des Nations 
Unies 69. The only example - besides Somaliland - of 
a group of states acting as an administering authority 
was the regime for Nauru, consisting of 
representatives from Australia, New Zealand and United 
Kingdom. Article 4 of the trusteeship agreement, 
however, stated that Australia - in the name of the· 
three States - exercised full administrative and 
legislative power. See UNTS vol 10 3. 
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Finally, one might consider a trusteeship agreement 
with SWAPO as the 'authentic representative of the Namibian 
people'. There is no basis in the Charter, however, for the 
exercise of administrative powers by a liberation movement 
like SWAPO. Article 81 of the Charter states that the task 
of an administering authority could be fulfilled only by 
'one or more States or the organisation itself'. 55 More, 
importantly, a trusteeship agreement with SWAPO would 
contradict art 81 UN Charter. The administering powers of 
the trustee are extensive, and most trusteeship agreements 
gave the trustee 'full power of legislation, administration 
and jurisdiction'. 56 If SWAPO could have fulfilled these 
tasks it would have been established as an independent 
government in Namibia. Apart from the difficulty of 
treating SWAPO as a government for the Namibian people, 57 
the sense of art 76(b) of the Charter ('development towards 
self-determination') would have been fulfilled, and the 
application of the trusteeship system would have been 
point-less. 
Summing up, there was no realistic possibility of the 




Membership in the UN is not necessary. So, for 
example, in case of Somaliland mentioned above, when 
.the trusteeship agreement between Italy and Somaliland 
was concluded on 2 December 1950, Italy was not a 
member of the Organisation. 
For instance, art 5 of the Tanganyika-Trusteeship 
Agreement with United Kingdom. See UNTS vol 8 94. 
See, for this problem, supra IV (2) (b). 
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(ii) sanctions by the security council in terms of 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
Apart from concluding trusteeship agreements, the UN might 
have terminated South Africa's illegal de facto 
administration over Namibia by initiating sanctions in 
terms of Chapter VII of the Charter. Leaving aside the 
question of efficacy of sanctions in solving conflicts, the 
initiation of sanctions in terms of arts 41 and 42 would 
have been conceivable, because all necessary requirements 
of art 33(1) of the Charter58 for a peaceful settlement of 
the dispute had been ignored by south Africa. 
On 13 April 1978, the 'Committee on the implementation 
of the declaration of the granting of independence' adopted 
a Resolution recommending 
'that the Security Council consider taking appropriate 
measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations to secure South Africa's speedy 
compliance with the Council's decisions. 159 
So, in 1981, the former GDR and the Soviet Union applied to 
the SC for sanctions against South Africa to secure the 




A basic requirement for the initiation of sanctions, 
Article 33 (1) UN Charter provides: 'shall first of 
all, seek solution by negotiations, enquiry, 
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial 
settlement, resort to regional agencies or 
arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own 
choice.' 
See 1978 UNYB 229. 
See 1981 UNYB 1129. 
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however, was that the situation in Namibia posed a threat 
to international peace and security. 61 Efforts to 
characterise the situation as such were consistently 
thwarted by the permanent Members - United Kingdom, France 
and the United States - and by the objections of the 
Western Five. These States argued that there was no threat 
to international peace and security in the case of Namibia 
and that negotiations between South Africa and the UN 
should not be pre-empted. Besides, the United states 
doubted the efficacy of sanctions (for the international 
community as well as for the Namibian people) to reach 
immediate independence for the Territory. 62 
Hence it appears that a solution of the problem by 
initiation of sanctions in terms of Chapter VII of the 
Charter was politically impossible in the UN. 
(d) Direct UN-authority 
From the above examination it is evident that there was no 
61 
62 
See arts 41 and 42 UN Charter. The only case in the 
history of the UN (before the Gulf War) in which the 
SC initiated sanctions in terms of art 41 was the 
former Southern-Rhodesia (today Zimbabwe) by SR Res 
221 (1966) of 9 April 1966. For a comparison of this 
with the Namibian case see, AS Minty in P Taylor & A 
· J R Groom (eds) Utilizing the System: A Non-
governmental Perspective 428. He comes to the 
conclusion that there were no differences regarding 
the requirements for sanctions, and that accordingly 
the initiation of sanctions is a political rather than 
a legal que~tion. 
See 1981 UNYB 1137. 
- 82 -
method under the Charter for the UN to discharge its 
obligations towards the Namibian people as prescribed in 
arts 1(2) and 55. The only option available was for the 
organisation to directly undertake the powers of 
administration itself by internationalising the Territory. 
Internationalism means the limitation of a State's 
sovereignty by an international contract and the transfer 
of the State's administration to a community of States, an 
international commission or another organ. 63 The degree 
and scope of the international administration may differ 
according to the form of the internationalism: a 
distinction can be drawn between international· 
administration with full~ or limited65 governmental 
powers. 
In contrast to all examples of internationalism in the 
history of the Organisation, in the case of Namibia there 
was no agreement between the parties concerned {South 
Africa and the UN). On the contrary, the UN unilaterally 
declared the termination of the Mandate.and constituted 




See K Herndl in K Strupp (ed} Worterbuch des 
Volkerrechts ~ol II 138-9. 
For instance, the administration of the 'Saargebiet' 
between 1919 and 1935 (arts. 50-58 Treaty of 
Versailles); the international zone of Tangier 
(Tangier-Convention of 1923) and status of the Free 
City of Danzig 1919 to 1939 (arts 100-108 Treaty of 
Versailles}. 
So, for instance, the administration of the 'Seedonau' 
(mouth of the Danube) by the European Danube-
Commission 1856 to 1940, which was authorised to 
administer the Territory only with regard to shipping 
traffic. 
-- --· ---- . -------
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UN administration of the Territory was illegal, but 
legality must be established, since the UN may not exercise 
administering authority without an international contract. 
In other words, can the UN exercise administering powers 
outside the Charter? 
Kelsen categorically denies the exercise of 'rights of 
sovereignty' outside the provisions of art 81 UN 
Charter.~ He gives the following reasons for his opinion: 
'No provision of the Charter confers upon the 
Trusteeship Council other functions than those 
relating to trust territories. Neither the General 
Assembly nor the Security Council has the power to 
confer upon the Trusteeship Council functions which 
are outside of the trusteeship system. The fact that 
the Charter does not expressly preclude the General 
Assembly or Security Council from delegating to the 
Trusteeship Council the performance of special tasks 
not included in the trusteeship system does not 
justify such delegation. Jhe principle: what is not 
forbidden is permitted, may apply to the relationship 
of a subject to the legal order. Organs of a community 
are permitted to perform only those acts which the 
legal order authorises the organs to perform. 
Otherwise, any constitution of a national as well as 
of an international community would be meaningless. To 
confer upon the Trusteeship Council functions outside 
of the trusteeship system is unconstitutional even if 
these functions have some similarity to the 
trusteeship functions. such similarity cannot be 
substituted for the missing authorisation by the' 
Charter. ' 67 
~ 
67 
H Kelsen The Law of the United Nations 833 seq. 
Kelsen op cit 684-5. 
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A similar remark was made by the British Minister of State 
for Foreign Affairs, when commenting on the proposal that 
Antarctica should be placed under United Nations 
sovereignty: 'there is no provision in the United Nations 
Charter for accepting the sovereignty of this or any other 
part of world. 168 
In contradistinction to this view, most scholars 
agree69 that the exercise of administrative powers by the 




'In the first place, article 81 of the Charter 
expressly provides that the authority administering a 
trust territory may be one or more states or the 
Organisation itself. This is not, of course, the same 
thing as saying expressly that the United Nations 
shall have the capacity to be sovereign over a trust 
or any other territory, but it is a clear indication 
that the United Nations was intended to possess 
sufficient personality to exercise jurisdiction and 
control over territory. The difference between the 
exercise of jurisdiction and control and the 
possession of sovereignty is sufficiently small for it 
House of Commons Debates vol 551 col 1758 25 April 
1956. Similar observations were made by the Secretary 
of State of the United States in relation to the 
possibility of placing Cyprus under the control of 
NATO; see Department of state Bulletin (1956) 34 713. 
E Lauterpacht 'The contempary practice of the United 
Kingdom in the field of International Law' ( 1956) 5 
ICLQ 411-12; J Leyser (n14) 270-1; I von Munch 
. 'Volkerrechtsfragen der Antarktis' (1958) 7 ArchVR 
251; E Klein Statusvertrage im Volkerrecht 303; A 
Vedovato 'Les accords de tutelle' (1950) 76 Academie 
de Droit International (RdC) 655; F Seyersted 'United 
Nation Forces - some legal problems' ( 1961) 37 BYIL 
447 seq and J H Verzijl International Law in 
Historical Perspective vol III 473. 
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to be of real importance. There would seem no good 
reason in law for drawing a distinction between the 
capacity of the United Nation to administer a trust 
territory and its capacity to administer other 
,territories. ' 70 
Even the practice of the UN showed that Kelsen's 
restrictive interpretation was not tenable in international 
law. 71 Furthermore, there are examples outside the 
practice of the UN of international organisations wielding 
general administering powers. The ca~e of the 'Saarbecken' 
is one: according to the Treaty of Versailles this 
Territory was administered by a body ('Regierungsrat') 
which represented the League of Nations. The 
'Regierungsrat' had full administrative power, including 
legislative, judicial and fiscal competence. 72 This case 
is comparable to that of Namibia because both administering 
powers were temporally limited according to their term of 
office (the UNCfN until independence of the Territory and 
the 'Regierungsrat' until the plebiscite in 1934). 
Another argument in favour of UN competence to 
administer territories outside Chapter XII of the Charter 
is the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ in the Reparations for 
Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations 





Lauterpacht op cit 411-12. 
See infra IV ·(2) (f), dealing with examples of UN 
administration outside Chapter XII of the Charter. 
Paragraphs 20, 25 and 26 Annex to arts 45 to 50 of the 
Treaty of Versailles. 
1949 ICJ Reports 174 seq. 
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'Under international law, the Organisation must be 
deemed to have those powers which, though not 
expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon 
it by necessary implication ~s being essential to the 
performance of its duties. 174 
In its judgment of 20 July 1962~ the ICJ stated that: 
'the functions and powers conferred by the Charter on 
the General Assembly are not confined to discussions, 
considerations, the initiation of studies and the 
making of recommendations; they are not merely 
hortatory.' 
Similarly, in an Advisory Opinion of 1954, the Court 
pointed out that although the Charter contains 'no express 
provision for the establishment of judicial bodies or 
organs and no indication to the contrary', the capacity to 
establish a tribunal to do justice as between the 
Organisation and staff members 'arises out of the 
Charter'. 76 In other words the Court supported the 






ICJ Reports op cit 182. 
Certain Expenses of the UN Case 1962 ICJ Reports 151 
seq. 
Effects of Awards of Compensation made by the United 
Nations Administrative Tribunal 1954 ICJ Reports 56. 
See also in favour of the existence of implied powers 
of the GA the ICJ's West-Sahara Opinion 1974 ICJ 
Reports 12 seq and the 1971 Namibia Opinion 1971 ICJ 
Reports 15 seq where the Court stated: 'it would not 
be correct to assume that, because the General 
Assembly is in principle vested with recommendatory 
powers, it is debarred from adopting in specific cases 
within the framework of its competence, resolutions 
which make determinations or have operative design.' 
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(e) UNO-practice in comparable cases 
There are some examples in State practice of the 
recognition of the UN's capacity to administer or to 
supervise the administration of territories other than 
trust territorie~. The first is the case of Trieste. In the 
Peace Treaty with Italy of 10 February 1947, 78 provision 
was made for the establishment for a Free Territory of 
Trieste. 79 Organisational questions were laid down in a 
Protocol annexed to the Treaty. Although the Protocol never 
came into force (on 5 October 1954, United Kingdom, Italy, 
Yugoslavia and the United States signed in London a 
Memorandum which parcelled out the Territory between Italy 
and Yugoslavia), it provided evidence of the UN's capacity 
to supervise the administration of a territory. Article 2 
of the Statute provided 'the integrity and independence of 
the Free Territory shall be assured by the Security 
Council 1 • 80 This responsibility implied tha~ the Council 
should ensure the observance of the Protocol (and in 
particular the protection of the basic human rights of the 
inhabitants) and ensure the maintenance of public order and 




For text see UNTS (1950) 49 139. 
Article 21 of the Peace Treaty with Italy. 
In the case of Trieste the SC, not the GA, was the 
administering power because of. the particular 
situation which was a threat to international peace 
and security. See HJ Schlochauer 'Berichterstattung 
zu volkerrechtlichen Fragen von europaischer 
Bedeutung' (1949) 1 ArchVR 69 seq. 
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disallow legislation which in its view contradicted the 
Protocol. 
A second example is the city of Jerusalem. By a series 
of Resolutions passed between 1947 and 1948, the GA 
provided that the city should be placed under a special 
international regime subject to UN control. Article 1 of 
the draft Statute81 establishing this regime constituted 
the city as 'a corpus under the administration of the 
United Nations'. The Governor of the city, who was 
entrusted 'on the behalf of the United Nations' with full 
executive power, was to be appointed by and be responsible 
to the Trusteeship Council. 82 He had the power to conduct 
the external affairs of the city and to conclude treaties 
on its behalf. 83 Although, there was no express 
disposition of the Territory to the UN, it was clear that 
the Organisation or its representative, the Governor, was 
intended under the Statute to exercise extensive powers 
amounting to full sovereignty. 
The final example is that of Palestine. Because of 
its similarity to the case of Namibia, it is the most 
apposite case. Apart from South West Africa, Palestine was 




Report of the Trusteeship Council on the Question of 
an international regime for the Jerusalem area and the 
protection of the holy places GAOR 5th Sess Suppl No 
9 Annex II 19 seq. 
Articles 12 and 13 of the above mentioned Statute. 
See art 37 of the Statute. 
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independent nor transferred into the UN Trusteeship 
System.~ The United Kingdom as the Mandatory power could 
not find a solution for the future of the Territory that 
would meet the wishes of the majority Arab population and 
the minority Jewish population. on 2 April 1947 the British 
Government submitted the problem to the GA 'to make 
recommendations under article 10 of the Charter concerning 
the future government of Palestine'.M On 25 May 1947, the 
GA established the 'United Nations Special Committee on 
Palestine' consisting of 11 Members. 86 In August 194 7, 
this Committee submitted a proposal ('Partition Plan with 
Economic Union') which suggested an Arab and a Jewish 
constituent State. 87 On 29 November 1947, the GA adopted 
Res 181 (II) which established the 'United Nations 
Palestine Commission (UNPC)' to realise the plan proposed 






'The administration of Palestine shall, as the 
Mandatory power withdraws its armed forces, be 
progressively turned over to the Commission which 
After the end of the First World War Palestine became 
a mandated Territory with the United Kingdom as 
Mandatory under the supervision of the League of 
Nations. 
Cited from RN Chowdhuri International Mandates and 
Trusteeship Systems - a comparative Study 105. 
The 11 Member states were: Canada, Czechoslovakia, 
Guatemala, Holland, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay, Australia, 
India, Iran and Yugoslavia. 
Chowdhuri (n85) 108. 
The Members were: Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Panama, 
Denmark and Philippines. 
- 90 -
shall act in conformity with the recommendations of 
the General Assembly under the guidance of the 
Security Council.'~ 
The UNPC had, inter alia, the following tasks: to establish 
a body for each constituent State which would have the 
power to administer the Territory; to maintain security in 
the Territory by organising a police force; to hold and 
observe elections for a constituent assembly and to 
establish an economic council for the preparation of a tax 
and monetary union.~ 
Like the case of Namibia, the UNPC could not exercise 
these extensive powers effectively because the United 
Kingdom refused to co-operate with the Commission or to 
recognise it. 91 The United Kingdom changed its attitude on 
15 May 1948, however, and recognised the Commission as the 
'sole authority which will be the Government of 
Palestine'. 92 On 16 May 1948, the UNPC was dissolved by 






The United Kingdom's recognition does not weaken the 
GA Res 181 (II) of 29 November 1947. 
GA Res 181 (II) op cit. 
See the statement of the UNPC to the GA of 10 April 
1948 GAOR 2nd Sess Suppl No 1 36: 'The armed hostility 
of both Palestinian and non-Palestinian Arab elements, 
the lack of co-operation from the mandatory power, the 
disintegrating security situation in Palestine and the 
fact that the Security Council did not furnish the 
Commission with the necessary armed assistance are the 
factors which have made it impossible for the 
Commission to implement the Assembly's resolution.' 
Report UNPC GAOR 2nd Sess Suppl No 1 7. 
See GA Res 189 (S-II) of 16 May 1948. 
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precedent value of the UNPC in the present argument. The~e 
are two characteristics in particular which would suggest 
that the Council had extensive powers of administration 
over the Territory of Namibia: first in the field of 
functions (in terms of the establishment of a police force, 
the functions of the UNPC were even more extensive than the 
functions of the Council); and, secondly, and more 
importantly, although the constitutive Resolution for the 
UNPC demanded a SC hearing before the Commission could 
execute its tasks,~ resolutions passed by the UNPC were 
binding and would immediately become effective unless the 
Commission had previously received contrary instructions 
from the SC. 95 
Apart from the fact that the UNPC could never 
discharge its tasks (because of circumstanc~s which are not 
relevant to the Namibian problem) it is a useful precedent 
for the UNCfN. The UNPC (as a subsidiary organ of the GA) 
was an accepted authority for a particular territory. In 
this context it is important to note, that the legal basis 
for the Commission was based on a GA Resolution. 
94 
95 
'The General Assembly requests that the Security 
Council consider whether the situation in Palestine 
constitutes a threat to the peace. If it decides that 
such a threat exists, the Security Council should 
empower the Commission to exercise in Palestine the 
functions which are assigned to it by this 
Resolution'. See GA Res 181 (II) part II No 14. 
GA Res 181 op cit No 15. 
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(f) Conclusions 
From the above discussion it appears that the practice of 
the UN confirmed the Organisation's administrative powers 
outside Chapter XII of the Charter and that these powers 
could be exercised by a subsidiary organ of the GA in terms 
of art 22 UN Charter. Thus, the establishment of the UNCfN 
as a subsidiary organ of the GA was consonant with the UN's 
policy and practice in comparable cases. Hence it seems 
clear that the UNCfN was a legitimate organ for the 
execution of administering powers in the Territory until 
its independence. 
(3) Capacity of the council to represent Namibia in 
foreign relations 
Although UNCfN might have been the legitimate organ to 
administer the Territory, the question of the Council's 
capacity to act for the Territory in external matters is 
still unanswered. Such a power does not automatically arise 
from UNCfN's double role as an organ of the GA in terms of 
art 22 of the Charter and as the 'legal administering 
authority for Namibia 1 • 96 The implication of this dual 
capacity was merely that Members of the UN were obliged to 
accept the Council's actions regarding the Territory as 
those of a legitima~e,Namibian government. Above all it 
96 See GA Res 32/9F of 4 November 1977. 
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would ha.ve been wrong to accord the Council the right to 
represent Namibia internationally with binding force on 
Member States. The corollary would be that the binding 
force of GA resolutions, and therewith a competence of the 
GA to enact binding laws, would also have to be accepted. 
The general legislative power of the GA, however, must be 
denied; it may act with legal effect only when competent 
under the Charter. 97 Apart from such matters resolutions 
of the GA are only recommendations to the Members: 
'It is in the nature of recommendations that, although 
on proper occasions they provide a legal authorisation 
for Members determined to act upon them individually 
or collectively, they do not create a legal obligation 
to comply with them. 198 
One has to proceed, however, from the generally 
accepted thesis that only sovereign States may act on 
behalf of their territory in international law.w One of 




H Kelsen The Law of the United Nations 195; A Stone 
Legal Control of International Conflict 275; G 
Fitzmaurice 'Hersch Lauterpacht - the scholar as 
judge' (1962) 38 BYIL 3 seq; F B Sloan 'The binding 
force of a "recommendation" of the General Assembly of 
the United Nations' ( 1948) 2'5 BYIL 1 seq; D H N Johnson 
'The effect of resolutions of the GA of the United 
Nations' (1955-6) 32 BYIL 97 seq. Also Judge 
Fitzmaurice in the Expenses case (1962) ICJ Reports 
210. 
Voting Procedure 1955 ICJ Reports 155. 
A VerdroB & Bruno Simma Universelles Volkerrecht -
Theorie und Praxis Jed para 378. He gives an extensive 
survey of the literature and a number of judgments and 
examples for this particular thesis. 
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the form of an independent authority. 100 Even if one could 
have qualified the Council as a government, which is not 
possible from my point of view, 101 it lacked independent 
authority because the UNCfN was a subsidiary organ of the 
GA, and as such subject to UN direction. Thus, if UNCfN 
lacked independence, as an element of statehood, 1~ it had 
no authority to represent Namibia in international law. 
If one simultaneously denied South Africa's power to 
represent the Territory after termination of the Mandate, 
there would have been no representative of the Namibian 
people in international relations and consequently no way 
of defending their interests in international organs. This 
would have been an untenable situation in terms of arts 
1(2) and 55 of the UN Cha:rter. Consequently, one has to 
understand the establishment of the Council as an 
obligation of the UN to discharge its responsibilities 
towards the Namibian people under the Charter. For the 
execution of this basic task it would have been impossible 




The definition of 'State' was adopted in the 
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of 
States of 1933: 'The State as a person of 
international law should possess the following 
qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a 
defined territory; (c) a government; and (d) capacity 
to enter into relations with other States.' For the 
requirement of the independence of the government see, 
VerdroB op cit para 380. 
See supra IV (2) (a), which deals with the legal 
qualification of the UNCfN as an exile government for 
Namibia. 
In this context it does not mean the political, but 
the 'external independence'. See D Gurist Der Begriff 
der Souveranitat im modernen Volkerrecht 105 seq. 
- 95 -
executive and legislative matters. This means that the 
UNCfN had of necessity -to be allowed to act for the 
Territory in international relations as the legitimate 
representative of the Namibian people. 
The Council's capacity in this regard would not be as 
extensive as in case of a sovereign state, because the UN 
administration for Namibia was based on the requirements of 
administration as laid down in arts 1, 73 and 76 of the 
Charter. Consequently, all actions of the Council had to 
find authority in the Charter. This would mean that the 
Council was not authorised to incur any unnecessary 
obligations for the later independent people of Namibia and 
it could act only for the purposes of development to self-
government and protection of natural resources and human 
rights. Only then would the Council's actions be valid in 
law. 
(4) Analysis of the council's actions 
(a) Multilateral activities - representation within the 
United Nations 
Since its establishment, the UNCfN considered one of its 
principal functions to be the representation of Namibia in 
international organisations and conferences, both in and 
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outside the UN. 1m In the initial period, the Council 
sought to obtain observer status in international 
organisations and conferences, and, where the constitution 
of the specialised agencies permitted, associate member 
status. 104 The 1971 Advisory Opinion of the ICJ105 gave 
added impetus to the Council's quest for international 
representation of Namibia and the Council conducted a 
campaign to obtain the approval of the GA in this regard. 
The campaign was successful, with the adoption of two 
Resolutions by the GA in 1976 and 1977. 1M The first of 
these Resolutions requested: 
'all specialised agencies and other organisations and 
conferences within the United Nations to grant full 
membership to the United Nations Council for Namibia 
so that it may participate in that capacity as the 
legal administering authority for Namibia in the work 
of those agencies, organisations and conferences.' 1~ 






There was no obligation for international 
organisations to allow any kind of membership in the 
Council because of its status as a subsidiary organ of 
the GA or as the lawful administration for the 
territory of Namibia. The decision to allow membership 
in special organs of the UN is exclusively reserved to 
the organ themselves, following the procedures laid 
down in their constitutions. 
For a detailed account on the. status as an observer 
and as an associate member see, E Suy 'The status of 
observers in international organisatiqns' (1978) 160 
Academie de Droit International (RdC) 75 seq. 
See supra II (3) (d). 
GA Res 31/149 of 20 December 1976 and GA Res 32/9 E of 
4 November 1977. 
GA Res 32/9 E of 4 November 1977. This Resolution was 
adopted by 120 votes to none, with 7 abstentions. 
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by the UNCfN, applied for membership in many organisations. 
Hence, in its last fiscal year (1989), Namibia was a full 
member of the UNIDO, ILO, FAO, UNESCO, ITU, IAEA, the 
Executive Committee of the -Programme of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees, and an associate member in 
WHO. It also had observer status in the OAU, WMO, WIPO, 
IMO, WTO and ICAO. 108 
From a legal point of view the admission of the 
Council to organisations, which reserve membership for 
'States', 109 'Nations' 110 or 'Countries', 111 is of 
particular interest. 
On the basis of the above mentioned Resolutions of the 
GA, 112 UNCfN decided to apply for full membership in the 
- FAO, and a formal request to this effect was addressed to 
the Director-General on 27 September 1977. 113 The 
Council's application was presented to the 19th Session of 
the FAO Conference. On 14 November 1977 the Conference 







See UNCfN GAOR 44th Sess Suppl No 24 para 180 seq and 
206. 
See, for instance, arts 3 and 4 of the UN Charter; art 
1(2) of the ILO Constitution; arts 3, 5 and 6 of the 
WHO Constitution; art 2(2) of UNESCO Constitution and 
art 11 section 2{c) and (d) of the IDA Constitution. 
See, for instance, art 2 of the FAO Constitution. 
See, for instance, article of agreement of IMF art 1 
sections 1 and 2; IBRD section 2(c), (e) and (f) and 
IFC art 9 section 2{c) and (d). 
See GA Res 31/149 and 32/9 E (nl06). 
See E Osieke 'Admission to membership in international 
organisations: the case of Namibia {1980) 51 BYIL 208. 
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Member of the Organisation 'represented by the United 
Nations Council for Namibia'. 114 After the result was 
announced, the United States delegate explained why the 
United States had voted against admission. This state took 
the view that a nation, in the sense in which this term is 
used in art 2 of the FAO Constitution, means 'a territory 
controlled by an internationalli recognised government 
located in the territory that it controls or administers'. 
He continued: 
'We do not consider it wise for the future of this 
Organisation or other organisations in the United 
Nations System to take decisions that create confusion 
as to the meaning of the concept of State or Nation as 
it relates to membership in the United Nations 
Organisation. For this reason, although the FAO's 
General Committee took pains to underline the 
exceptional legal nature of the application of 
Namibia, we cannot agree with the decision taken in 
favour of its full membership. 115 
The United States believed that Namibia's admittance to 
associate membership116 would have been more in keeping 
with its peculiar status while still allowing the Council 
to pursue the basic purpose of GA Res 31/149, namely the 




Report of the Conference of the FAO 19th Sess Doc 
C/77/PV/4. The voting was 112 votes to 4, with 11 
abstentions (the required two-thirds majority was 78). 
The full statement is reprinted in Report of UNCfN 
GAOR 33rd Sess Suppl No 24 23-4. 
See arts 2 (3)~ (4) and (5) of the FAO Constitution. 
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other speakers welcomed the admission of Namibia. 117 
More problems arose when Namibia applied for admission 
to membership of the ILO. According to art 1(2) of the FAO 
Constitution, membership in the organisation is open only 
to 'States', and the Constitution has no rule for admission 
as an associate member. 118 During the 64th Session of the 
ILO Conference, however, the UNCfN decided to apply for 
full membership. 119 In view of the constitutional 
difficulties surrounding the Council's application, the 
Selection Committee of the 64th ILO Conference requested a 
legal opinion on the possible admission of Namibia. In its 
opinion, the Legal Adviser of the ILO examined the law and 
practice of the ILO concerning admission to membership and 
made the following points. 120 The ILO Constitution 
contains provisions regarding the rights and obligations of 
Members, which appear to confirm the need to meet the 
generally accepted criteria of statehood in international 
law. 121 The provisions of art 19 presuppose that members 
of the ILO are capable of concluding treaties and 
international agreements and are able to make them 






Report of UNCfN (nll5) 25-8. 
Observer status at sessions of the ILO was granted to 
the Council in 1974. 
See Report of UNCfN (nll5) 79. 
For full text of the opinion, see Provisional Record 
No 24 ILO 64th Sess 22-4. 
The criteria are laid down in art 1 of the Montevideo 
Convention of 1933 on the Rights and Duties of States. 
For the provisions of this article, see above (n97). 
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members of the ILO have standing before the ICJ and art 40 
presupposes that each member has a territory and is capable 
of granting privileges and immunities therein. In the view 
of the Legal Adviser, the situation in Namibia was 
comparable to the Free City of Danzig. 122 
The Free City of Danzig had been created in 1919 by 
the Treaty of Versailles. It had a defined territory, a 
population and a government. The conduct of its foreign 
relations, however, was entrusted to the Government of 
Poland. In 1930, Danzig applied to become a member of the 
ILO, but the PCIJ held, that because it lacked in 
competence in foreign relations, it could not comply with 
all the obligations of a member of the ILO, and could not 
therefore become a member. On the basis of this analysis, 
the Legal Adviser concluded, 'the Council for Namibia 
cannot be admitted as a Member of the ILO'. 
Notwithstanding this opinion, Namibia, represented by 
the UNCfN, was admitted as a full Member of the ILO on 23 
June 1978, by a vote of 368 too, with 50 abstentions (the 
required two-thirds majority was 320) . 123 The text of this 
Resolution confirms the above findings in many respects, 
that is, that the Council was the lawful administrator of 
the Territory until independence, which included 
representation in international law: 
122 
123 
'(The Selection Committee of the ILO) decides to admit 
Free City of Danzig and the ILO 1930 PCIJ Reports 
Series B No 18 71 seq. 
Report of UNCfN GAOR 33rd Sess Suppl No 24 102~3. 
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Namibia to membership in the Organisation, it being 
agreed that, until the present illegal occupation of. 
Namibia is terminated, the United Nations Council for 
Namibia, established by the United Nations as the 
legal administering authority for Namibia is 
empowered, inter alia, to represent it in 
international organisations, will be regarded as the 
Government for Namibia for the purpose of the 
application of the Constitution of the 
Organisation.' 124 
The Resolution gave further reasons, why the Selection 
Committee deviated from the requirements of the ILO · 
Constitution for the admission of new members: 
'Noting that Namibia is the only remaining case of a 
former Mandate of the League of Nations where the 
former Mandatory Power is still in occupation, 
considering that an application for membership in 
terms of article 1 is prevented only by the illegal 
occupation of Namibia by South Africa, the illegal 
nature of this occupation having been confirmed by the 
International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion 
of 21 June 1971, 
affirming the International Labour Organisation is not 
prepared to allow the legitimate rights of the 
. Namibian people to be frustrated by the illegal 
actions of South Africa, 
decides to admit Namibia to membership in the 
Organisation.' 125 
The admission of Namibia as a full Member of the ILO, 
however, did not appear to have resulted in a new 
interpretation of the ILO Constitution or in a change in 
124 
125 
ILO Official Bulletin (1978) 61 Series A 188. 
ILO Official Bulletin ibid. 
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the meaning generally attributed to the term 'State' for 
purposes of membership of the Organisat~on. In fact, the 
admission would appear to have been based on political 
expediency. 126 
The admission of Namibia, as represented by the 
Council, as a full Member in FAO and ILO, was followed by 
full membership in the UNESCO, UNCTAD, ITU and in the IAEA. 
The Council's activities included representation of 
Namibia in international conferences. Of particular 
interest was its participation in the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), where 
Namibia, 'represented by the Council as the legal 
administering authority for Namibia', was accepted as a 
full Member. 127 In this capacity the UNCfN signed the 
Convention (arts 305 (b), 306) on behalf of Namibia. 128 
In conclusion, it may be said that examination of the 
Council's multilateral activities confirms the finding that 
the UNCfN, although it lacked de facto control over the. 




The interplay between law, politics and ideology 
appears to be more in evidence in admission to 
membership in international organisations than in any 
other area in international law. When considering the 
admission of a new Member, existing Members are 
influenced not only by the rules and procedures of the 
organisation but also by political considerations, 
such as the nature of the relations between the 
applicant and the Member and the extent to which the 
government of the applicant conforms with the 
political philosophy or ideologies of the .Member 
State. See Osieke (n113) 189. 
See Report of UN CLOS III Official Records 6th Sess 
(New York 23 May - 15 July 1977) vol 7 4. 
Report of UNCfN GAOR 42nd Sess Suppl No 24 para 742. 
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imposed by membership of particular organisations, was 
accepted as the lawful representative of the Namibian 
people. This result was obviously accepted by all Members 
of the UN. 129 
f 
(b) Other activities 
The Council was also concerned with the dissemination of 
information and publicity concerning Namibia, educational 
assistance to Namibians abroad and the issuing of travel 
documents. 
UNCfN made great efforts to disseminate information, 
doubtless in the hope of putting international pressure 
upon South Africa. The Council was supported by the GA, 
which confirmed the necessity 
'to arouse world public opinion on a continuous basis 
with a view to assisting effectively the people of 
Namibia to achieve self-determination, freedom and 
independence. ' 130 
To realise this aim, the GA called upon the Council, in 
agreement with SWAPO, to: 
129 
130 
(a) 'disseminate publications on political, economic, 
military and social consequences of the illegal 
occupation of Namibia by South Africa, on legal 
matters, on the question of the territorial 
integrity of Namibia and on contacts between 
Member States and South Africa; 
The voting for admission in the ILO was unanimous. 
GA Res 32/9 C of 4 November 1974. 
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(b) produce and disseminate radio and television 
programmes designed to draw the attention of 
world public opinion on the current situation in 
and around Namibia; 
(c) produce and disseminate in both the English and 
the local languages of Namibia, radio programmes 
designed to counter the hostile propaganda and 
dissinformation campaign of the racist regime of 
South Africa. ' 131 
The Council (with the approval of the GA) later enlarged 
its activities, when independence of the Territory was in 
sight, to: 
'(a) monitoring of events and developments in Namibia 
by all means available including the continuation 
of financial support to non-governmental 
organisation~ for mobilising world public opinion 
to support the efforts on the Secretary General 
in ensuring the effective implementation of the 
independence plan for Namibia; 
(b) mobilising the international community for 
emergency and development assistance to the newly 
independent Namibia. ' 132 
So far as the educational assistance of Namibians 
abroad was concerned, activities could be divided into two 
major projects. The United Nations Fund for Namibia was set 
up to train qualified people for the post-independent 
period and the Nationhood Programme for Namibia was 
131 
132 
GA Res 43/26 D of 17 November 1988. 
UN-Doc A/AC/131/304 of 22 December 1988. A survey of 
all public relations activities of the Council was 
given in the annual report of the UNCfN to the GA. For 
the last report, see UNCfN GAOR 44th Sess Suppl No 24 
paras 245-271. 
- 105 -
established to work out a plan for the development of the 
later independent Namibia. In 1988 one quarter of the 
budget of 11 507, 187 US$ (US-Dollar) was financed by the 
GA and three quarters by voluntary contributions of Member 
r 
States. 133 
Finally, the third field of the non-multilateral 
activities of the Council was the issuing of travel 
documents to Namibians. Subsequent to the establishment of 
the UNCfN, many Namibians applied at-the UN Headquarters in 
New York for UN passports on the ground that the Council 
would have been responsible as their government. 1¾ The 
Council issued passports to the Namibians who qualified 
under GA Res 2372. 135 In the same Resolution, the GA 
designated the question of issuing travel documents to 
Namibians as 'a matter of priority' and established a 
special Committee with the task to make efforts for the 





'to recognise and accept as valid travel and identity 
documents issued by the Council to Namibians abroad, 
subject to its usual visa requirements and to extend 
its full co-operation to the Council in this regard 
and afford all necessary assistance normally accorded 
Report UNCfN GAOR 44th Sess Suppl No 24 para 322. 
1967 November UN Monthly Chronicle 28 seq. 
GA Res 2372 (XXII) of 12 June 1968. For a legal 
examination of the issuing of travel documents to 
Namibians by the UNCfN, see 1967 UN Juridical Yearbook 
309 seq and J F Engers 'The United Nations travel and 
identity documents for Namibians' (1971) 65 AJIL 571 
seq. 
- 106 -
to the bearers of such documents.' 1~ 
The majority of Member States complied with this 
request. 137 In the c9urse of time the Council issued 
thousands of travel documents to Namibians; in the period 
from June 1988 to August 1989 not less than 2034 passports 




UN-Doc A/AC/131/10 of 2 July 1968. 
See Report UNCfN GAOR 32nd Sess Suppl No 24 vol I para 
267. 
See Report UNCfN GAOR 44th Sess Suppl No 24 para 353. 
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V. THE FIRST DECREE 
(1) Introduction 
In establishing the UNCfN to administer the Territory, the 
GA expressly authorised the Council 'to promulgate such 
laws, decrees and administrative regulations as are 
necessary for the administration of the Territory'. 1 on 27 
September 1974, acting on this basis, the Council adopted 
Decree No 1 for the protection of the natural resources of 
Namibia. 2 The Decree was endorsed by the GA in Res Ji95 
(XXIX) of 13 December 1974. 
Following the endorsement, the office of the 
Commissioner for Namibia undertook a number of measures 
with a view to the implementation of the Decree. The first 
was to publish the First Decree in an official form and to 
give it as wide a circulation as possible. Copies of the 
Decree were addressed to all Member States as well as 
companies engaged in the exploitation of Namibian natural 
resources, including carriers and insur.ers. 3 Besides this 
the Commissioner's office organised two conferences with 
legal experts to discuss the particular legal problems 
2 
3 
GA Res 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1969. 
Hereinafter called Decree, Decree No 1, or First 
Decree. For text of the Decree No 1, see Report UNCfN 
GAOR 29th Sess Suppl No 24· 27-8. 
See F Rigaux, 'The Decree for the protection of the 
natural resources of Namibia - adopted on 27 September 
1974 by the United Nations Council for Namibia' (1976) 
9 Revue des droits de l'homme 473. 
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raised by the Decree. 4 Parallel to these measures, the 
Commissioner undertook research designed to acquire 
information on the basis of which legal action could be 
brought. The result of this research reflected the idea 
that 'seizure of illegally exported resources' through 
legal proceedings 
'will not be an effective remedy in. States ~1hich do 
not recognise the power of the General Ass~~bly to 
revoke the Mandate or to create a subsidiary organ to 
administer Namibia pending independence as well as 
those which deny the power of the Council to adopt 
decrees'. 5 
The Council recognised that even in States whose 
governments accepted the validity of the decree, local 
courts were unable or unwilling to validate the seizure of 
Namibian resources 'since they are not empowered to enforce 
international law in the absence of domestic enabling 
legislation. 16 
(2) Decree No 1 before independence 




The first was a conference held in New York in May 
1975 to consider the implementation of the Decree in 
Anglophone, common-law jurisdictions; the second was 
held in December 1975 in Brussels to discuss legal 
approaches and problems in Belgian and Dutch law and 
under the rules of the EC. 
UN-Doc A/AC/131/81 of 18 July 1980. 
UN-Doc op cit. 
- 109 -
entities and not to States, covers all natural resources, 
animal and mineral. 
Paragraph 1 of the Decree provides that: no person or 
entity, whether a body corporate or unincorporated, may 
search for, prospect for, explore for, sell, export or 
distribute any natural resource, situated or found to be 
situated within the territorial limits of Namibia without 
the consent and permission of the UNCfN. Paragraph 2 
provides that any permission, concession or licence for all 
or any of the purposes specified in para 1 granted by any 
person or entity (including any body purporting to act 
under the authority of the Government of South Africa or 
the administration of Namibia or their predecessors), is 
null, void and of no force or effect. In terms of para 3, 
no animal, mineral or other natural resource produced in or 
emanating from Namibia may be taken from the Territory by 
any means whatsoever to any place outside the territorial 
limits of Namibia. Under para 4, any product mentioned in 
para 3 which is taken from the Territory without the 
necessary permission may be seized and forfeited to the 
Council, which will hold it in trust for the benefit of the 
people. Paragraph 5 of the Decree states that any vehicle, 
ship or container found to be carrying animal, mineral or 
other natural resource produced in or emanating from 
Namibia shall also be subject to seizure and forfeiture by 
or on behalf of the UNCfN. Paragraph 6 gave the future 
Government of an independent Namibia the right and power to 
hold any person, entity or corporation liable in damages 
- 110 -
for a contravention of the Decree. 
Decree No 1 was, according to the Council~s scope of 
authority, lawful. On the one hand, it sought to preserve 
the status quo of the natural resources of the Territory 
for later indepen~ence, 7 and, on the other hand, the 
Decree fell within the scope of GA Res 2248 (S-V), 
specifically para II l(b), which determined the function of 
the Council. 8 The more important question was to what 
extent Decree No 1 bound Member States of the UN. The 
answer depends on the character of the Decree: was it to be 
treated as an act of internal Namibian legislation or was 
it an obligation of international law. As an international 
obligation, the Decree could have direct effect in the 
internal law of Member States; it could possibly even take 
precedence over domestic law. 9 Consequently it is 
necessary to establish the legal character of the Decree 




This task was clearly delegated to the Council by the 
GA. See Report UNCfN GAOR 44th Sess Suppl No 24 para 
136. . 
'For the text of the Resolution, see supra IV (1). 
As, for instance, in Germany. Article 25 of the German 
Constitution reads (translated): 'The rules of public 
international law shall be an integral part of federal 
law. They shall take precedence over the laws and 
shall directly create rights and duties for the 
inhabitants of the federal territory.' 
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(a) Legal character of the Decree 
Theoretically there are three ways in which the Decree 
could be interpreted: 
(i) directly as a binding obligation of international 
law; 
(ii) or indirectly as an obligation of international law 
in the sense that the Member States were obliged to 
promulgate national regulati~ns for its execution; 
or 
(iii) as Namibian legislation, which would be binding only 
in terms of the law of the executing State. 
The first two possibilities are based on the legal status 
of the Council as a subsidiary organ of the GA in terms of 
art 22 of the UN Charter; the third is based on the 
Council's status as the 'legal administering authority for 
Namibia' • 10 
If the provisions of the Decree were to be viewed as 
binding obligations of international law the Council would 
have had to be competent to enact binding laws. such 
competence would follow from the status of UNCfN as a 
subsidiary organ of the GA. And, in consequence, the Decree 
could be treated 'as a binding decision of the GA. The 
binding force of GA resolutions, and therewith a competence 
of the GA to enact binding laws, ,however, must be denied. 
The GA has no general legislative power and may act with 
10 GA Res 32/9 F of 4 November 1977. 
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legal effect only when competent under the Charter. 11 
Other decisions and resolutions have no binding force on 
Member States. 12 If the GA itself cannot bind Member 
States, it clearly cannot confer such a power on a 
subsidiary organ. Hence UNCfN had no competence to enact 
decrees of binding force for Member States. 
Besides this, the first two possibilities mentioned 
above presuppose that Member States would have been the 
addressees of the Decree. In fact, however, the Decree was 
aimed, not at Members of the Organisation, but at b6dies 
corporate or unincorporate. Thus there is no basis for 
obliging Member States to execute the Decree. Even more 
important is the fact that the Council, as a subsidiary 
organ of the GA, had no authority to oblige Member States 
to promulgate national laws for the execution of the 
Decree. 
Certain authors, however, have advanced different 
arguments to support Member states' obligation to execute 
the provisions of Decree No 1. One such argument put the 
Decree on the same level as SC Res 276 (1970), 283 (1970) 




For instance, the admission of new members in terms of 
arts 4, 5, and 6 of the Charter as well as the 
elections to non~plenary organs and the adoption of 
the budget. See also the discussion supra II (3) (d). 
See H Golsong 'Das Problem der Rechtsetzung durch 
Internationale Organisationen (insbesondere im Rahmen 
der UNO) (1971) 10 Berichte der Deutschen Gesellschaft 
fur Volkerrecht 1 seq. 
These Resolutions called upon all States, particularly 
those which had economic and other interests in 
Namibia 'to refrain from any dealings with the 
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was determined by the ICJ in its Advisory Opinion of 
1971. 14 This argument might have been successful if the SC 
Resolutions had had the same content as the Decree. But 
Decree No 1 went far beyond the scope of these Resolutions. 
First, the SC said nothing about the exploitation of 
Namibian natural resources, and, secondly, the Resolutions 
of the SC were addressed to States and not to individuals 
as the Decree No 1 was. 15 16 
It follows - through elimination of the first two 
possibilities - that Decree No 1 should be regarded.as if 
it were an enactment of municipal law. Accordingly, the 
provisions of the Decree can be taken to be internal 




Government of South Africa'. 
In this sense, see the statements of M Ahmad and S 
Verheuls, UN-Doc A/AC/131/SLI/PVJ 13-15. 
See statement of HG Schermers UN-Doc A/AC/131/SLI/PVJ 
11. 
Another argument sought to prove that the provisions 
of the Decree constituted valid customary law. But 
there is no support for the idea that SC or GA 
resolutions (or resolutions of a subsidiary organ) 
outside Chapter VII of the Charter have binding force. 
On the contrary, two permanent members ( France and 
United Kingdom) and some non-permanent Members of the 
SC referred expressly to the fact that their consent 
to the relevant resolutions was dependent on the non-
recognition of the binding force of these resolutions. 
Consequently, because it is impossible to characterise 
the provisions of the Decree before independence as 
rules of international customary law, they could not 
be binding on Member States of the Organisation. For 
for this argument, see B Conforti Lezione di Diritto 
Internazionale 163-83. 
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legislation17 which could only have extraterritorial 
effect depending on the internal rules of other States. 
(b) Practice of states 
This conclusion is confirmed by the practice of States in 
only some instances. The Federal Republic of Germany took 
the view that the UNCfN had the right to represent the 
political interests of the Namibian people within the UN, 
but that it was not 'das volkerrechtlich endgultige und 
umfassend vertretungsberechtigte Organ fur Namibia'. 18 
Furthermore the German State Minister, Hamm-Brucher, 
maintained that, because the Council lacked de facto 
control over the Territory it could not exercise the powers 
reserved for a future independent government.- The Council 
therefore exceeded its competence by adopting Decree No 1, 
17 
18 
One has to agree with Booysen & Stephan that there 
were many factors which made the Decree unacceptable 
as municipal legislation directly affecting 
individuals in the State. First, any municipal 
legislation intended to affect individuals in a 
particular country should be promulgated in that 
country. The First Decree had only been promulgated 
internationally and it is doubtful whether the people 
of Namibia, with_ a few exceptions, had even heard 
about it. Secondly, an act of internal legislation 
should be promulgated in the language of the country. 
It could not be said at that stage that English was 
the mother tongue of the majority of persons who lived 
in Namibia. See H Booysen & GE J Stephan 'Decree No 
1 of the United Nations Council for South West Africa' 
(1975) 1 SAYIL 67. 
Cited from the German Minister of State, Hamm-Brucher, · 
in the Session of the German Parliament of 26 June 
1980 Bundesanzeiger (1980) 6 27. 
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and the Decree had no binding force. Consequently, the 
German Government saw no legal basis for hindering private 
economic transactions in the Territory nor did it regard 
itself as obliged to transform the provisions of the Decree 
into internal law. 19 
In France, the Council was not recognised either de 
jure or de facto, and the French Government expressed the 
view that the Council lacked the power to enforce its 
Decrees: 
'La France continue a ne pas reconnaitre de valeur 
obligatoire au decret No 1 sur la Namibie. En 
l'absence de toute decision du conseil de securite 
dans la matiere, les societes francaises en Namibie ne 
suraient etre considerees comme contrevenant au droit 
international.'m 
The United Kingdom's attitude had been expressed on 
numerous occasions when explaining votes and at meetings 
with delegations of the Council. All these statements 
confirmed the United Kingdom's stance: that it did not 
recognise the validity of GA Res 2145 (XXII) (on 
termination of the Mandate) and that it considered that the 
GA lacked the power to establish an administration for 
Namibia. Consequently, the United Kingdom did not recognise 
the Council as either the de jure or de facto administering 
19 
20 
See Volkerrechtspraxis der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
(1985) 24 Za6RV 727 (BTD 10/5221 of 14 April 1985). 
This statement confirms the finding that the Council 
as a subsidiary organ of the GA could not pass binding 
enactments, but it goes too far when it denies UNCfN's 
governmental powers in general. 
Pratique Francaise 1979 (1980) 22 AFDI 947. 
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authority for the Territory. The United Kingdom stated 
that: 
'.The Government does not . accept as val id the United 
Nations Council Decree No 1, which purports to prevent 
the exportation of natural resources in Namibia, since 
the United Nations General Assembly acted beyond its 
powers in seting up the Council. The Government 
therefore has no grounds for interfering with this or 
any other trade between Namibia and the United Kingdom 
which does not conflict with any of our international 
obligations. 121 
In 1976 the Council for Namibia asked the Canadian 
Government whether Canada would continue to import Namibian 
products. The Canadian Foreign Minister answered: 
'The only sanctions that Canada has accepted within 
the United Nations system, of course, a~e the 
sanctions that applied with regard to Rhodesia, and 
there have been no such sanctions applied with regard 
to trade with Namibia. 122 
Apart from this statement, the Canadian Government 
indicated that 'an investigation would be made of possible 
tax concessions obtained by companies operating in Namibia' 
and that 'codes of conduct' for further investments by 




The attitude of the United States was similar. 
Statement of the British Government spokesman in the 
course of a debate in the House of Lords on the 
subject of independence negotiations for Namibia. 
Printed in G Marston 'United Kingdom materials on 
international law' (1982) 53 BYIL 391. 
MD Copithorne 'Canadian practice in international law 
1976' (1977) 15 CYIL 346. 
See L Meret 'Canada and Namibia' (1979) 17 CYIL 321. 
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Although America supported both GA Res 2145 (XXI) and the 
1971 ICJ Advisory Opinion, it did not accept the Council's 
legislative authority over Namibia, although it made no 
pronouncement on whether it considered the Council as the 
de jure authority for Namibia. 24 To the contrary South 
Africa was regarded as the de facto power with control over 
the Territory. 25 Even if the United states' position could 
have been interpreted as recognising the Council de 
jure, 26 that did not entail recognising the binding force 
of Decree No 1. 
Switzerland took the same stance: 
'Cree par l'Assemblee Generale de l'ONU, le conseil 
pour la Namibie est un organe dent les decision n'ont 
qu'une valeur de recommandation, meme a l'egard des 
etats membres, mais ne deploient pas d'effets 
juridiques contraignants pas de raison pour que le 
conseil federal prenne des mesures dans le sens 
propose' (ban on Namibian uranium) .u 
Of all countries, the Netherlands view on implementing 
Decree No 1 was the most positive. Before Namibian 





See Report UNCfN GAOR 35th Sess Suppl No 24 vol I 41-
2 • 
Report UNCfN op cit 43. 
The Council itself took this view when it stated that: 
'ttie United States recognises the authority of the 
United Nations over Namibia and the Council for 
Namibia as the lawful representative of the interests 
of the Namibia people.' See Report UNCfN GAOR 35th 
Sess Suppl No 24 vol III 66. 
See L Caflisch 'La pratique suisse en matiere de droit 
international public' (1983) 39 Schweizerisches 
Jahrbuch filr Internationales Recht 204. 
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Africa's Mandate over Namibia to have been legally 
terminated by the GA, hence South Africa no longer had 
legal title to administer the Territory. Consequently the 
Netherlands did not recognise South Africa's de facto 
administration over the Territory as legal. 28 According to 
the Netherlands Government, the legal title to administer 
Namibia had been transferred to the UN, which had delegated 
its administrative powers to the UNCfN. From this one could 
conclude that the Council for Namibia was the de jure 
administrator for Namibia. The Dutch Government, however, 
never made any formal statement to this effect. In July 
1980, the Dutch Foreign Minister described the attitude of 
his Government towards Decree No 1 (as it emerged from 
parliamentary questions) as follows: 
28 
'The Government, it was said, has recognised that the 
United Nations Council for Namibia is entitled to make 
regulations for the exploitation, etc., of the natural 
resources of Namibia, but it had never recognised that 
the council had authority to create direct duties for 
the Netherlands state which the Government then has to 
carry out. 
The Government, it was said, considers that the 
United Nations Council was competent to take decisions 
concerning the administration of the Territory of 
Namibia as such, but not more than that. The 
Government's position was that GA Res 2248 (S-V) which 
created the Council, provided that the powers and 
functions of the Council, which included the making of 
laws and decrees should be exercised within the 
Territory. Otherwise they considered the Council might 
K s Sik 'Netherlands state practice for the 
parliamentary year 1970-1971' (1972) 3 NYIL 193-200. 
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cr~ate international legal obligations for United 
Nations Member States, which would give the Council 
greater powers than those attributed to the Government 
of a country. Decree No 1 of the Council could be seen 
only as an act of governing Namibia. 129 
An examination of the practice of States regarding to 
Decree No 1, therefore, confirms the thesis that the UNCfN 
was the lawful administering authority for the Territory30 
but that the Council's power over Namibia was limited. 
(3) Decree No 1 after independence - legal force of the 
Decree in international law 
(a) Introduction 
In terms of art 140 of the Namibian Constitution: 
29 
30 
'all laws which were in force immediately before 
independence remain in force until repealed or amended 
by Act of Parliament or until they are declared 
For full text see, UNCfN Report of the Panel for 
Hearings on Namibian Uranium UN-Doc A/AC/131/L163 of 
1980 138; see also R c R Siekmann 'Netherlands state 
practice for the parliamentary year 1978-1979' (1980) 
11 NYIL 205-6. 
In this regard one has to add that the attitude of the 
Western European States was based more on an economic 
than on a legal point of view. For the far-reaching 
economic interests of the Western European States and 
the United States and for an interpretation of these 
states' attitude, see W H Thomas Economic Development 
in Namiba 134; AD Cooper United States Economic Power 
and Political Influence in Namibia 1700-1982 66 and 
Report UNCfN GAOR 44th Sess Suppl No 24 33-4. 
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unconstitutional by a competent Court. 131 
Accordingly Decree No 1 is now national Namibian law. As 
such its international effect cannot be denied by the 
argument that it was not adopted by elected representatives. 
of the Namibian people or that it was issued by a 
subsidiary organ of the GA which had no capacity to issue 
binding decrees for Member States. Furthermore the validity 
of the Decree cannot be denied by the argument that it was 
issued by a body which had no de facto control over the 
territory on whose behalf it claimed to act. 
As an internal act of the Namibian Government, to 
what extent does Decree No 1 have binding force on the 
international community, in particular on Namibia's trading 
partners? This leads to a consideration of the principles 
governing observance of foreign acts of state. 
(b) Definition of an act of state 
Before embarking on this inquiry, it must be decided 
whether the Decree qualifies as an act of state. 32 This is 
a generic term that describes a number of different 
concepts including not only an executive or administrative 
31 
32 
For full text of the Constitution, see AP Blaustein 
& G H Flanz Constitutions of the Countries of the 
World vol XI. 
In English literature the term 'governmental act' is 
sometimes also used. In French 'acte de gouvernement' 
and in the German 'staa tl icher Hohei tsakt' are the 
most common terms. 
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exercise of sovereign power by an independent State (or by 
its duly authorised agents or officers) but also 
legislative and administrative acts, such as statutes, 
decrees, orders, or judgments of a superior court. 33 
Decree No 1, as a legislative act of the Namibian 
Parliament (under art 140 of the Namibian Constitution), 
clearly falls within the scope of this definition. 
The international legal effect of an act of state is 
similarly interpreted differently in terms of the 
Continental 'territorial principle' and the Anglo-American 
'act of state doctrine'. 34 And, to confuse the matter, 
there is considerable controversy in the relevant 
literature dealing with this concept. The opinions range 
from a general obligation on States to recognise these acts 
to a complete refusal to recognise them outside contractual-
agreements. 35 
The following questions will be examined below: to 
what extent do the provisions of Decree No 1 (as an 




In this sense also see M Zander in L Gross (ed) 
International Law in the Twentieth Century 411; F A 
Mann 'The sacrosancti ty of foreign acts of state' 
(1943) 59 LOR 42; HJ Schlochauer Die exterritoriale 
Wirkung von Hoheitsakten nach dem offentlichem Recht 
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und nach 
internationalem Recht 10; R Heiz Das fremde 
offentliche Recht im internationalem Kollisionsrecht 
162 and Fedozzi 'De l'efficacite extraterritoriale des 
leis et des actes de droit puplic' (1929) 27 Academie 
De Droit International (RDC) 147. 
For a detailed account on this problem, see infra (3) 
(e) (ii) 2. 
For the different opinions on this matter and for 
references, see Heiz (n33) 15. 
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international community of States and, in particular, are 
States obliged to ensure their performance in their own 
territories? 
(c) Recognition of extraterritorial acts of state which 
are lawful in international law 
Is a local judge obliged to recognise or to abstain from 
recognising the act of a foreign State? Public 
international law is based on the principle of state 
sovereignty, and the reality of international relations 
suggests that a State is unable to invalidate, undo or 
alter a governmental act of another sovereign state. 36 If 
it were possible to undo another State's act, the same 
state of affairs could be regulated by two concurrent acts 




Instead, Anglo-American state practice, declared and 
This can be inferred from the Roman principle 'par in 
parem non habet imperium', which is today generally 
recognised in the community of states. Sees Barile 
Appunti sul valore del diritto pubblico straniero 
nell' ordinamento nazionale 72 seq, who gives a survey 
of the historical development of the principle with 
many references. 
An abrogation of an act of state is only possible by 
the State itself or by an international court: 'un 
acte public ne peut pas etre annule ou ' revoque ou 
modifie si ce n'est par la meme autorite qui l'adresse 
ou par une autorite superieure a celle qui l'adresse'. 
See Fedozzi (n33) 211. 
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confirmed in many judgments, 38 appeals to the notion of 
'Courtoisie' (Comity of Nations). This implies a general 
obligation to recognise foreign acts of state. From this 
follows the principle of the 'sacrosancity of foreign acts 
of state' 39 and the Anglo-American act of state doctrine. 
According to this doctrine the validity of an act of state 
may be considered only in terms of its nature as an 
governmental act but not in terms of its conformity with 
the rules of international law. 40 
This doctrine, however, cannot be regarded as a 
general rule of international law, and it is not widely 
accepted in the practice of states. 41 This is evident in 
the case of acts of state purporting to expropriate foreign 
property. These acts were, and are still today, of 





For examples, see Heiz (n33} 167 seq. 
See Schlochauer (n33} 56. 
See Heiz (n33) 170; Schlochauer (n33) 55; Buttes Gas 
and Oil v Hammer (1981) 3 All ER 616 (HC} and Rumasa 
SA v Multinvest (1986) 1 All ER 129. Anglo-American 
Oil Company Ltd v Jaffrate (1952) 1 WLR 246 (discussed 
by H Lauterpacht 'Public international law - foreign 
legislation enacted in violation·of international law' 
(1954) 4 Cambridge Law Journal 20 seq and D P 
O'Connell International Law 804 seq) and the South 
African Case Basrah Petoleum Co v Saint Nicholas 
Maritime Co (reported in 1973 Annual survey of South 
African Law 45), however, held that the validity of a 
foreign act of state was dependent on compliance with 
international law. These decisions do not represent 
the current view, in Britain at least. For a criticism 
of the doctrine see also infra (3) (e) c. 
For a detailed account on the act of state doctrine, 
see infra (3) (e} (ii) 2. 
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practice.Q The extraterritorial effect of such acts of 
state is normally implicit in expropriation decrees; a 
.literal reading permits no limitation to the territory of 
the State which passed the decree. 43 Sometimes, however, 
extraterritorial effect is explicitly mentioned in the 
decree. 44 
There is no uniform approach to acts of state with 






See BA Wortley Expropriation in Public International 
Law 127 seq. 
G White .Nationalisation of Foreign Property 103. See, 
for instance, the Czechoslovakian Nationalisation 
Decree of 24 October 1945, the Yugoslavian 
Nationalisation Decree of 5 December 1946 and the 
Hungarian Nationalisation Decree of 28 December 1949. 
For full text of these Decrees, see W Birke Die 
Konfiskation auslandischen Privatvermogens im 
Hoheitsbereich des konfiszierenden Staates 100-11. 
Examples are the Egyptian Decree No 285 of 26 July 
1956 concerning the nationalisation of the Suez Canal 
Company and the Austrian Nationalisation Decree of 26 
July 1946. Article 1 of the Egyptian Decree reads: 'La 
Compagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez est 
nationalisee. Taus les biens et droits qu'elle possee 
et les obligations qu'elle a sent transferes a l'Etat. 
Article 1 of the Austrian Decree reads: 'Mit 
Inkraftreten dieses Bundesgesetzes gehen die 
Anteilsrechte an den in der Anlage genannten 
Gesellschaften und die dart angefuhrten Unternehmungen 
und Betriebe in das Eigentum der Republik bsterreich 
iiber. ' 
Judgment of the Reichsgericht of 7 June 1921 (1921) 
102 RGZ 251; Judgments of the Bundesgerichtshof of 11 
Februar 1953 (1953) 9 BGHZ 38 seq; of 12 April 1954 
(1954) 13 BGHZ 108 seq; of 30 January 1956 (1956) 20 
BGHZ 12 seq and of 11 July 1957 (1957) 25 BGHZ 134 
seq. 
Judgments of the Supreme Court of Austria of 9 July 
1948 and 3 February 1954. Amtliche Sammlung der 
Entscheidungen des bsterreichischen Obersten 
Gerichtshofes in Zivilsachen (1946-48) 21 Nr 114 and 
(1954) 27 Nr 117. 
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Swiss~ and French~ courts have refused to recognise such 
I 
acts and have declared that they have no effect within 
their territories. American and British courts, on the 
other hand, according to their act of st~te doctrine, 
normally recognise foreign acts of state, 50 but even their 
practice is not uniform. Some American51 and some 
British52 decisions have ind1cated that foreign acts of 
state are limited to the territory of the issuing State. 
There is also no uniform view in the literature. 
Certain authors consider that there is no rule in 
international law obliging States to recognise foreign acts 
of state. 53 Others take the view that a foreign act is an 
expression of the State's sovereignty, and that another 









Judgment of the Dutch Supreme Court of 12 May 1952 
{1954) 81 Journal du Droit International 480 seq. 
Judgments of the Supreme Court of Switzerland (1958) 
64 SBGE 97 seq and {1965) 71 SBGE 136 seq. 
See ( 1953) 59 Revue de Droit Public et. de Science 
Politique en France et a l'Etranger 334 seq. 
For examples, see M Singer 'The act of state doctrine 
of the United Kingdom: an analysis with comparisons to 
United States practice' {1981) 75 AJIL 283 seq; M 
Zander 'The act of state doctrine' {1959) 53 AJIL 826 
seq and HF v Panhuys 'The borderland between the act 
of state doctrine and questions of jurisdictional 
immunities' (1964) 13 ICLQ 1193 seq. 
For examples, see Schlochauer (n33) 61. 
For examples, see Schlochauer (n33) 62. 
See M Beitzke ' E.x terr it or i a 1 e Wirkung von 
Hoheitsakten' in K Strupp (ed) worterbuch des 
Volkerrechts vol I 505 seq for more references. 
For instance, Singer (n50) 283 seq. 
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even the first view accepts,in special cases (for instance, 
in the case of expropriation with just compensation or 
nationalisation of companies) 55 the extraterritorial 
effect of foreign acts of state. 
In the light of the diversity of opinion on the 
extraterritorial effect of foreign acts of state, it is 
impossible to extrapolate a general obligation on Stat~s to 
recognise such acts. Rather it may be said that States are 
free to recognise foreign acts of state, treaty obligations 
aside. 
(d) Execution of extraterritorial acts of state which are 
lawful in international law56 
The notion that States have no obligation to•recognise 
foreign acts of state implies that they are not obliged to 
execute them in their own territory. Although some authors 
are of the opinion that such an obligation exists, it 




See, I Seidl-Hohenveldern Internationales 
Konfiskations- und Enteignungsrecht 132 seq and White 
(n42) 62 seq. 
This examination is of particular interest with a view 
to paras 4 and 5 of Decree No 1 because these 
provisions are - contrary to paras 1-3 and 6 - not 
self-executing. Accordingly they require execution in 
the internal legislation of the State concerned. 
See G Dahm Volkerrecht vol I 261; 
Universelles Volkerrecht 775; 
'Volkerrechtl iche Enteignungen var 





Hence, a State may (without violation of pu_blic 
international law or another State's rights) make execution 
dependent on various preliminary examinations. 58 
The preliminary examination takes place at three 
levels. First, a national court may assess the act in terms 
of its conformity with the legislation of the issuing 
State. The result of this assessment - a startling one in 
view of the principle of the sovereignty of state - is that 
a foreign court may advise a national court on the 
application of its own law. Moreover, it is no easy matter 
for a judge to evaluate an act of state when his knowledge 
of the foreign law is limited; for this reason American 
courts refuse to undertake this type of examination. 59 
Regardless of this problem the Continental courts continue 
to adhere to this practice.~ 
Secondly, a national court may assess the foreign act 
of state in terms of its internal 'ordre public' or 'public 





The practice of states shows that many states do this. 
See, I A E Insley & F Wooldridge 'The Butter Case: the 
final chapter in the litigation' ( 1983) 32 ICLQ 62 
seq; J Crawford 'Decisions of British courts during 
1982 involving questions of public and private 
international law' (1982) 53 BYIL 253 seq and Singer 
(n50) 283 seq. 
For examples, see Heiz (n33) 171-2. 
See Fedozzi (n33) 200 seq; W Delbruck Volkerrecht vol 
I 486 and D F Mann 'Problems of public international 
law' (1965) 26 JZ 96 seq. 
A useful definition of the term 'public policy' or 
'ordre public' is given by the Court de Bruxelles 
RCDIP (1939) 43 316: 'Cette notion est composee de 
certaines regles ou conceptions morales, economiques 
et aussi politiques dent l 'observation dans un Etat 
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obliged to subordinate· its own fundamental rules and 
policies to the legislation or administrative acts of 
another State. Consequently a State may examine foreign 
acts of state to determine their compatibility with its 
internal policies and moral attitudes. 62 
Finally, a national court may examine the governmental 
act to determine its compliance with principles of public 
international law. This power is self-evident in so far as 
the law of nations takes precedence over any internal 
62 
determine est consideree comme indispensable pour la 
subsistance paisible de la communaute sur le 
territoire.' 
The options of American and British courts are limited 
according to the act of state doctrine. For some 
exceptional cases, see J Cohn British Courts and 
Public Policy 57 seq and A Spickhoff Der ordre public 
in internationalen Privatrecht 127 seq who gives a 
survey of the historical development of public policy 
in Anglo-American law. Nearly all European countries 
have made express provision for the principle of 
'ordre public' in their legal systems. Article 6 of 
the German EGBGB reads: 'Eine Rechtsnorm eines anderen 
Staates ist nicht anzuwenden, wenn ihre Anwendung zu 
einem Ergebnis fuhrt, das mit wesentlichen Grundsatzen 
des deutschen Rechts unvereinbar ist. Sie ist 
insbesondere nicht anzuwenden, wenn die Anwendung mit 
den Grundrechten unvereinbar ist.' Switzerland 
provides in art 17 'Schweizerisches Bundesgesetz uber 
das internationale Privatrecht' of 18 December 1987: 
'Die Anwendung von Bestimmungen eines auslandischen 
Rechtes ist ausgeschlossen, wenn sie zu einem Ergebnis 
fuhren wurde, das mit dem schweizerischen ordre public 
unvereinbar ware. Austria provides in art 6 of its 
'IPR-Gesetz' a very traditional understanding of ordre 
public: 'Eine Bestimmung des fremden Rechtes ist nicht 
· anzuwenden, wenn eine Anwendung zu einem Ergebnis 
fuhren wurde, das mi t den Grundwertungen der 
osterreichischen Rechtsordnung unvereinbar ist. ' Ordre 
public clauses can also be found in art 6 of the 
Polish, para,7 Hungarian, art 4 of the Yugoslavian IPL 
Codes and in art 5 of the Turkish private law code, 
art 12(3) of the Spanish and art 22 of the Portuguese 
civil codes. 
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legislation. 63 (And, as a result, some authors hold the 
view that a State is obliged to assess foreign acts of 
state on these grounds).~ 
The above discussion shows that States are free to 
recognise (in case of self-executing acts of state) or to 
execute (in case of non-self-executing acts of state) 
foreign acts of state in their own territory. In other 
words, there is no provable obligation in international law 
on States to react on these governmental acts. 
Nevertheless, an investigation of the practice of states 
reveals that (particularly regarding European countries) 
the enforcement or application of a foreign act of state is 
usually dependent on a series of preliminary tests. Even if 
the act of state passed these tests, however, the State 
would still be free to refuse to recognise or execute it. 
Hence it follows that if these findings are applied to 
paras 4 and 5 of Decree No 1, as non-self-executing acts of 
state, other States have no obligation to execute them. The 
same applies to paras 1, 3 and 6 of the Decree, as self-
executing acts of state. 
63 
64 
See F Morgenstern 'Validity 
belligerent occupant' (1951) 







For instance A Drucker 'Foreign property legislation' 
{1953) 2 ICLO 391-6 and G Dahm Recognition of foreign 
acts of state 71 seq. 
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(e) The problem of.observance of acts of state which are 
illegal in international law 
(i) Ascertainment of illegality 
Before one can discuss the effects of the illegality of a 
foreign act of state, one has to answer two questions: who 
has the competence to determine the illegality, and in what 
circumstances may a foreign act of state be characterised 
as illegal? 
Ideally these questions should be submitted to an 
international court or a commission, which would be 
established specially for each case. 65 The law of nations, 
however, is poorly developed in this area.~ The only 
possibility in the circumstances is that a concerned State 
itself must undertake the examination. At first sight, 
bearing in mind the principle of sovereignty of states, it 
seems dubious whether a State may judge the act of another 
independent State; but when looked at more closely, these 
scruples appear to be unfounded. A State has to observe 
international law when issuing its governmental acts. Thus 
there is no obvious reason why a state should not evaluate 
the acts of foreign states (when they concern its 
territory) in terms of their conformity with rules of 
public international law. Such an examination is even 
unavoidable for States which have incorporated the rules of 
65 
66 
See P Pugh Legal Aspects of Foreign Investment 734. 
See Heiz (n33) 186. 
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public international law into their internal law. 67 In 
these States the local judge would - by observing the 
illegal foreign act of state - violate his own legal order. 
In what circumstances may an act of state be 
characterised as illegal in international law? Typical 
cases have involved expropriation of foreign property. 68 
One of the first issues concerned the nature of the 
property expropriated: what did the term 'foreign' property 
imply? It is agreed that the property need not belong to a 
foreigner who actually resided in the expropriating State. 
rt was sufficient that his property was situated•in a 
country other than the one in which he resided. 69 The 
meaning of 'property' is not so easy to determine because 
the law of property is a matter of municipal law and so can 
vary greatly even within a single system. Hence it is not 
surprising that international law does not have its own 
definition of the term. 70 Any international definition of 
property that there is must derive from the practice of 




For instance art 25 of the German Constitution; arts 
26 and 28 of the French Constitution (of 27 October 
1947); and art 10 of the Italian Constitution (of 22 
December 1947). For further examples, see Heiz (n33) 
186. 
For other apperances of illegality, see M Roth The 
Minimum Standard of International Law applied to 
Aliens 55 seq; H Lauterpacht International Law and 
Human Rights 146 seq; Heiz (n33) 187 seq and L 
Schindler Gleichberechtigung von Individuen als 
Problem des Volkerrechts 147 seq. 
See J H Herz 'Expropriation of foreign property' 
(1941) 35 AJIL 243. 
See White (n43) 48. 
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According to a great array of diplomatic and judicial 
cases71 and according to the great majority of authors,n 
foreign rproperty comprises 'all movable and immovable 
property, whether tangible or intangible, including 
industrial, literary and artistic property, as well as 
rights of interests of any kind in property such as rights 
arising from contracts of concessions, purchases, loans 
etc. 173 
Having defined 'foreign property', in what situations 
is its expropriation lawful under international law? First, 
a lawful expropriation must have a public purpose. This 
.view is adopted in many international judicial and arbitral 
decisions and can be seen as a generally accepted rule of 





For references, see Herz (n69) 244 and .H Mosler 
Wirtschaftskonzessionen bei Anderung der Staatshoheit 
138 seq. 
See, for instance, G Kaeckenbeek 'La protection 
internationale des droits acquis' (1937) 59 Academie 
de Droit International (RdC) 322 seq; G 
Schwarzenberger 'The protection of British property 
abroad' (1952) 5 Current Legal Problems 295 seq; Heiz 
(n33) 192-3; A VerdroB 'La propriete privee et les 
limites de ce droit' (1931) 37 Academie de Droit 
International (RdC) 373 seq. See also a proposal of 
experts of the Havard Law School of 1 June 1961 
'Convention on the international responsibility of 
states for injuries to aliens' Draft No 11 art 10(7), 
published in K H Bockstiegel 'Enteignungs- und 
NationalisierungsmaBnahmen gegen auslandische 
Kapitalgesellschaften' Berichte der Deutschen 
Gesellschaft fur Volkerrecht (1974) 13 103. 
s Friedmann Expropriation in International Law 148. 
For examples, see: White (n43) 145 seq; VerdroB (n57) 
para 1217; I Seidl-Hohenveldern 'Die Enteignung 
niederlandischer Plantagen in Indonesien' (1959) 12 
AWBB 103 seq and A F Schnitzer 'Mindeststandard im 
Volkerrecht' in K Strupp Worterbuch des Volkerrechts 
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discrimination against foreigners, either between groups of 
foreigners or between foreigners and na~ionals: 
'Under established principles of international law, 
measures taken against the rights and property of 
foreign nationals which are arbitrary, discriminatory, 
or based on considerations of political reprisal and 
economic coercion are invalid and not entitled to 
recognition by other States.'~ 
Thirdly, a State must pay compensation.~ The questions of 
amount, form and time of the compensation are amongst the 
most controversial issues in this branch of law with 
fundamental disagreement between developed and developing 
States. 77 No subject of international law seems to have 
aroused as much debate as the question of the standard for 




vol I 538. 
Statement of the United States in response to one of 
several Libyan nationalisations, in 1973, which were 
thought to be motivated by political opposition to the 
United States policies in the Middle East. Quoted in 
R B- v Mehren & P N. Kourides 'International 
arbitrations between states. and foreign private 
parties: the Libyan nationalisation case' (1981) 75 
AJIL 486. The same view is taken by the majority of 
authors; see White (n43) 119 seq for further 
references. 
See z Kronfol Protection of Foreign Investment 110; H 
T Hu 'Compensations in expropriations: a preliminary 
economic analysis' (1979-80) 20 VJIL 61 seq; Corfu 
Channel Case 1949 ICJ-Reports 244 seq; W L Rodgers 
'The amount of compensation' (1923) 17 AJIL 393 seq; 
R L Bindschelder VerstaatlichungsmaBnahmen und 
Entschadigungspflicht nach Volkerrecht 54-7 and M 
Dawson 'Prompt, adequate and effective: a universal 
standard of compensation?' (1962) 30 Fordham Law 
Review 728-9. 
I Foighel Expropriation - a Study in the Protecti6n of 
Alien Property in International Law 130 seq. 
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expropiiated. The long-standing view of many developed 
States was expressed in the 'Hull formula' used by the 
Secretary of State Hull in 1938 in his notes to the Mexican 
Government claiming compensation for expropriated agrarian 
lands owned by US nationals: 
'the right to expropriate property is coupled with and 
conditioned on the obligation to make adequate, 
effective and prompt compensation. The legality of an 
expropriation is in fact dependent upon the observance 
of this requirement. ' 78 
Since that time the US Government has always maintained 
that 'prompt, adequate and effective compensation' is 
required by international law. This appears, for instance, 
in the draft articles of the American Law Institute's 
Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States (Revised). Section 712 provides that 'a State is 
responsible under international law for injury resulting 
from a taking by the state of the property of a national of 
another State when provision is not made for just 
compensation'. 79 In the comments that follow this section, 
the draft Restatement refers to the principle of section 
712 as an expression of the traditional rules on 
expropriation. The comments also acknowledge that the 
United States has consistently maintained that just 
compensation means prompt, adequate and effective 
~ Cited in D J Harris Cases and Materials on 
International Law 543. 
79 Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United 
states (Revised) §712 Draft No 3 1982. 
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compensation. 80 
The United Kingdom takes the same view in its memorial 
in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co Case81 : 
'it is clear that the nationalisation of the property 
of foreigners, even if not unlawful on any other 
ground, becomes an unlawful confiscation unless 
provision is made for compensation which is adequate, 
prompt and effective.'~ 
Many of the developed States still keep to the 'Hull 
formula', and make the the legality of an expropriation 
conditioned upon it.~ 
Developing States now contest the 'Hull formula' as a 





Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States op cit Comment e. 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co Case 1952 ICJ Reports 93 seq. 
Anglo~Iranian Oil Case op cit 105. This case is of a 
particular interest because it is one of the very few 
dealing with the meaning of adequate, prompt and 
effective. By adequate compensation is meant · 'the 
.value of the undertaking at the moment of 
dispossession, plus interest to the day of 
payment' (see Chorz6w Facoty Case 1928 PCIJ Reports 
Series A No 17 46) . The compensation is considered 
prompt in accordance with the rules of international 
law if: the total amount to be paid is fixed promptly; 
allowance for interest for late payment is made; the 
guarantees that the future payments will in fact be 
made are satisfactory, so that the person to be 
compensated may,- if he so desires, raise the full sum 
at once on the security of the future payments. The 
third requirement 'effective' means that the recipient 
of the compensation must be able to make use of it. He 
must, for instance, be able, if he wishes, to use it 
to set up a new enterprise to replace the orte that has 
been expropriated or to use it for such other purposes 
as he wishes. 
See for examples, K H Bockstiegel Die allgemeinen 
Grundsatze des Volkerrechts uber Eigentumsentziehung 
75; Harris (n77) 544. 
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this regard the GA Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources~ and the Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of states85 express the view of the developing 
States. Article 2 (2) (c) of the Chart~r reads: 
'Each State has the right to nationalize, expropriate 
or transfer ownership of foreign property in which 
case appropriate compensation should be paid by the 
State adopting such measures, taking into account its 
relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances 
that the State considers pertinent. In any case where 
the question of compensation gives rise to 
controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic 
law of the nationalizing State and by its tribunals, 
unless it is freely and mutually agreed by all States 
concerned that other peaceful means be sought on the 
basis of the sovereign equality of States and in 
accordance with the principle of free choice of 
means.' 
Clearly, the 1974 Charter favours the view of developing 
States. It does not mention any public purpose limitation 
upon the power to expropriate nor does it mention 
international law standards. It clearly contradicts the 
views of developed States, and almost certainly does not 
reflect current law.M Brownlie states: 
~ 
85 
'It is fairly clear that the Charter does not purport 
to be a declaration of preexisting principles and 
overall it has strong programmatic, political and 
GA Res 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962. The Res was 
adopted by 87 votes to 2, with 12 abstentions. 
GA Res 3281 (XXIX) of 1974. The Res was adopted by 120 
votes to six, with 10 abstentions. 
M See Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co and California 
Asiatic Oil Co v Libya 53 ILR 389 (1977). 
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didactic flavour. Nonetheless, there can be little 
doubt that Article 2 (2) (c) is regarded by many States 
as an emergent principle .... 187 
Resolution 1803 (XVII), on the other hand, does not go 
as far as the Charter. It declares that nationalisation, 
expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on grounds 
or reasons of public utility, security or the national 
interest and that in such cases the owner shall be paid 
appropriate compensation in accordance with international 
law. The Resolution has been accepted in a number of 
arbitration awards as reflecting customary international 
law.M The Aminoil Case89 in particular is a notable 
example of the increasing use by tribunals of the 
'appropriate compensation' formula in Res 1803 (XVII) as 
the standard of compensation required by international law. 
In this case 'appropriate compensation' was used as a 
standard that permitted by its generality a flexible and 
equitable response to the legitimate expectations of the 
parties, taking into account, on the facts of that case, 
the history of the particular investment. The Iran-United 
states Claims Tribunal interpreted 'appropriate 




I Brownlie 'Legal status 
international law' (1979) 
International (RdC) 268. 
of natural resources in 
162 Acad~mie de Droit 
See Kuwait v American Independent Oil Co 21 ILM 976 
(1982) and Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co and California 
Asiatic Co v Libya (n85) 548. 
See Kuwait v American Independent Oil Co op cit. For 
a detailed account on this case, see FA Mann 'The 
Aminoil Arbitration' (1983) 54 BYIL 213 seq. 
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views of Western States than those of developing States. In 
the Sola Tiles Casew for instance, the Chairman of 
Chamber One, having settled on the 'appropriate 
compensation' formula as 'having achieved widespread use in 
recent years', interpreted it as the equivalent of adequate 
compensation and regarded Res 1803 (XVII), which 
incorporated the appropriate compensation formula, as 
intending 'no break with prevailing customary law'. In 
another case, 91 Lagergren, an earlier Chairman of Chamber 
One, raised the question whether the standard of 
appropriate compensation may have replaced the Hull 
formula: 
'Whether this standard is more correctly characterised 
as an exception to a still subsisting - though 
admittedly shrinking - Hull doctrine, or as evidence 
of a more general tendency towards the wholesale 
displacement of that doctrine as the repository of the 
opinio'juris, is still the subject of debate. But the 
latter view appears by now to have achieved a rather 
solid basis in arbitral decisions and in writings.' 92 
The above discussion shows that the standard for the 
payment of compensation ('appropriate' as opposed to 
'prompt, adequate and effective') for nationalisations and 
expropriations is still a controversial issue. For the 
present argument, however, it is sufficient to say that a 
State has to pay compensation for expropriation of foreign 
90 14 Iran-USCTR 223 (1987). 
91 INA Case 8 Iran-USCTR 373 {1987). 
92 INA Case op cit 387. 
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property. Certainly, an expropriation without paying 
compensation is illegal in international law. 
(ii) Effects of the illegality 
1. Continental territorial principle 
The European countries (except the United Kingdom) follow 
the territorial principle, according to which the 
competence of States is limited by international law, ie 
competence must end where it is contrary to customary 
international law. According to this principle an act of 
state which is illegal in international law need not be 
observed or executed within other States. However, the 
majority of the European countries observe or execute a 
foreign act of state only on the understanding that it 
passed the three tests mentioned above, and one of these 
tests was an examination of the foreign act for its 
compliance with generally recognised principles of 
international law.~ If the act was in conflict with one 




See supra V (3) (d). 
For judgments of almost every European high court, see 
F A Mann 'Volkerrechtswidrige Enteignungen vor 
nationalen Gerichten' (1961) 16 NJW 707. See also, 
VerdroB (n59) para 1187; H W Bayer 'Die Enteignungen 
auf Kuba vor den Gerichten der Vereinigten Staaten' 
(1965) 25 zaoRV 35; HE Folz Die Geltungskraft fremder 
HoheitsauBerungen 16 and K Konig Die Anerkennung 
- 140 -
2. The Anglo-American act of state doctrine 
Since its inception, the act of state doctrine has been a 
source of confusion. 95 Historically, the doctrine has been 
attributed to or compared with the principles of comity96 
and sovereign immunity. 97 Another view is that the act of 
state doctrine had its origin in traditional conflict of 
law rules, 98 according to which, domestic courts should 
defer to the acts of foreign soverei9ns only to the extent 





auslandischer Verwaltungsakte 123. 
Commentary and debate on the act of state doctrine are 
voluminous. See generally, R Delson 'The act of state 
doctrine - judicial deference or abstention? (1972) 66 
AJIL 82 seq; A Henkin 'Act of state today: 
recollection in tranquility' (1967) 6 CJTL 175 seq; M 
Zander 'The act of state doctrine' (1959) 53 AJIL 826 
seq and J W Note 'Rehabilitation and exoneration of 
the act of state doctrine' (1980) 12 NYUJILP 599 seq. 
In oetjen v Central Leather 246 us 303-04 (1918), the 
Supreme Court of the United States stated that its 
refusal to inquire into the validity of a sovereign 
act was based on 'the highest consideration of 
international community and expediency'. 
The rules on sovereign immunity determine when a 
domestic court has juri~diction over a foreign state. 
For a discussion of the relationship between the act 
of state doctrine and the concept of sovereign 
community, see Note (n95) 599 seq. 
Conflict of laws is that area of law which, 
recognising that the world is composed of territorial 
states having separate and differing systems of law, 
uses rules and methods for the resolution of issues 
that have a relationship to more than one state. 
According to this theory, the act of state doctrine is 
a 'special rule' that modifies the ordinary conflicts 
rules when the conduct of a foreign nation is at 
issue. see, Henkin (n95) 178 and H Kirgis 'Act of 
state exceptions and choice of law' (1972) 44 UCLR 173 
seq. 
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norms. The conflict theory, however, has not been accepted 
by British or United States courts, with the result that 
today there is no clarity about the proper scope of the 
doctrine in international law.~ 
a. History and development of the act of state doctrine 
At the outset it is helpful to trace the origin of the act 
of state doctrine in order to understand more fully the 
meaning and validity of its present formulation. The 
doctrine originated in the sixteenth century in England. In 
1673 Lord Nottingham granted a permanent injunction to 
prevent an action against a Danish citizen who had seized 
goods of th~ plaintiffs on the ground that they were 
infringing patent rights granted him by the King of 
Denmark. The Lord Chancellor stated: 
'Now after all this to send it to a trial of law, when 
either the court must pretend to judge the validity of 
the King's letters patent in Denmark or of the 
exposition and meaning of the articles of peace, or 
that a common jury should try whether the, English have 
a right to trade in Iceland is monstrous and 
absurd. ' 100 
Already at this stage, therefore, tP.e courts had the 
gravest misgivings as to the propriety of an action against 
~ 
100 
See, s Jacobs & RH King 'The act of state doctrine: 
a history of judicial limitations and exceptions' 
(1977) 18 HILJ 677 seq. 
Blade v Bamfield and Others 3 swans 603 (1674). cited 
in Folz (n94) 19. 
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a foreigner who maintained a defence based on a foreign act 
of state. 
The case of Duke of Brunswick v King of Hanover101 
involved the additional problem of impleading a foreign 
sovereign. The appellant, the formerly reigning Duke of 
Brunswick who, by an instrument executed in 1833 by King 
William IV and confirmed by the German Diet, had been put 
under guardianship, claimed against the respondent, the 
reigning King of Hanover who was his guardian, that the 
instrument of 1833 should be declared null and void and 
that the respondent should be accountable to him. The 
appellant failed. The House of Lords expressly disclaimed 
any intention of dealing with the question of whether the 
respondent was entitled to personal immunity or whether the 
fact of his presence in England and of his being a British 
peer deprived him of the privilege. Instead the House based 
its decision on the ground that, in the words of Lord 
Cottenham: 
'A foreign sovereign coming into this country cannot 
be responsible for an act done in his sovereign 
character in his own country; whether it be an act 
right or wrong, whether according to the constitution 
or not, the courts of this country cannot sit in 
judgment upon an act of a foreign sovereign effected 
by virtue of his sovereign authority abroad.' 
And later Lord Cottenham continued: 
101 
'It. is true, the bill states that the instrument was 
(1848) 2 HCL 1. _For a detailed discussion of this case 
in terms of its authority for the development of the 
act of state doctrine, see FA Mann 'The sacrosanctity 
of the foreign act of state' (1943) 59 LQR 47 seq. 
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contrary to the law of Hanover and Brunswick but, 
notwithstanding that it is so stated, still if it is a 
sovereign act, then, whether it be according to law or 
not according to law we cannot inquire into it. No 
court in this country can entertain questions to bring 
sovereigns to account for their acts done in their 
sovereign capacity abroad' 1~ 
Although the case did not make it clear whether the House 
of Lords intended to establish a general rule of immunity 
for the foreign act of state (so that the result would have 
been the same if the respondent had not been a foreign 
sovereign) it exercised a great influence upon a number of 
American decisions. 103 
In the United States the act of state doctrine 
originated in a decision of the Supreme Court in Waters v 
Collot. 1~ In this case, which was an action in tort 
against the former Governor of Guadaloupe for acts done in 
his official capacity, the Attorney General of the United 
States made the follow~ng statement concerning the merits 




'I am inclined to think, if the seizure of the vessel 
is admitted to have been an official act, done by the 
defendant by virtue, or under color, of the powers 
vested at him as Governor, that it will of itself be a 
sufficient answer to the plaintiff's action; that the 
defendant ought not to answer in our courts for any 
mere irregularity in the exercise of his powers; and 
The statement of Lord Cottenham is cited in Folz (n94) 
29-30. 
See Folz (n94) 39. 
2 Dall 247 US (1796)~ 
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that the extent of his authority can, with propriety 
or convenience, be determined only by the constituted 
authorities of its own nation.' 1~ 
The leading decision of the Supreme Court at this 
stage, however, was Underhill v Hernandez. 1~ In the 
course of a revolution in Venezuela the plaintiff, an 
American citizen resident in Bolivar, was, during a period 
of about eight weeks, refused a passport and permission to 
leave the country under orders of the defendant, a general 
in command of the revolutionary forces occupying Bolivar. 
Later the defendant came to New York where the plaintiff 
served him with a writ claiming damages for detention, 
confinement to his own house, and similar matters. There 
was in this case an additional problem: judgment against 
the defendant would in effect have been a judgment against 
the Venezuelan Government. As in the case Waters v Collet, 
the Court was reluctant to adjudicate upon the acts of 
agents of government or officials acting within the scope 
of their governmental authority. Consequently it is not 
surprising that the Court refused to rule on the validity 
of the acts in question. But the judgment has been 
interpreted as laying down a principle much wider than the 
facts of the case required. Chief Justice Fuller enunciated 
the classic and often repeated dictum: 
105 
106 
'Every sovereign State is bound to respect the 
independence of every other sovereign State and the 
courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the 
Cited in Folz (n94) 22. 
168 us 250 (1897). 
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acts of the Government of another done within its own 
territory.' 107 
He continued: 
'The immunity of individuals from suits brought in 
foreign tribunals for acts done within their own 
States in exercise of governmental authority must 
necessarily extend to the agents of governments ruling 
by paramount force as a matter of fact. We think that 
the Circuit Court of Appeals was justified in 
concluding that the acts of the defendant were acts of, 
the Government of Venezuela and as such not properly 
the subject of adjudication in the Courts of another 
Government. ' 108 
Unfortunately, the Court did not expound on the theoretical 
basis of its decision which would have given guidance to 
the lower courts. The lack of a clearly articulated premise 
became the source of much controversy over the proper role 
of the act of state doctrine in American jurisprudence. 109 
b. The Sabbatino case 
The starting point for an analysis of the modern act of 




Underhill v Hernandez op cit 252~ This formulation is 
frequently referred to as the 'classic American 
statement of the act of state doctrine'. See L Mathias 
'Reconstruction of the act of state doctrine: a 
blueprint for legislative reform' (1980) 12 LPIB 372. 
Underhill v Hernandez (nl06) 252. 
See Zander (n95) 826 seq. 
- 146 -
Nacional de Cuba v Sabbatino. 110 The judgme,nt of the Court 
is clearly a significant one, for it raised many issues, in 
particular the scope and the interpretation of the American 
act of state doctrine. A leading authority, Professor 
Richard Falk, has written that 'no international law case 
in United States judicial practice has aroused such 
widespread interest among members of legal profession' and 
'that it is almost certain that Sabbatino will become a 
landmark decision in the field of international law'. 111 
The facts of the Sabbatino Case can be summarised as 
follows: in February and July 1960, a New York commodity 
broker contracted to purchase sugar from Compania Azucarera 
Vertientes-Camaguey de Cuba (CAV), a Cuban corporation 
owned almost by American nationals. When, on 6 July 1960, 
the United States Congress amended the Sugar Act of 1948 to 
permit the President to reduce the sugar quota allotted to 
Cuba, the Cuban Council of Ministers responded by 
expropriating American property in Cuba. 112 Pursuant to 
this decree, the Cuban Government promulgated a Resolution 
expressly nationalising CAV and its subsidiaries. As a 
condition of permitting the sugar to be transported from 
Cuba, the government exacted a second purchase contract 




376 us 398 (1964). 
RA Falk 'The complexity of Sabbatino' (1964) 58 AJIL 
951. 
Cuba Gaceta Oficial 7 July 1960 Folletos de Divulgac6n 
Legislativa 29. English translation in (1961) 55 AJIL 
822-3. 
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a Cuban governmental agency. When the broker resold the 
sugar, a New York state court, finding CVA to have been the 
rightful owner, awarded the proceeds to a New York receiver 
appointed to manage the assets of CVA. Banco Nacional then 
brought an action in a federal district court against both, 
the broker and the receiver, alleging conversion of the 
sale proceeds. The broker defended the action by 
challenging Cuba's claim of title to the sugar, arguing 
that the purported expropriation failed to pass title to 
the Cuban Government because the taking violated 
international law. Banco Nacional, relying on the act of 
state doctrine, asserted that American courts could not 
question the validity of its title obtained by 
expropriation. The district court ruled that, while the 
doctrine precludes courts from testing the validity of the 
seizure under Cuban law or under the forum's public policy, 
it does not prevent such examination under principles of 
international law. Having found the taking to be invalid 
under international law, because it was discriminatory, 
confiscatory, and retaliatory, the court granted summary 
judgment for the defendants. 113 The court of Appeals for 
the second circuit confirmed this ruling, holding that 
Cuba's expropriation violated international law on the 
ground that the taking was not for a public purpose, but 
was designed instead to discriminate against the United 
113 See DJ Dimock 'Judicial decisions- Banco Nacional de 
Cuba v Sabbatino' (1961) 55 AJIL 741 seq. 
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States and its nationals. 114 The Supreme Court reversed 
this decision, holding that the act of state doctrine 
precludes judicial review of foreign acts of state 
regardless of any violation of international law: 
'Therefore, rather than laying down or reaffirming an 
inflexible rule and all-encompassing rule in this 
case, we decide only that the Judicial Branch will not 
examine the validity of a taking of property within 
its own territory by a sovereign government, extant 
and recognised by this country at the time of suit, in 
the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement 
regarding controlling legal principles, even if the 
complainant alleges that the taking violates customary 
international law. 1115 
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the act of state 
doctrine immediately became the subject of debate. 116 In 
the eight months following the decision, an intensive 
lobbying effort (initiated by the international business 
community) led to the enactment of legislation aimed at 
superseding the Sabbatino judgment. 117 The legislation, 
known as the Sabbatino amendment, requi.red domestic courts 





See J Waterman 'Banco Nacional de Cuba v Sabbatino -
US Court of Appeals second circuit' ( 1962) 56 AJIL 
1085 seq. 
See Banco Nacional de Cuba v Sabbatino (nll0) 428. The 
court concluded 'that there are few if any issues in 
international law today on which opinion seems to be 
so divided as the limitations on a state's power to 
expropriate the property of aliens.' 
For a survey,' see PA Longo 'Limiting the act of state 
doctrine: a legislative initiative' (1982-83) 23 VJIL 
103. 
Se~ W Delbrilck V6lkerrecht vol I 489. 
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doctrine. 118 The provisions of the amendment, however,-
were narrowly construed by the courts and so have had only 
a limited effect. 119 
There are several reasons for the limited application 
of the amendment. First, the amendment applies only to 
cases in which 'a claim of title or other rights to 
property is asserted'. 120 Therefore, courts have held that 





The Sabbatino amendment (frequently referred to as the 
Hickenlooper Amendment) provides: 
'Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no Court 
of the United States shall decline on the ground of 
the federal act of state doctrine to make a 
determination on the merits giving effect to the 
principles of international law in a case in which a 
claim of title or other right is asserted by any party 
including a foreign state (or a party claiming through 
such state) based upon (or traced through) a 
confiscation or other taking after January 1, 1959, by 
an act of that state in violation of the principles of 
international law, including the principles of 
compensation and the other standards set out in this 
subsection: provided, that this subparagraph shall not 
be applicable (1) in any case in which an act of a 
foreign state is not contrary to international law or 
with respect to a claim of title or other right 
acquired pursuant to an irrevocable letter of credit 
of not more than 180 days duration, or (2) in any case 
with respect to which the President determines that 
application of the act of state doctrine is required 
in that particular case by the foreign policy 
interests of the United States and a suggestion to 
this effect is filed on this behalf in that case with 
the court.' Cited from R E Hellweg 'The Sabbatino 
amendment: congressional modifications of the American 
act of state doctrine' (1969) 29 ZaoRV 316 seq. For a 
general discussion of the amendment, see M Cardozo 
'Congress versus Sabbatino: constitutional 
considerations' (1966), 4 CJTL 297 seq. 
See W Delbruck (nl17) ibid. 
See Sabbatino amendment (n118). 
See Mendenez v Sacks & Co 485 F2d 1355 (1973). In this 
judgment the court stated: 'We are persuaded by the 
legislation history, and in particular by Congress's 
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courts have read the amendment to imply that in the case of 
a foreign expropriation, property must find its way back 
into the United States before a court can decline to apply 
the act of state doctrine. 1~ Thirdly, courts have 
interpreted the amendment not to apply to a foreign State's 
own nationals. 123 Finally, under the terms of a proviso to 
the amendment, the President retains the right to raise the 
act of state doctrine as a bar to adjudication of 
expropriation cases that would otherwise fall within the 
provisions of the legislation. 1~ 
The Sabbatino amendment was followed by judicial 
efforts to limit the effects of the Sabbatino Case in 
domestic courts. The Supreme Court had its first 




insertioh in 1965 of the words to "property" 
immediately after the phrase "claim of title or other 
right" that the intent was to exclude all contract 
claims from the Sabbatino amendment.' 
See Banco Nacional de Cuba v First National City Bank 
431 F2d 394 (1970). 
See F Palicio y Compania SA v Brush 256 F Supp 481 
(1966). In this case the court observed that 'acts of 
a state directed against its own nationals do not give 
rise to question of international law'. It then 
concluded that 'confiscations by a state of the 
property of its own nationals, no matter how flagrant 
and regardless of whether compensation has been 
provided, do not constitute violations of 
international law. Thus, the acts of the Cuban 
Government come not within the purview of the 
Hickenlooper amendment but rather within the specific 
exception excluding application of the amendment in 
any case in which an.act of state of a foreign state 
is not contrary to international law.' 
See Sabbatino amendment (nll8). 
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National City Bank v Banco Nacionale d~ Cuba. 1~ In 
response to Cuba's seizure of Citibank's Cuban branches, 
Citibank sold loan collateral that had been pledged by the 
Cuban bank. Banco Nacional's rejoinder was to sue in the 
Federal district court to recover the excess proceeds of 
the sale. Citibank counterclaimed to recover damages from 
the expropriation. The issue posed in the Citibank Case was 
whether the act of state doctrine barred assertion of the 
counterclaim. The Supreme Court allowed the 
counterclaim. 1u Justice Rehnquist based his decisio~ on 
assurances by the executive branch that adjudication in 
this case would not interfere with the conduct of foreign 
relations. 1u Justice Powell, in a separate opinion, 
declined to adopt an overly broad interpretation of the 
Sabbatino Case. He concluded that the federal courts must 




406 us 759 (1972). 
First National City Bank v Banco Nacional de Cuba op 
cit 761 seq. 
First National City Bank v Banco Nacional de Cuba 
(nl25) 768. Reliance on executive assurances to avoid 
application of the act of state doctrine is commonly 
known as the 'Bernstein exception' • The exception 
holds that abstention is appropriate when the 
executive branch communicates to the judiciary that 
application of the act of state doctrine is not called 
for in a particular case. Bernstein v N V 
Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij 
210 F2d 375 (1954). On the Bernstein exception and the 
effect of executive action in act of state cases, see 
W J Bogaard 'The act of state doctrine after 
Sabbatino' (1964-65) 63 MLR 528 seq; M Leigh 'The 
Supreme Court and the Sabbatino watchers' (1972~73) 13 
VJIL 41 seq and SD Metzger 'The State Department's 
role in the judicial administration of the act of 
state doctrine' (1972) 66 AJIL 94 seq. 
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exercise of jurisdiction would interfere with delicate 
foreign relations conducted by the political branches'.,~ 
As no such conflict had been shown, Justice Powell asserted 
that 'the courts have a duty to determine and apply the 
applicable international law'. 1~ Finally, Justice 
Douglas, in a concurring opinion, drew an analogy with an 
earlier case on sovereign immunity and based his decision 
on equitable considerations. 130 He concluded: 
'To allow recovery without more. would permit Cuba to 
have its cake and eat it too. Fair dealing requires 
allowance of the set-off to the amount of the claim on 
which this suit is brought. 1131 
The dissenting opinion in the Citibank Case fiercely 
criticised the majority's view of the act of state 
doctrine. Justice Brennan asserted that 'Sabbatino held 
that the validity of a foreign act of state in certain 
circumstances is a "political question" not cognisable in 
our courts' . 132 Consequently, 'the executive branch, 






First National Bank City Bank v Banco Nacional de Cuba 
(n125) 775. 
ibid. 
Justice Douglas drew an analogy with National City 
Bank v Republic of China 348 US 356 (1955). In this 
case the court decided that when a foreign sovereign 
invokes the jurisdiction of US courts, it shall not be 
permitted to assert sovereign immunity as a defence to 
counterclaims to the extent· of the sovereign's own 
claims. 
First National City Bank v Banco Nacional de Cuba 
(n125) 772. 
First National City Bank v Bano Nacional de Cuba 
(n125) 787-8. 
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affairs, cannot by simple stipulation change a political 
question into a cognisable claim'.,n By equating the 
'politica~ question' and the act of state doctrine, Justice 
Brennan took a step that even the Court in the Sabbatino 
Case did not take. 134 While the Citibank Case indicates a 
retreat from the extreme position taken in the Sabbatino 
Case 135 1· t 1 1 d' f . ' __, a so revea s a 1vergence o opinion among the 
members of the Court about the best way to limit the effect 
of Sabbatino. The Citibank Case can be seen as an important 
illustration of a growing inability, in the wake of 
Sabbatino, to interpret the act of state doctrine in a 
consistent and predictable manner. 1~ 
The next effort of the Supreme Court to limit the wide 
application of Sabbatino was in Alfred Dunhill of London 
Inc v Republic of Cuba. 137 The case arose when the Cuban 
Government confiscated several Cuban cigar companies, and 
agents (called 'interventors') appointed to take over these 
enterprises received the proceeds of preconfiscation 
sales. 138 The issue in the Dunhill Case was whether the 








See Folz (n94) 155. 
See RB Lillich 'The proper role of domestic courts in 
the international legal order' (1971-72) 11 VJIL 9 
seq. 
See Folz (n94) 155-6. 
425 us 682 (1976). 
For a detailed account on the facts of the case, see 
Jacobs & King (n99) 680 seq. 
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funds constituted an act of state, and was thus immune_from 
judicial action by a us court. The court refused to extend 
the act of stat~ doctrine to the purely commercial 
transactions of a sovereign. Therefore, the Court ruled 
that a United States tribunal could consider the 
interventors' refusal to repay the disputed proceeds. 139 
This commercial activity exception, however, was adopted_ 
only by a majority of the Court. 140 Two reasons were given 
for adopting the commercial activity exception. First, not 
recognising the commercial conduct of a foreign sovereign 
as an act of state risks little embarassment to the 
executive branch in its conduct of foreign relations. 141 
Secondly, treating purely commercial transactions as acts 
of state: 
'would undermine the policy supporting the restrictive 
view of sovereign immunity, which is to assure those 
engaging in commercial transactions with foreign 
sovereignties that their rights will be determined in 
the courts whenever posssible. ' 142 
In conclusion it may be said that, while the Sabbatino 
Case (and its aftermath) endorses the act of state 
doctrine, it does not formulate an absolute rule that even 





Alfred Dunhill of London Inc v Cuba (nl37) 706. 
The decisioi was taken by a 5-4 majority. See, for the 
dissenting opinions of Justices Brennan, · Stewart, 
Marshall, and Blackmun, Alfred Dunhill of London Inc 
v Cuba (nl37) 682 seq. 
Alfred Dunhill of London Inc v Cuba (nl37) 710. 
Alfred Dunhill of London Inc v Cuba (nl37) 699. 
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an American court is P(?Werless to act. It holds that, while 
American courts may not review the validity of 
expropriations under customary international law, they may 
review all governmental acts, including-expropriations, 
that violate 'a treaty or other unambiguous agreement 1 • 10 
Besides this, Sabbatino urges courts to use the act of 
state doctrine flexibly, which encourages courts to 
consider whether the policies underlying the doctrine would 
be served by its application in the particular case. 144 
Even when the specific requirements for the application of 
the act of state doctrine are fulfilled, an American court 
may continue its procedure if it determines that a 
consensus of the community of nations exists supporting the 
customary rule violated by the act in question and that the 
case has no important bearing on the conduct of foreign 
relations. 1~ Therefore, the Sabbatino rule seems to be in 





Banco Nacional de Cuba v Sabbatino (nllO) 428. 
See Banco Nacional de Cuba v Sabbatino {nllO) 430 and 
R A Falk 'Toward a theory of the paticipation of 
domestic courts in the international legal order: a 
critique of Banco Nacional de Cuba v Sabbatino' {1961-
62) 16 Rutgers Law Review 1 seq. 
See H W Bayer 'Die Enteignungen auf Kuba vor den 
Gerichten der Vereinigten Staaten' {1965) 25 Za6RV 48. 
See Folz (n94) 185. 
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c. Criticism of the doctrine 
The main point of criticism of the act of state doctrine 
goes to the rationale laid down in the Supreme Court's 
decision in Sabbatino; 147 that the doctrine should 
regulate relations between the political and judicial 
branches of government. This rationale has led to much 
uncertainty over the appropriate use of the doctrine. 148 
.The lower courts interpreted the Sabbatino judgment to 
require deference to all sovereign conduct, thereby denying 
many litigants meaningful access to domestic forums. 1w 
More important, however, is the subversive effect the 
doctrine has on international law. The supremacy of 
international law is, or should be, the cornerstone of any 




It should be mentioned that this criticism did not 
start with the Sabbatino Case. In May 1959, at the 
annual meeting of the Bar Association of the City of 
New York, the Committee on International Law presented 
a resolution recommending that any American court be 
free to judge upon the validity of any act of state of 
a foreign country when the effect of that act of state 
on legal rights is an issue in a case pending before 
the American court. For text and discussion of the 
resolution, see J N Hyde 'The act of state doctrine 
and the rule of law' (1959) 53 AJIL 635 seq and for 
criticism of the resolution, see W H Reeves 'The act 
of state doctrine and the rule of law - a reply' 
(1960) 54 AJIL 141 seq. 
In theory, Sabbatino requires courts to determine, in 
each case involving the act of a foreign sovereign, 
whether foreign policy implications warrant 
application of the act of state doctrine. See Banco 
Nacional de Cuba v Sabbatino (nll0) 423-8. 
Illustrative examples are: Empresa Cubana Exportadora 
Inc v Lamborn & Co 652 F2d 231 (1981) and IAM v OPEC 
649 F2d 1354 ( 1981) . 
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it should be unthinkable for any judge to apply a law wtiich 
is, and is known to be, contrary to international law and 
therefore a wrong. 150 
Another effect of the act of state doctrine is the 
restriction it imposes on the courts' participation in the 
development of international law. Sabbatino limited the 
competence of domestic courts to ascertain and apply 
principl~s of international law in resolving act of state 
cases. The Supreme Court concluded that courts should not 
apply international law where there is no clear evidence 
that an international consensus exists on the matter in 
question. 151 This 1 imitation ignores the commitment of any 
court to the application and development of international 




See Mann (n94) 708. 'Es ist eben die Pflicht und das 
Priveleg des Richters das Recht - einschlieBlich des 
Volkerrechts - zu wahren. Er verlaBt den Boden des 
Rechts und wird seiner Aufgabe untreu, wenn er 
Politik, sei es auch nur Wirtschaftspolitik, treibt.' 
He continues: 'Volkerrechtsverletzungen sind irnrner 
absolutes Unrecht. Sie sind unverzeihlich und konnen 
in den Augen des verantwortungsbewuBten Juristen nie 
Recht schaffen.' In this sense also the Supreme Court 
of Germany held: 'das Volkerrecht steht als 
unantastbarer Kernbereich des Rechts uber jedem 
innerstaatlichen Recht, und wenn zum Beispiel eine 
MaBnahme gegen allgemeine Regeln des Volkerrechts 
verst6Bt, so mussen die inlandischen Gerichte mi t 
Wirkung fur den Einzelnefi ihre Unre6htmaBigkeit 
zugrunde legen.' (1951) 1 BGHSt 391. 
Banco Nacional de Cuba v Sabbatino (nllO) 423-4. 
See dissenting opinion of Justice White in Banco 
Nacional de Cuba v Sabbatino (nllO) 458. That judicial 
decisions of national court systems are important to 
the development of international law was recognised by 
the International Rule of Law Act which was introduced 
by Senator Mathias as a bill in the US Congress. The 
purpose of this legislation was twofold. First it 
sought to provide victims of international wrongs with 
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unsettled, universal principles will only be derived 
through repeated application and refinement: 
'Domestic court decisions are a patchwork process and 
often conflict with each other, but from such stuff is 
customary international law made and modified. Indeed, 
by refusing to clarify and apply the relevant 
international law standards, the Court actually 
perpetuates the supposed lack of consensus so damaging 
to customary international law. ' 153 
The lack of international law standards can only be 
remedied by allowing courts to participate in the formation 
of international legal principles. 154 
In summary it may be said that the American act of 
state doctrine needs to be reformed to end the confusion 
153 
154 
a forum in which to litigate their claims. Secondly, 
it encouraged domestic courts to become involved in 
the development of international law and consequently 
to participate in the international legal system. See 
97th Congress 1st Sess 127 Congress Record S7120-1. 
Lillich {nl35) 32-3. 
See VerdroB (n57) 778 and Dahm (n57) 491. That 
domestic courts are capable of making objective 
determinations of international law can be 
illustrated, even in American practice, in the case of 
Banco Nacional de Cuba v Chase Manhattan Bank 658 F2d 
875 (1981). Chase Manha~tan Bank, like Citibank, 
brought a counterclaim to recover damages for Cuba's 
seizure of the bank's Cuban branches. The court lifted 
the act of state bar and was therefore free to 
determine the applicable international standards of 
compensation for expropriation. Despite the lack of 
consensus in this area of international law, the court 
surveyed authoritative sources in an effort to obtain 
objective standards. It then applied the rule it 
considered most representative of customary 
international law on this point. In doing so, the 
court made a valid contribution to the development of 
international law. More importantly, it demonstrated 
the ability of us courts to determine and apply 
principles of international law in a responsible 
manner. 
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presently surrounding its judicial use and the scope of its 
application. 155 
(f) conclusion 
From the above it follows that paras 1, 2, 3, and 6 of 
Decree No 1 (as self-executing acts of state) need not be 
recognised by any other State. And there is no rule in 
international law which would oblige other States to 
execute paras 4 and 5 (as non-self-executing acts of 
state). The most fundamental principle of international law 
is the sovereignty of States which implies that one state 
is never obliged to execute the acts of another State. 
More complex is para 2 of the Decree because this 
provision violates rules of customary international law. It 
states that all concessions, permissions, or licences 
whenever granted under the authority of the Government of 
South Africa are null and void, but contains no provision 
155 For the existing uncertainty about the judicial use 
and scope of the act of state doctrine, see us case of 
Republic of Philippines v Marcos 808 F2d 344 (1986) 
where the court considered how far the act of state 
doctrine is applicable to acts of former governments. 
See also, Clayo Petroleum Corporation v Ocidental 
Petroleum Corporation 712 F2d 404 (1983) and 
particularly the criticism of FA Gevurtz 'Using the 
antitrust laws to combat overseas bribery by foreign 
companies: a step to even the odds in international 
trade' (1986-87) 27 VJIL 211 seq. It is still an open 
question whether the act of state doctrine is 
applicable ih cases concerning violation of human 
rights. For that problem, see Filartiga v Pen-Irala 
630 F2d 876 (1980) and R G Haren 'Alien Tort Claims 
Act' (1986-87) 27 VJIL 433 seq. 
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for paying compensation for the expropriation of the 
foreign property. 1~ In so far as the Namibian Government 
adopted Decree No 1 in its Constitution, para 2 is now an 
act of the Namibian State illegal under international law. 
The observance of illegal acts of state is dependent 
on the way in which this matter is approached. Whereas para 
2 of the Decree will most probably not be observed in the 
countries which follow the territorial principle, ie the 
Continental jurisdictions (because para 2 will not pass the 
preliminary test as to whether it complies with principles 
of public international law), the situation is not as clear 
in terms of the Anglo-American act of state doctrine. 
Because of the confusion surrounding the application of the 
doctrine in America, one can only speculate on what an 
American court's approach to a case based on para 2 of 
Decree No 1 would be. 
The doctrine would be applied by the court only on the 
understanding that, first, Decree No 1 does not fall within 
the scope of the commercial activity exception, and, 
secondly, that the State Department decides that 
application is not contrary to the foreign policy interests 
of the United States. The commercial activity exception, 
introduced by the Supreme Court in Alfred Dunhill of London 
Inc v · Republic of Cuba, 157 denies the extension of the act 
of state doctrine to purely commercial transactions. Hence, 
156 
157 
Concessions fall into 
property. See supra V (3) 
425 us 682 (1976). 
the definition 
( d) • 
of foreign 
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if the Decree is such a transaction, the doctrine would not 
be applicable. Decree No 1, however, was issued by the 
UNCfN (and later incorporated into the Namibian 
Constitution) to preserve the natural resources of the 
Territory for the Namibian people. Hence it is arguably an 
emanation of the right of economic self-determination and 
not a purely commercial activity. 158 
Assuming a determination of the.State Department had 
been made that the application of the Decree is not 
contrary to foreign policy interests, the court would be 
free to apply the doctrine in the particular case. In the 
case of a claim by an American national who had lost 
property under para 2 of the Decree (because the Na~ibian 
Government confiscated permissions, licences, or 
concessions), it is likely that the court would judge in 
favour of the plaintiff. The modern practice of American 
courts shows that they usually deny application of the 
doctrine when it appears that a violation of customary 
international law had'occurred, 1~ and expropriation 
without paying compensation is contrary to generally 




The right of economic self-determination is part of 
the general right of self-determination of every 
nation; it is accepted in international customary law 
and laid down in GA Res 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 
1962. 
See H W Bayer 'Die Enteignungen auf Kuba vor den 
Gerichten der Vereinigten Staaten' (1965) 25 Za6RV 33 
seq. 
See K H Bockstiegel Die allgemeinen Grundsatze des 
Volkerrechts uber Eigentumsentziehungen 75. 
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this, the court would take into consideration the policies 
underlying the act of state doctrine. First there is the 
question whether the court's decision would infringe on the 
executive's conduct of foreign relations. This would seem 
unlikely given the current relations between America and 
Namibia. Namibia is dependent on America's support in the 
form of development aid and America is one of Namibia's 
most important trading partners. More important, however, 
is the tendency in the practice of states since the Second 
World War to settle problems arising from expropriations or 
confiscations, even after a court's judgment, by agreements 
which are based on a compromise between the concerned 
parties, and which allow the maintenance of friendly 
relationship between States. 161 
Hence one can assume that an American court would not 
apply the act of state doctrine in terms of para 2 of 
Decree No 1, but would instead judge against the Namibian 
Government to pay compensation for the confiscation because 
its act violates customary international law. 
161 For examples, see I Foighel Nationalisation - a Study 




Decree No 1 for the Protection of the 
Natural Resources of Namibia 
Conscious of its responsibility to protect the natural 
resources of the people of Namibia and of ensuring that 
these natural resources are not exploited to the detriment 
of Namibia, its people or environmental assets, the United 
Nations Council for Namibia enacts the following decree: 
DECREE 
The United Nations Council for Namibia 
Recognising that, in the terms of General Assembly 
Resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966 the Territory of 
Namibia (formerly South West Africa) is the direct 
responsibility of the United Nations, 
Accepting that this responsibility includes the obligation 
to support the right of the people of Namibia to achieve 
self-government and independence in accordance with General 
Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, 
Reaffirming that the Government of the Republic of South 
Africa is in illegal possession of the Territory of 
Namibia, 
Furthering that the decision of the General Assembly in 
Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962 which declared 
the right of the peoples and nations to permanent 
sovereignty over their national.wealth and resources, 
Noting that the Government of the Republic of South Africa 
has usurped and interfered with these rights, 
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Desirous of securing for the people of Namibia adequate 
protection of the natural wealth and re?ources of the 
Territory which is rightfully theirs, 
Recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court 
of Justice of 21 June 1971, 
Acting in terms of the powers conferred on it by General 
Assembly Resolution 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967 and all other 
relevant resolutions and decisions regarding Namibia, 
Decrees that 
1. No person or entity, whether a body corporate or 
unincorporated, may search for, prospect for, explore 
for, take, extract, mine, process, refine, use, sell, 
export, or distribute any natural resource, whether 
animal or mineral situated or found to be situated 
within the territorial limits of Namibia without the 
consent and permission of the United Nations Council 
for Namibia to any person authorised to act on its 
behalf for the purpose of giving such permission or 
such consent; 
2. Any permission, concession or licence for all or any 
of the purposes specified in paragraph 1 above 
whensoever granted by any person or entity, including 
any body purporting to act under the authority of the 
Government of the Republic of South Africa or the 
'Administration of South West Africa' or their 
predecessors, is null, void and of no force or effect; · 
3. No animal, mineral, or other natural resource produced 
in or emanating from the Territory of Namibia may be 
taken from the said Territory by any means whatsoever 
to any place whatsoever outside the territorial limits 
of Namibia by any person or body, whether corporate or 
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unincorporated, without the consent and permission of 
the United Nations Council for Namibia ·or of any 
person authorised to act on behalf of the said 
Council; 
4. Any animal, mineral or other natural resource produced 
in or emanating from the Territory of Namibia may be 
taken from the said Territory by any means whatsoever 
to any place whatsoever outside the territorial limits 
of Namibia by any person or body, whether corporate or 
unincorpotated, without the consent and permission of 
the United Nations Council for Namibia or of a~y 
person authorised to act on behalf of the said 
Council; 
5. Any animal, mineral or other natural resource produced 
in or emanating from the Territory of Namibia which 
shall be taken from the said Territory without the 
consent and written authority of the United Nations 
Council for Namibia or any person authorised on behalf 
of the said Council may be seized and shall ~e 
forfeited to the benefit of the-said Council and held 
in trust by them for the benefit ~f the people of 
Namibia; 
6. Any vehicle, ship or container found to be carrying 
animal, mineral or other natural resources produced in 
or emanating from the Territory of Namibia shall also 
be subject to seizure and forfeiture by or on behalf 
of the United Nations Council of Namibia or of any 
person authorised to act on behalf of the said Council 
and shall be forfeited to the benefit of the said 
Council and held in trust by them for the benefit of 
the people of Namibia; 
7. Any person, entity or corporation which contravenes 
the present decree in respect of Namibia may be held 
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liable in damages by the future Government of an 
independent Namibia; 
8. For the purpose of the preceding paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 
4, and 5 and in order to give effect to this decree, 
the United Nations Council for Namibia thereby 
authorises the United Nations Commissioner for 
Namibia, in accordance with Resolution 2248 (S-V), to 




covenant of the League of Nations 
Article 22 
1. To those colonies and territories which as a 
consequence of the late war have ceased to be under 
.the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed 
them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able 
to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions 
of the modern world, there should be applied the 
principle that the well-being and development of such 
peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that 
securities for the performance of this trust should be 
embodied in this Covenant. 
2. The best method of giving practical effect to this 
principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should 
be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of 
their resources, their experience or their 
geographical position can best undertake this 
responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and 
that this tutelage should be exercised by them as 
Mandatories on behalf of the League. 
3. The character of the mandate must differ according to 
the stage of the development of the people, the 
geographical situation of the territory, its economic 
conditions and other similar circumstances. 
4. Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish 
Empire have reached a stage of development where their 
existence as independent nations can be provisionally 
recognised subject to the rendering of administrative 
advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time· 
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as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these 
communities must be a principal consideration in the 
selection of the Mandatory. 
5. Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are 
at such stage that the Mandatory must be responsible 
for the administration of the territory under 
conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience 
and religion, subject only to the maintenance of 
public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses 
such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the 
liquor traffic, and the prevention of the 
establishment of fortifications or military and naval 
bases and of military training of the natives for 
other than police purposes and the defence of 
territory, and will also secure equal opportunities 
for the trade and commerce of other Members of the 
League. 
6. There are territories, such as South West Africa and 
certain South Pacific Islands, which, owning to the 
sparseness of their population, or their small size; 
or their remoteness from the centres of civilisation, 
or th.eir geographical contiguity to the Territory of 
the Mandatory, and other circumstances, can be best 
administered under the laws of the Mandatory as 
integral portions of its territory, subject to 
safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the 
indigenous population. 
7. In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render 
to the Council an annual report in reference to the 
territory committed to its charge. 
8. The degree of authority, control, or administration to 
be exercised by the Mandatory shall, if not previously 
agreed upon by the Members of the League, be 
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explicitly defined in each case by the Council. 
9. A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive 
and examine the annual reports of the Mandatories and 
to advise the Council on all matters relating to the 
observance of the mandates. 
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Appendix III 
Mandate for German south west Africa 
The Council of the League of Nations: 
Whereas by Article 119 of the Treaty of Peace with 
Germany signed at Versailles on June 28th, 1919, Germany 
renounced in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated 
Powers all her rights over her oversea possessions, 
including therein German South West Africa; and 
Whereas the Principal Allied and Associated Powers 
agreed that, in accordance with Article 22 Part I (Covenant 
of the League of Nations) of the said Treaty, a Mandate 
should be conferred upon His Britannic Majesty to be 
exercised on his behalf by the Government of the Union of 
South Africa to administer the territory aforementioned, 
and have proposed that the Mandate should be formulated in 
the following terms; and 
Whereas His Britannic Majesty, for and on behalf of 
the Government of the Union of South Africa, has agreed to 
accept the Mandate in respect of the said territory and has 
undertaken to exercise it on behalf of the League of 
Nations in accordance with the following provisions; and 
Whereas, by the aforementioned Article 22, paragraph 
a, it is provided that the degree of authority, control or 
administration to be exercised by the Mandatory not having 
been. previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, 
shall be explicitly defined by the Council of the League of 
Nations: 
Confirming the said Mandate, defines its terms as 
follows: 
ARTICLE 1 
The territory over which a Mandate is conferred upon His 
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Britannic Majesty for and on behalf of the Government of 
the Union of South Africa (hereinafter called the 
Mandatory) comprises the territory which formerly 
constituted the German Protectorate of South West Africa. 
ARTICLE 2 
The Mandatory shall have full power of administration and 
legislation over the territory subject to the present 
Mandate as an integral portion of the Union of South 
Africa, and may apply the laws of the Union of South Africa 
to the territory, subject to such local modifications as 
circumstances may require. 
The Mandatory shall promote to the utmost the material and 
moral well~being and the social progress of the inhabitants 
of the territory subject to the present Mandate. 
ARTICLE 3 
The Mandatory shall see that the slave trade is prohibited, 
and that no forced labour is permitted, except for public 
works and services, and than only for adequate 
remuneration. The Mandatory shall also see that the traffic 
in arms and ammunition is controlled in accordance with 
principles analogous to those laid down in the Convention 
relating to the control of the arms traffic, signed on 
September 10th, 1919, or in any convention amending the 
.same. 
The supply of intoxicating spirits and beverages to the 
natives shall be prohibited. 
ARTICLE 4 
The military training of the natives, otherwise than for 
purposes of internal police and the local defence of the 
territory, shall be prohibited. Furthermore, no military or 
naval bases shall be established or fortifications erected 
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in the territory. 
ARTICLE 5 
Subject to the provisions of any local law for the 
maintenance of public order and public morals, the 
Mandatory shall ensure in the territory freedom of 
conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, 
and shall allow all missionaries, nationals of any State 
Member of the League of Nations, to enter into, travel and 
reside in the territory for the purpose of prosecuting 
their calling. 
ARTICLE 6 
The Mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of 
Nations an annual report to the satisfaction of the 
Council, containing full information with regard to the 
territory, and indicating the measures taken to carry out 
the obligations assumed under Articles 2, 3, 4, and 5. 
ARTICLE 7 
The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is 
required for any modification of the terms of the present 
Mandate. 
The Mandatory agrees that, if any dispute, whatever should 
arise between the Mandatory and another Member of the 
League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the 
application of the provisions of the Mandate, such dispute, 
if it-cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted 
to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided 
for by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. 
The present Declaration shall be deposited in the archives 
of the League of Nations. Certified copies shall be 
forwarded by the Secretary General of the League of Nations 








Charter of the United Nations 
The security council 
Article 24 
1.- In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the 
United Nations, its Members confer on the Security 
Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, and agree that in 
carrying out its duties under this responsibility the 
Security Council acts on their behalf. 
2. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall 
act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of 
the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the 
Security Council for the discharge of these duties are 
laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII. 
Article 25 
The Members of ·the United Nations agree to accept and carry 
out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance 
with the present Charter. 
Chapter VI: Pacific settlement of Disputes 
Article 33 
1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which 
is likely to endanger the maintenance of international 
peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a 
solution by negotiations, enquiry, meditation, 
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co_nciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort 
to regional agencies or arrangements, or other 
peaceful means of their own choice. 
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, 
call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such 
means. 
Chapter VII: Action with respect to Threats to the Peace 
Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of 
Aggression 
Article 41 
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving 
the use of armed forces are to be employed to give effect 
to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the 
United Nations to apply such measures. These may include 
complete or partial interruption of economic relations and 
of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other 
means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic 
relations. 
Article 42 
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided 
for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be 
inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land 
forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. Such action may include 
demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, 
or land forces of Members of the United Nations. 
Chapter IX: 
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International Economic and social co-
operation 
Article 55 
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability an_d 
well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly 
relations among nations based on respect for the principle 
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the 
United Nations shall promote: 
a. higher standards of living, full employment, and 
conditions of economic and social progress and 
development; 
b. solutions of intern~tional economic, social, health, 
and related problems; and international cultural and 
educational co-operation; and 
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights 
and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction 
as to race, sex, language, or religion. 
Article 56 
All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate 
action in co-operation with the Organisation for the 
achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55. 
Chapter XI: Declaration regarding Non-Self-Governing 
Territories 
Article 73 
Members of the United Nations which have or assume 
responsibilities for the administration of territories 
whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-
government recognise the principle that the interests of 
the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and 
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accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the 
utmost, within the system of international peace and 
security established by the present Charter, the well-being 
of the inhabitants of these territories, and, to this end: 
a. to ensure with due respect for the culture of the 
peoples concerned, their political, economic, social, 
and educational advancement, their just treatment, and 
their protection against abuses; 
b. to develop self-government, to take due account of the 
political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist 
them in the progressive development of their free 
political institutions, accordi'ng to the particular 
circumstances of each territory and its peoples and 
their varying stages of advancement; 
c. to further international peace and security; 
d. to promote constructive measures of development, to 
encourage research, and to co-operate with one another 
and, when and where appropriate, with specialised 
international bodies with a view to a practical 
achievement of the social, economic, and scientific 
purposes set forth in this Article, and 
e. to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for 
information purposes, subject to such limitation as 
security and constitutional considerations may 
require, statistical and other information of a 
technical nature relating to economic, social, and 
educational conditions in the territories of which 
they are respectively responsible other than those 
territories to which Chapter XII and XIII apply. 
ARTICLE 74 
Members of the United Nations also agree that their policy 
in respect of the territories to which this Chapter 
applies, no less than in respect of their metropolitan 
areas, must be based on the general principle of good 
neighbourliness, due account being taken of the interests 
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and well-being of the rest of the world, in social, 
economic, and commercial matters. 
Chapter XII: , International Trusteeship system 
ARTICLE 75 
The United Nations shall establish under its authority an 
international trusteeship system for the administration and 
supervision of such territories as may be placed thereunder 
by subsequent individual agreements. These territories are 
hereinafter referred as trust territories. 
ARTICLE 76 
The basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in 
accordance with the purposes of the United Nations laid 
down in Article 1 of the present Charter, shall be: 
a. to further international peace and security; 
b. to promote the political, economic, social, and 
educational advancement of the inhabitants of the 
trust territories, and their progressive development 
towards self-government or independence as may be 
appropriate to the particular circumstances of each 
territory and its peoples.concerned, and as may be 
provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement; 
c. to encourage respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to 
race, sex, language, and to encourage recognition of 
the interdependence of the peoples of the world; and 
d. to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and 
commercial matters for all Members of the United 
Nations and their nationals, and also equal treatment 
for the latter in the administration of justice, 
without prejudice to the attainment of the foregoing 
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objectives and subject to the provisions of Article 
80. 
ARTICLE 77 
1. The trusteeship system shall apply to such territories 
in the following categories as may be placed 
thereunder by means of trusteeship agreements: 
a. territories now held under mandate; 
b. territories which may be detached from enemy states as 
a result of the Second World War; and 
c. territories voluntarily placed under the system by 
states responsible for their administration. 
2. It will be the matter for subsequent agreement as to 
which territories in the foregoing categories will be 
brought under the trusteeship system and upon what 
terms. 
ARTICLE 79 
In terms of trusteeship for each territory to be placed 
under the trusteeship system, including any alteration or 
amendment, shall be agreed upon by the states directly 
concerned, including the mandatory pow~r in the case of 
territories held under mandate by a member of the United 
Nations, and shall be approved as provided for in Articles 
83 and 85. 
ARTICLE 80 
1. Except as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship 
agreements, made under Article 77, 79, and 81, placing 
each territory under the trusteeship system, and until 
such agreements,have been concluded, nothing in this 
Chapter shall be construed in or of itself to alter in 
any manner the rights whatsoever of any states or any 
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peoples or the terms of existing international 
instruments to which Members of the United Nations may 
respectively be parties. 
2. Paragraph 1 of this Article shall not be interpreted 
as giving grounds for delay or postponement of the-
negotiation and conclusion of agreements for placing 
mandated and other territories under the trusteeship 
system as provided for in Article 77. 
ARTICLE 81 
The trusteeship agreement shall in each case include the 
terms under which the trust territory will be administered 
and designate the authority which will exercise the 
administration of the trust territory. Such authority, 
hereinafter called the administering authority, may be one 
or more states or the Organisation itself. 
ARTICLE 85 
1. The function of the United Nations with regard to 
trusteeship agreements for all areas not designated as 
strategic, including the approval of the terms of the 
trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or 
amendment, shall be exercised by the General Assembly. 
2. The Trusteeship Council, operating under the authority 
of the General Assembly, shall assist the General 
Assembly in carrying out these functions. 
- 181 -
Chapter XIV: The International court of Justice 
ARTICLE 94 
1. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply 
with the decisions of the International Court of 
Justice in any case to which it is a party. 
2. If any party to a case fails to perform the 
obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment 
rendered by the Court, the other party may have 
recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it 
deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon 
measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment. 
statute of the International court of Justice 
ARTICLE 37 
Whenever a treaty or convention in force provides for 
reference of a matter to a tribunal to have been instituted 
by the League of Nations, or to the Permanent Court of 
International Justice, the matter shall, as between the 
parties to the present Statute, be referred to the 
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